Special to Israel National News
“For by Wise Counsel, Thou Shalt Make Thy War.” (Proverbs, 24,6)
Though Israel’s recent hostilities with Iran ended successfully, it was a transient victory. Already, Iran is working to re-start ambitious plans for military nuclearization. Reciprocally, Israel is preparing to reassess its own operational planning.
This reassessment should be ongoing, conceptual and far-reaching. Above all, it must be a job for capable scholars and visionary strategic thinkers, not pundits or politicians.
In these matters, Jerusalem will require “wise counsel.” Meeting this requirement would support continuously-refined estimations of (1) future bombing assistance from the United States; (2) North Korean and/or Pakistani alliance ties with Tehran; and (3) converging enemy threats to Israel’s “escalation dominance.” Of special urgency will be matters of nuclear doctrine and strategy. In essence, Israel will have to decide between keeping the country’s “bomb in the basement” and shifting to “selective nuclear disclosure.”
There are many pertinent details. Even if Iran were to remain non-nuclear, Israel could find itself involved in a nuclear war. Any such conflict would represent an “asymmetrical nuclear war,” but only if neither North Korea nor Pakistan would have agreed to becoming Tehran’s nuclear proxy.
Relevant calculations on both sides (Israel and Iran) could depend in large measure on variously anticipated actions of the United States and Russia. This would mean more than direct American and Russian involvement in a new Israel-Iran war. It would signify potentially unprecedented military actions between the dominant superpowers.
What should be expected in Jerusalem? A plausible escalation danger would lie in Iranian use of radiation dispersal weapons or a conventional rocket attack on Israel’s Dimona nuclear reactor. By definition, certain imaginable scenarios would be unique. Ipso facto, related explanations or predictions could never be scientific.
For Israeli planners there will be abundant particulars. In logic and mathematics, true assessments of probability must always derive from the determinable frequency of past events. Because there has never been a nuclear war (Hiroshima and Nagasaki don’t “count”), nothing truly science-based could be estimated. To the point, all details concerning a “next-round” Israel-Iran nuclear war must remain speculative.
Even if Iran were to remain non-nuclear, Israel could calculate that crossing the nuclear threshold would be rational. Most conspicuously, this would be the case in circumstances wherein the non-introduction of Israeli nuclear threats could grant Iran a strategic upper hand. During the course of future competitive risk-taking with Iran and/or Iran’s prospective nuclear proxies in Pakistan or North Korea, Israel could feel compelled to tender unconventional military threats. Here, Jerusalem’s overriding deterrence objective would be to establish “escalation dominance.”
These are weighty intellectual matters. They are not matters for “common sense” resolution. In such foreseeably existential matters, nothing could be riskier than choosing to rely on visceral rather than conceptual reasoning. Perhaps even more urgently than the United States, Israel will need to guard against situationally ad hoc decision-making processes.
For a country smaller than America’s Lake Michigan, nuclear weapons and deterrence strategy remain altogether indispensable to national survival. Israel’s traditional policy of “deliberate nuclear ambiguity” or “bomb in the basement” goes back to early days of the state. In the 1950s, David Ben-Gurion, Israel's first prime minister, already understood the need for a dramatic "equalizer" vis-à-vis larger and more populous regional enemies. For “BG,” those original enemies were Sunni Arab states.
Now, preparing to once-again confront a recalcitrant Shiite Iran, Israel will need to update and refine its “ambiguous” nuclear posture. The core objective of such changes would be credible nuclear deterrence, a goal that will soon require a calculated and probably incremental shift to “selective nuclear disclosure.” Though counter-intuitive, Iran will need to be convinced that Israel’s nuclear arms are not too destructive for operational use. In all matters of military deterrence, what matters more than actual capability are enemy perceptions of capability.
There will be perplexing and variously intersecting nuances. For Israel to fashion reason-based nuclear policies against a re-emergent Iran, enemy decision-makers should initially be considered rational. Still, it is conceivable that Iran would sometime act irrationally, either by itself or in alliance with other more-or-less presumptively rational states (e.g., North Korea or Pakistan.)
As an unstable Islamic country, Pakistan is subject to coup d'état by jihadi elements and is closely aligned with Saudi Arabia. At some stage, moreover, the Sunni Saudi kingdom could decide to “go nuclear” itself, not for fear of Israel, but on account of Iran’s revived nuclear program. The only way for Israel to prepare for such strategic bewilderments would be “by wise counsel.”
There is more. Although the only gainful purpose of Israel’s nuclear weapons would be deterrence at varying levels of military destructiveness, there will still be circumstances (sudden or incremental) in which Jerusalem’s nuclear deterrence could fail. How might such worrisome circumstances arise? Promptly, in Jerusalem, the following four scenarios should be identified and evaluated. All four narratives could result as a “by-product” of Israel’s unceasing wars against changing jihadi adversaries. This includes terror-supporting Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) in post-Assad Syria, Iraq and Lebanon.
(1) Nuclear Retaliation
If a still non-nuclear Iran were to launch a massive conventional attack on Israel, Jerusalem could ultimately (or in increments) respond with a limited nuclear retaliation. If Iranian first-strikes were to involve chemical or biological weapons, electromagnetic pulse weapons (EMP), or radiation dispersal ordnance, Israel could also decide to launch a measured nuclear reprisal. This decision would depend, in large part, on Jerusalem's expectations concerning follow-on Iranian aggressions and comparative damage-limitation. A nuclear retaliation by Israel could be ruled out conclusively only in circumstances wherein the Iranian aggressions were verifiably conventional and “hard-target” oriented; that is, oriented only toward Israeli weapons and military infrastructures, and not toward Israel’s civilian populations.
(2) Nuclear Counter-retaliation
If Israel should again feel compelled to preempt Iranian nuclear options with conventional weapons, that enemy state’s response would determine Israel’s next moves. If this response were to include “only” radiological weapons, Israel could still turn to variously calibrated forms of nuclear counter- retaliation. If this retaliation were to involve other non-nuclear weapons of mass destruction, Israel could still feel pressed to take the escalatory initiative. This decision would depend on Jerusalem's considered estimations of enemy intent and its corollary calculations of damage-limitation.
If the Iranian response to Israel's preemption were limited to hard-target conventional strikes, it is unlikely that Israel’s decision-makers would move to any level of nuclear counter retaliation. If, however, the Iranian conventional retaliation was "all-out" and directed in whole or in part to Israeli civilian populations, an Israeli nuclear counter-retaliation could not be excluded ipso facto. A nuclear counter-retaliation could be ruled out only if Iran’s conventional retaliation were presumptively proportionate to Israel's preemption; confined to Israeli military targets; circumscribed by the legal limits of “proportionality” and "military necessity," and accompanied by compelling evidence of non-escalatory intent.
(3) Nuclear Preemption
It is highly unlikely (perhaps inconceivable) that Israel would ever decide to launch a preemptive nuclear strike against Iran. Though circumstances could arise wherein such a strike would be both technically rational and permissible under international law, it is improbable that Israel would ever allow itself to reach such end-of-the-line circumstances.
In principle, at least, an Israeli nuclear preemption could reasonably be expected only: (a) where Iran had already acquired authentic (chain-reaction) nuclear and/or other weapons of mass destruction; (b) where Iran had clarified that its military intentions paralleled its capabilities; (c) where Iran was believed ready to begin a "countdown to launch;" and (d) where Jerusalem believed that exclusively conventional preemptions would no longer be consistent with preservation of the Jewish State.
(4) Nuclear War fighting
If nuclear weapons should ever be introduced into a conflict between Israel and Iran, some form of nuclear war fighting would ensue. This would hold true so long as: (a) Iranian first-strikes would not destroy Israel's second-strike nuclear capability; (b) Iranian retaliations for an Israeli conventional preemption would not destroy Israel’s nuclear counter-retaliatory capability; (c) Israeli preemptive strikes involving nuclear weapons would not destroy Iran’s second-strike nuclear capabilities; and (d) Israeli retaliation for conventional first-strikes would not destroy Iran’s nuclear counter-retaliatory capability. For the time being, any Iranian nuclear capacity would be limited to radiation dispersal (“dirty bomb”) weaponry.
Following its successful 12-Day War, Israel should do what is needed to (1) keep Iran non-nuclear; and (2) maintain “escalation dominance” against Iran and its prospective nuclear proxies in Pyongyang or Islamabad. Simultaneously, because it is still credible that Iran would manage to “go nuclear” itself, Israeli strategic planners will need to examine multiple narratives of nuclear war. Whatever is decided, Jerusalem should prepare to make its next wars against jihadi states and Islamist terrorists on the basis of “wise counsel.” Inter alia, this means coherent advice drawn from science-based propositions, not “common sense” extrapolations drawn from pre-nuclear experience.
Louis Rene Beres was educated at Princeton (Ph.D., 1971). Born in Zürich at the end of World War II, he is the author of many books, monographs, and articles dealing with Israeli nuclear strategy. Emeritus Professor of International Law at Purdue, he has lectured on this topic for over fifty years at leading universities and academic centers for strategic studies. Dr. Beres' twelfth book, Israel's Nuclear Strategy: Surviving amid Chaos, was published by Rowman and Littlefield, in 2016 (2nd ed., 2018). In December 2016, Professor Beres authored a monograph at Tel-Aviv University (with special postscript by retired USA General Barry McCaffrey), Israel's Nuclear Strategy and American National Security. In 2003-2004, he served as Chair of Israel’s “Project Daniel” (Iranian nuclear weapons) for Prime Minister Ariel Sharon.