Ahmad Al Khaled is a freelance journalist mainly focused on the Middle-East and North Africa, who covers various conflicts in the region and notable political events. His articles have been published by leading regional and global media.
The collapse of the Assad regime due to the Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham’s (HTS) coup d'état has become one of the most trending events in 2024. The main question that remains is whether the new Syrian administration is capable of governing the state effectively? And would it be another source of threats and instability?
After the events in Afghanistan, the collapse of the Assad regime became the second time in the world’s modern history when a militant group recognized by many world’s states as a terrorist organization took over the government.
The Syrian transitional government consisting of former warlords rightly raises fears among neighboring states as a potential source of regional instability. The head of the transitional government, Ahmad al-Sharaa (better known as Abu Muhammad al-Julani), has reached a milestone in changing the image of his administration in the eyes of the international society.
Nevertheless he is most famous for creating a branch of al-Qaeda in Syria - Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham. This terrorist group is banned in several Western countries and it is also under UN-backed sanctions. Al-Sharaa's recent decision to disband HTS is an obvious PR move and won’t change the nature of this militia. Nor will this fact spare it from the wary attitude of both neighboring countries and the international community.
First of all, torturing of ethnic and religious minorities and former officers of the security services affiliated with Assad regime continues despite the efforts of Syrian media to hide it. There’s also a high risk of the erupting clashes between armed groups. And all of these factors are a drop in the ocean for the new government compared to a number of economic problems.
According to UN Secretary General Antonio Guterres, currently there is a serious risk of segmentation of Syrian society, and the current government will have to prove its ability to represent the interests of all national minorities. This applies first and foremost to Christian and Kurdish communities. The actions of the new Syrian authorities to prevent bloodshed and radicalization of their security services will be a marker of their sustainability in many ways.
Secondly, the power shift in Syria has created preconditions for the situation to be escalated in the Middle East and the emergence of new security threats, especially for Israel, due to the traditional hostility of Islamist groups to the Jewish state. At the diplomatic level, Tel Aviv has repeatedly expressed concerns about the current developments in Syria. For example, Israeli Deputy Foreign Minister Sharren Haskel called al-Julani a "wolf in sheep's clothing" due to his long-standing ties to al-Qaeda. She also stressed the necessity to "avoid attempts to whitewash jihadist groups."
Amid Tel Aviv's own security concerns, the IDF launched a series of massive strikes on Syrian airfields and ammunition depots in order to reduce its military capabilities.
Against the backdrop of the Assad’s regime's sudden collapse, Israel's attention is also focused on the possible presence of chemical weapons in Syrian warehouses. As of 2013 its stockpiles were some of the largest in the world. Such weapons falling into the hands of jihadists are highly undesirable, to say the least, for Tel Aviv and the world.
Last December, Haskel expressed doubts that “al-Julani would not misuse chemical weapons," adding that "it is not safe to leave such weapons in his hands.” Israel's Consul General in New York City, Ofir Akunis, during his interview with the Foreign Policy said that the increased threat of prohibited weapons’ engagement by Syrian armed groups was one of the main reasons the IDF entered the buffer zone along the Golan Heights.
He noted that the Israeli military had already conducted airstrikes against suspected chemical weapons stockpile sites since the fall of the Assad regime. Further, the head of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), Fernando Arias, said that Israeli strikes on these targets could create a risk of environmental contamination and interfere with various international investigations into the use of chemical weapons in the past.
There are still no actual facts confirming these kinds of weapons are in Syria. According to OPCW’s 2023 official report all stockpiles of chemical weapons declared by Damascus have been disposed of in accordance with the organization's requirements. However, back in 2013, former SAA Brigadier General Zaher al-Saqat said that Assad’s regime had only granted access to the facilities known by the OPCW, while much of the stockpile had been moved to Iraq, Iran and Lebanon by Hezbollah units.
Possible Provocations
There’s another reason for high level attention to the fact of chemical weapons being located in Syria. Most of Assad’s officials are widely known for corruption and their irresponsibility regarding their duties. This is most likely true for those who worked directly with the OPCW on the removal and disposal of banned types of weapons from the country.
Ahmed Al-Sharaa in his recent interview to Reuters claimed that his specialists are cooperating with the international community to secure potential chemical weapons facilities. In this vein, it is important to note that cooperating with various organizations, such as the OPCW, is essential for the new authorities in Syria in order to be recognized by world’s leading states.
Syrian transitional government’s leaders are keenly interested in legitimizing their authority and have regularly claimed to bring Assad’s regime officials and military leaders to justice for using chemical weapons. It’s worth noting that a number of people involved in Syrian military-chemical program are still in the country. Some of them have already been neutralized by the HTS security services. So far, the deaths of the former Chief of Staff of the notorious 4th Division general Ali Mahmoud and chemical scientist Hamdi Ismail have been confirmed.
The fate of many others involved with the Syrian military-chemical program remains unknown.
Some of the key figures are Hassan Sharif, deputy head of Syria's National Commission for OPCW compliance, Bassam Sabbagh and Milad Atiyah, Syrian representatives to the OPCW. Their whereabouts are unknown, they are most likely detained by the Syrian transitional government’s security service and could be involved in creation a new version of the story about Syrian chemical munitions and denouncing the criminal actions of the Assad regime. Given the ongoing widespread repression throughout the country, using intimidation to obtain necessary information is not uncommon.
Obtaining this kind of testimony is particularly relevant in frames of the OPCW’s visit to Syria for updating data ahead of the organization's executive council meeting, which will be held from 4th to 7th of March. This circumstance may significantly affect the objectivity of the Syrian transitional government’s cooperation with the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) and become a pretext for the preparation of various provocations or the revelation of previously unknown stockpiles of banned weapons.
All of these factors stress a huge amount of work for both the authorities of the new Syria and international organizations in ensuring stability in the Middle East and preventing aggression, especially with the use of non-conventional weapons. Whether or not chemical weapons remain, the political and security situation in the country remains fragile. This issue is central for determining the ability of the Syrian transitional government to retain power by establishing the necessary crisis management and pursuing a balanced domestic and foreign policy as it claims it desires to do.