Introduction
When Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi recently referred to Israel as an “enemy,” it marked a rhetorical departure from decades of cautious, if tense, Egyptian diplomacy. Since the signing of the Camp David Accords in 1979, Egypt has officially maintained peace with Israel, though often described as a cold peace. For Sisi to use such stark language is not a declaration of war, but it is a reminder that this cornerstone of Middle Eastern stability may not be as unshakable as it once seemed.
The question is whether this rhetoric signals mere domestic posturing, or foreshadows real strategic shifts: a weakening of the peace treaty, a drift toward confrontation, or even the emergence of new regional military alignments.
Historical Backdrop: From War to Cold Peace
Egypt and Israel fought four major wars between 1948 and 1973. The most dramatic turning point came with President Anwar Sadat’s 1977 trip to Jerusalem, which paved the way for the Camp David Accords and the peace treaty signed in 1979.
The treaty transformed the region:
- Egypt regained the Sinai Peninsula in exchange for full peace.
- The Arab world split — Egypt was ostracized for making peace, suspended from the Arab League, but it secured massive U.S. military and economic aid.
- Israel gained its first recognition by an Arab state, breaking the united Arab front.
Yet peace was never warm. Egyptians were taught to view Israel with suspicion, cultural exchanges were minimal, and cooperation limited mainly to military coordination in Sinai. This cold peace endured through Mubarak and al-Sisi, grounded in strategic necessity rather than affection.
And then there is the most damning fact of all, direct proof that Egypt is far from a neutral bystander in the Hamas October 7 massacre: the vast supply of arms in Hamas' hands was smuggled into Gaza through Egyptian tunnels. There is no way Egypt did not know about it, even if it may not have actively aided it.
Why al-Sisi Used the Word “Enemy”
Al-Sisi’s “enemy” remark must be understood in this context. It serves several functions:
- Domestic legitimacy: Egyptian public opinion remains strongly pro-Palestinian. Harsh words shield al-Sisi from criticism that Egypt has abandoned Gaza.
- Deterrence: Egypt fears that Israel might push Gaza’s population into Sinai. Declaring Israel an “enemy” is a red line warning.
- Regional positioning: With Arab states divided — some normalizing with Israel, others entrenched in opposition — Egypt seeks to reclaim its old mantle as the Arab world’s leading voice.
This is not necessarily a prelude to war. Rather, it is a signal: if Israel crosses certain boundaries, Egypt will not remain passive.
Possible Scenarios: From Cold Peace to Cold or Warm War
1. Cold Peace Continues (Most Likely)
Egypt maintains the treaty, but rhetoric intensifies. Diplomacy is downgraded, ambassadors recalled, cooperation frozen. Israel and Egypt coordinate quietly on security in Sinai while publicly clashing in forums.
2. Colder Peace - Moving Toward Confrontation
In the event of mass displacement of Gazans into Sinai, Egypt may suspend aspects of the treaty. Border skirmishes or accidental clashes could occur. Trade and diplomatic ties would collapse.
3. Warm War (Unlikely but Possible)
If Israel were perceived as directly threatening Egyptian sovereignty — by forcing refugees into Sinai or conducting operations that spill over — Egypt could move forces into Sinai in violation of treaty limits. This might spiral into limited military conflict.
4. All-Out War (Least Likely)
Both countries know such a conflict would be catastrophic. Israel has superior technology, Egypt has manpower, but both would suffer immensely. U.S. and international intervention would almost certainly prevent escalation to this level.
Is Support for Hamas a Real Option?
Egypt’s relationship with Hamas is complicated:
- Strategic hostility: Hamas is an offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood, al-Sisi’s sworn enemy. Cairo sees Hamas as destabilizing.
- Pragmatic cooperation: Egypt mediates truces between Hamas and Israel, keeps Rafah crossing under control, and allows aid convoys.
- Limitations: Openly supporting Hamas militarily would backfire — inviting Israeli retaliation, jeopardizing U.S. aid, and empowering Islamists inside Egypt.
Thus, al-Sisi will not openly support Hamas. Instead, he may tolerate limited smuggling, host Hamas delegations, and use rhetoric to placate public opinion, while ensuring Hamas does not destabilize Sinai. Israel would have to ensure that the smuggling does not include arms.
After al-Sisi: Uncertain Horizons
Al-Sisi’s government is authoritarian but relatively stable. However, leadership changes in Egypt could reshape policy:
- A weaker successor may face stronger Islamist or nationalist pressures, possibly eroding commitment to Camp David.
- A populist leader might weaponize anti-Israel rhetoric more aggressively.
- Military elites, however, value U.S. aid and stability, and would likely preserve the treaty even under strained conditions.
The post-al Sisi era is uncertain. The durability of peace may depend less on public opinion than on whether Egypt’s rulers still see strategic benefit in the treaty.
Could an “Arab NATO” Emerge?
Calls for an “Arab NATO” — a collective defense pact among Arab states — resurface whenever Israel-Arab tensions rise. But the current environment makes this difficult:
- Divisions among Arabs: The Abraham Accords normalized ties between Israel and Gulf states. Saudi Arabia flirts with normalization. Others, like Qatar and Algeria, remain firmly opposed.
- Different priorities: Gulf states prioritize Iran, not Israel, as their main threat. Egypt worries more about refugees and domestic security.
- External players: The U.S. supports some regional alignment, but without a clear common enemy, Arab states struggle to unite.
Thus, while rhetoric may evoke an “Arab NATO,” the chances of such a formal alliance forming against Israel today are slim.
Conclusion
Al-Sisi’s words are not a declaration of war, but they are a warning. Egypt still values its peace treaty with Israel, but that peace is conditional, fragile, and built on mutual restraint.
If Israel respects Egypt’s red lines — particularly by avoiding forced displacement into Sinai — the cold peace will likely survive. If not, the Middle East could see a shift from cold peace to cold war, or even warm conflict.
History shows that Egypt and Israel can move from enemies to reluctant partners when strategic necessity dictates. The real test is whether that necessity still holds in a region where alliances are shifting, leaders are under pressure, and rhetoric can quickly become reality.