In a detailed interview with Arutz Sheva - Israel National News, Brigadier General (res.) Oren Solomon, formerly a senior official in the Prime Minister's Office and commander of the Gaza Division during combat operations, assigns grave responsibility to the Military Advocate General (MAG), Major General Yifat Tomer-Yerushalmi, for imposing legal restrictions that, in his words, tie the hands of IDF commanders, risk the lives of soldiers, and prevent the fulfillment of the war’s strategic objectives.
To explain the extent of these limitations, Solomon begins by outlining the chain of authority within the IDF: “The political echelon defines the objectives of the army, in this case, the defeat of Hamas, as clearly stated in the war’s goals. The IDF, under the Chief of Staff and through the Operations Directorate, translates these objectives into operational plans. These plans are passed down to the divisions and units, and a process of operational and battle planning is conducted. At the highest levels of this process, legal advice is introduced.”
Solomon emphasizes that this legal input, originally intended as support, has gradually become dominant: “Since Operation Cast Lead, legal advice has grown in influence. At that time, the IDF began inserting lawyers into operational planning teams, including those overseeing fire control and the use of various weaponry. This was unprecedented before Operation Cast Lead. In this current war, however, the weight of legal counsel has increased far beyond what is necessary, in my view, to the point where it jeopardizes the security of our forces and obstructs the attainment of the war’s strategic goals.”
He describes the present reality: “Legal advisers are fully integrated into the planning and fire-control groups. Every target must receive their approval. For example, if intelligence identifies a terrorist residing in a certain house, the target is passed to the Air Force planning teams. There, a lawyer may rule that a one-ton bomb is prohibited because, although it would kill the terrorist, the blast radius might damage adjacent homes. Instead, they insist on using a smaller bomb, half-ton or even quarter-ton, or they stipulate that the house may only be attacked once all neighboring homes have been evacuated. This requires additional intelligence collection through the Shin Bet and Military Intelligence, along with phone warnings to residents. Inevitably, by the time these measures are completed, the terrorist has already fled. Thus, we lose numerous targets.”
The legal rationale is rooted in the principle of proportionality, avoiding collateral harm to uninvolved civilians. Solomon concedes that in principle this is a moral concept, befitting a moral army and a moral people, but stresses that Hamas’ entire operational strategy is based on exploiting this very principle: “Hamas deliberately embeds itself within civilian infrastructure, hospitals, schools, residential buildings. Its command centers and weapons caches are hidden among civilians. This is precisely what makes it so difficult to strike Hamas. Each target requires meticulous legal review to ensure zero collateral damage.”
Solomon warns that the situation has spiraled dangerously: “This monster has gotten out of control. Even on October 7th, when our people were being slaughtered, murdered, and raped, orders were issued as if it were still October 6th. Throughout the war, excessive legal intervention has paralyzed commanders. Representatives of the Military Advocate General have increasingly influenced the planning and fire processes, thereby restricting the use of force.”
According to him, this intervention is not confined to tactical firepower but extends to critical strategic decisions, particularly those concerning population displacement: “Hamas draws its strength from the population that democratically elected it, supported it, and sheltered it. Every citizen knew that tunnels were dug under their houses. We are not speaking merely about the cheering crowds on October 7th or about testimonies from hostages who were held by civilians. The population is Hamas. That does not mean we indiscriminately kill women and children, but it does mean that this is a supportive population, and it must be treated as such, and bear the consequences.”
For this reason, Solomon advocates for controlled population movement: “Encirclement and forced relocation are essential. Hamas exploits civilians to move weapons, to serve as observers, to provide cover. To operate with freer and more effective use of firepower, we must separate the population from Hamas. Yet the MAG and the Attorney General’s office object, ruling that if civilians refuse to move, we cannot compel them. Moreover, if they stay behind, we are still obliged to provide them with humanitarian aid, which Hamas then seizes. This is the paradox: we both restrain ourselves and empower Hamas.”
Summarizing, Solomon delivers a sharp metaphor: “The legal guidelines are shackling our forces. It is as if a boxer has been bound hand and foot, blindfolded, forced to hop on one leg, and still expected to win.”
He stresses that while the legal advice is given by the MAG, responsibility ultimately lies with the Chief of Staff and the Operations Directorate, who sign the fire policy: “It is the commanders’ responsibility to revise these policies. Because of these restrictions, we miss dozens, hundreds, even thousands of targets. The Chief of Staff must allow greater flexibility in the use of force, or else terrorists will survive to endanger our troops. For the field commanders, this situation is unacceptable. It is long past time to adopt a different approach.”
Asked whether the IDF’s self-imposed restrictions align with international law, Solomon is unequivocal: “Experts in international law, both in Israel and abroad, affirm that the law permits far broader use of force than the MAG authorizes. We are voluntarily restricting ourselves. International law was never written with a massacre like October 7th in mind. It never envisioned a terrorist army deliberately hiding behind civilians. Even within the existing framework of the law, we can act far more decisively.”
He further warns that commanders often preemptively discard operational plans, knowing they will be vetoed by legal advisers. This self-censorship, he says, is even more damaging than formal restrictions.
Addressing reports that dozens of IDF lawyers gathered in the Kirya on the morning of October 7th to restrict immediate IDF responses, Solomon says: “I also heard these reports, but I cannot confirm them. On that day, I was in the midst of heavy combat with my eldest son, where we miraculously survived. From the investigations I have reviewed, it appears that legal restrictions were indeed applied to IDF responses in the first hours of the attack. This issue forms part of the inquiry I conducted at the request of the Chief of Staff. Ultimately, however, responsibility lies with the Chief of Staff, who has the authority to change course.”
Solomon laments the absence of decisive leadership: “We are being tested in leadership and determination. Sadly, we are not receiving the leadership required. I am not the only one saying this. Senior officers, who have since been removed, raised similar alarms. These matters must be part of public discourse.”
Brigadier General Solomon directs an emotional appeal to the Israeli public: “I call upon every mother whose son is serving, every wife of a reservist, every child whose parent is in combat, press for change. Demand a policy that protects our forces and allows the IDF to meet its strategic objectives.”
He is careful, however, to reject any notion of refusal to serve: “God forbid. Absolutely not. The last thing we need is refusal. Since 2023, I have opposed it in all its forms. Our path is to influence, to pressure commanders through dialogue, and to ensure they press their superiors. The demand is not to defy the law but to act in accordance with international law, which, in fact, allows us greater latitude than the restrictions imposed by the MAG.”
Finally, Solomon outlines an alternative operational concept for Gaza City: “It is possible to encircle Gaza City via the Netzarim axis, cut off the supply of water, food, and electricity, and force the civilian population to evacuate. Those who remain are Hamas operatives. They may have food, but without water they will either surrender or die of thirst. Refusing to implement such a strategy exposes our forces to unnecessary danger. Hamas in Gaza City can and should be defeated in a different way.”