Mousa Abu Marzouk, head of Hamas' foreign relations office, reportedly voiced frustration over the October 7 attack on Israel, claiming that if he had known the consequences, he would not have supported it. He later denied these statements—likely under pressure—saying his words were taken out of context. It’s irrelevant whether or not he actually said it publicly. It’s likely that some members of Hamas’ leadership have shared similar thoughts, privately discussing their miscalculations before publicly celebrating their supposed victory. (Of course, a logical inference from his words is that had the consequences been avoidable, the massacre would have met his approval, ed.)
The crucial question is why he and his colleagues failed to foresee that October 7 would mark a pivotal turning point in Israel's response, both in scale and intensity.
The October 7 massacre was unlike any previous attack Hamas had carried out; it was significantly more traumatic and devastating. A massive response was inevitable, and that is exactly what followed.
Did Hamas believe they could destroy Israel? If so, they were entirely delusional.
One explanation is that Hamas did not anticipate the level of success their October 7 attack would achieve. They likely assumed that the IDF would repel them quickly and that Israeli casualties would be significantly lower than what ultimately transpired.
The most likely explanation is that Israel had conditioned Hamas over the years to expect a proportionate response to its attacks—that is, proportionate in scope, not the definition of proportionate in international law, which has to do with the scope needed to accomplish war goals - one that would not involve a full-scale invasion of the entire Gaza Strip.
Hamas likely assumed that, at most, any invasion would be limited to a small area, just enough for Israel to assert its retaliation. This pattern had been established over time, and people often predict the future based on past experiences.
When you combine the two factors—the ease with which Hamas was able to penetrate and attack Israel due to the absence of the IDF, and the expectation that Israel’s retaliation would be proportionate—it becomes clear why Hamas miscalculated. Israel’s previous conduct led Hamas to wrongly assume that the consequences of its actions would be limited.
This should serve as a lesson for Israel’s leadership. Small-scale responses to ceasefire violations do not deter the enemies surrounding Israel; On the contrary, they see them as mere political gestures aimed at satisfying the Israeli public. Meanwhile, potential civilian casualties on the Palestinian Arab side can be counted on to fuel Hamas’ propaganda efforts, as left-leaning groups in Europe and the U.S. often sympathize with the perceived underdog and blame Israel for its treatment of the Palestinian Arabs.
Another crucial aspect of Israel’s responses is the message they convey. When Israel reacts proportionately to acts of terror, it inadvertently rewards the aggressor, reinforcing the belief that future Israeli responses will remain limited and predictable. This not only emboldens terrorists but also serves their propaganda objectives. The unfortunate conclusion: terrorism against Israel yields significant strategic and propaganda gains for its perpetrators.
October 7 imparted several crucial lessons to Israel’s leadership. One of the most important is that proportionate, small-scale responses only lead to more of the same, perpetuating violence rather than ending it. Moving forward, Israel’s response to aggression must be disproportionate mathematically, but proportionate in international law—one that decisively achieves the aim of disrupting or ending the enemy’s will to continue.
Another crucial lesson that should be deeply ingrained in Israel’s leadership is the one learned from the Gilad Shalit deal with Hamas. The excessively high price Israel paid to retrieve hostages and the remains of the dead was perceived by Hamas as a major victory, justifying the suffering and losses they endured. Moreover, this precedent served as an incentive for future operations, encouraging further attempts to exploit hostage-taking as a strategic tool.
Bringing hostages back, whether alive or deceased, is an incredibly emotional undertaking. All Jews deeply desire to see our loved ones return home. We are willing to pay any price to accomplish this vital mission—it’s ingrained in our very nature, a sacred duty. No amount of money or effort will deter us. As long as we can bring our loved ones back to Israel, surrounded by their families, tears, and joy, we are ready to pay the cost.
However, there is a price we should not be willing to pay. This price is measured in the lives of the soldiers who sacrifice everything to rescue those they aim to save. It’s also measured in the lives of innocent Israeli civilians who may be killed or severely harmed by terrorists freed prematurely—terrorists who return to violence, rejoin Hamas, and resume their deadly activities. The number of Israeli casualties caused by those released in exchange for hostages is bound to exceed the number of hostages freed. In the case of Gilad Shalit, and with many terrorist releases, including that of Yahya Sinwar, the cost exceeds the value of their freedom way beyond proportion. It’s possible that this time, the price could be even greater.
I can only hope that I am wrong.
But here’s what truly sends shivers down my spine. The latest hostage exchange agreement between Israel and Hamas is nothing short of bewildering. Under this deal, I understand, Israel is releasing 30 terrorists for each civilian hostage, 50 for each soldier, and a staggering 150 (four bodies for 600 terrorists) for the remains of fallen and murdered Israelis. The flaw in this formula is glaring. Not only does it give Hamas a strong incentive to kill hostages rather than keep them alive, but the idea that a dead body is worth three to five times more than a living person defies all logic. Who is the genius responsible for crafting such an irrational and dangerous precedent?
Dr. Avi Perry, talk show host at Paltalk News Network (PNN), is the author of "Fundamentals of Voice Quality Engineering in Wireless Networks,"and "72 Virgins," a thriller about the covert war on Islamic terror. He was a VP at NMS Communications, a Bell Laboratories - distinguished staff member and manager, as well as a delegate of the US and Lucent Technologies to the ITU—the UN International Standards body in Geneva, a professor at Northwestern University in Chicago and Intelligence expert for the Israeli Government. He may be reached through his web site www.aviperry.org