
"Fortune is the arbiter of one-half of our actions, but that she still leaves us to direct the other half, or perhaps a little less." - Machiavelli's The Prince
I hope to share very favorable results when I review this checklist in another year:
1. Iran
1.1. Does Iran still possess the equipment to make weapons-grade uranium?
1.2. Are there Israeli warnings regarding the potential that Iran makes and/or acquires nuclear weapons which have not been satisfactorily addressed?
2. Gaza Strip
2.1. Do Hamas and/or Islamic Jihad (either as they now call themselves or as they relabel themselves) continue to have an active role in what goes on in the Gaza Strip?
2.2. Does Israel have the intelligence on the ground to detect programs to rebuild the "resistance"?
2.2.1. When such programs are detected, are they promptly quashed or recorded in a "target bank"?
2.3. Have adequate measures been implemented in the educational system in the Gaza Strip so that it educates for peaceful coexistence with Israel?
3. Judea and Samaria
3.1. Has Israel annexed any area in Judea and Samaria?
3.2. Has illegal Arab construction in Area C been significantly reduced as compared to a year ago?
3.3. Is the number of final building permits (not the many intermediate steps) for Israeli construction in the last 12 months significantly larger than a year before?
3.4. Has there been a significant decline in terror attacks in Judea and Samaria?
4. IDF
4.1. Has Israel followed through with the implementation of the various domestic production projects to make Israel "sanction resistant"?
4.2. Is the IDF successfully drafting enough people to meet its needs?
5. The Haredi Sector
5.1. Is there effective financial and pedagogic oversight of Haredi educational institutions?
5.2. Have subsidies, taxes, etc., been revised to discourage able-bodied men from choosing poverty rather than full-time work?
5.3. Were Haredi men drafted in accordance with the capacity of the IDF to accommodate them (10,000 in 2025)?
5.3.1. Were these Haredi recruits from the mainstream of Haredi society?
5.3.2. Were these mostly young single men?
6. Saudi Arabia
6.1. Has Israel upgraded its relations with Saudi Arabia?
6.1.1. Was this achieved without Israel making any commitment, no matter how vague, to advance on the "two-state solution"?
7. Negotiated Evacuation of Hamas from Gaza
President-elect Trump shares Israel's determination that Hamas will not be in control of the Gaza Strip.
Therefore, it follows that the negotiations with Hamas can focus on arrangements for the evacuation of Hamas from the Gaza Strip as well as any civilians who wish to leave.
It is believed that the simplest arrangement is for the evacuation to be carried out via the El Arish Port, which is around 53 kilometers from the Gaza Strip.
The El Arish Port can handle, subject to weather conditions, around 10,800 passengers a day, using small vessels that shuttle passengers to larger passenger vessels anchored offshore.
Turkey, which until the fall of Assad housed some three million Syrian refugees, is considered the most practical partner for both providing the transportation and absorption of the evacuees.
It remains unclear who, beyond those in the military wings of Hamas and the other various terrorist organizations in the Gaza Strip, as well as the senior levels of the "civilian wings" of the groups, and civilians who want to leave, would be part of the evacuation.
It has been suggested that, as a practical matter, the families of the evacuees will have the option to also move to Turkey.
Others assert that anyone in Gaza should be provided the option to move to Turkey. Indonesia has been suggested as well.
A more conservative suggestion is that Gazans with visas to other countries or foreign passports be allowed to exploit the evacuation to reach an airport in Turkey so that they may begin their journey.
Don't for get to check in a year!
Dr. Aaron Lerner heads IMRA - Independent Media Review and Analysis, since 1992 providing news and analysis on the Middle East with a focus on Arab-Israeli relations.