Our Parasha opens with the passuk:(21:1)’And these are the ordinances which you shall place before them’.
Our Sages, as Rashi brings, noting the opening word ‘and these’, expound that the ordinances in our Parasha are additional to that which was said previously- the ten commandments -AND that these, too, were given at Har Sinai.
The Sforno comments on the link between these ordinances, and the preceding ten commandments:’’And these ordinances’: here, in the preceding Parasha, we find the warning: ‘thou shalt not covet..that which nelongs to your fellow man’, ‘and these ordinances’ - in our Parasha, instruct us yhat which ‘belongs to your fellow man’, ‘which you will place before them’, so that when the need to do so arises, you will know how to adjudicate.’
Rav Chaim Friedlander comments:’משפטים: ordinances, are those Mitzvot the טעםים: the reason for which we understand, such as against robbery and damage to others, unlike חוקות: Mitzvot, the reason for which is beyond our understanding, but we obey because we were so commanded at Sinai.
‘Our Sages, come here to teach us - in their comment that ‘just as what was said previously, was said at Sinai, so too these ordinances’- that we obey these ordinances, not because our intellect agrees with them, but, that even were this not the case, we would obey them ONLY because that is the Will of Hashem, as declared at Sinai.
‘This is why the Torah expressly wrote, that these ordinances were given at Sinai, just like the ten commandments; and, just as we obey these because they were given at Sinai, we obey the ordinances for the same reason:that it is the Will of Hashem- as if we had a desire to transgress them, and only stopped ourselves from doing so, because we were so commanded at Sinai.’
Rav Yosef Salant offers a different answer:’When we take a closer look at some of the ordinances in our Parasha, we can but conclude that, though they are called משפטים: ordinances, aspects of them appear to contradict their ‘name’, as ‘logical’ ordinances.
‘By our ‘logical’ understanding, the purpose of משפטים is to ensure, in the event of dispute, that each party will receive that which is ‘rightfully’ his; yet, we find this not to be the case with several of the ordinances in our Parasha, as they require the party ‘in the right’ to make concessions - in some cases, major ones.
‘Take the first case dealt with in our Parasha, that of the Jewish thief sold as an עבד: a ‘slave’, because of his inability to repay that which he stole.
‘You would have expected that he then becomes ‘the property’ of the master who bought him, to do with him as he wishes, unlimited in time or in usage.
‘Yet we find that the so called ‘slave’ is more like the ‘master of the house’, than a slave! The master is obligated to sustain the slave’s wife and children, and to offer him the same food as he himself enjoys; he is precluded from making him do any ‘humiliating’ tasks, and, to cap it all, should there only be one mattress, the slave is to be given it, and the master is to sleep on the bare floor.
‘How true is the conclusion of our Sages:’Whoever buys a slave, is deemed to have purchased a master for himself’’.
‘Similarly, an ordinance in our Parasha obligates the making of loans to those in need. ‘Logically’, we would have expected that this, too, would give the lender the discretion as to whom to lend his money, guided by considerations for the security of the loan.
‘Yet, the ordinance, as expounded by our Sages, gives precedence to the poor when they require a loan, saying: ‘Between a poor man and a rich one, the poor man takes precedence’.
‘Further, the lender is warned against behaving like a נושה: ‘a creditor’ - if he knows that the borrower is unable to presently repay the loan, he is not to embarrass him, as by entering his house to take security, but is to wait for it to be brought out to him; and several other strictures protect the dignity of the borrower.
‘The nations of the world, when they hear of these ‘ordinances’, will say that they are not משפטים, but acts of צדקה: of charity.’
And here is the beautiful original insight of Rav Salant, as to why pur Sages felt the need to relate that these ordinances were ‘also given at Sinai’: ‘Only Bnei Israel who stood at Har Sinai ‘as one man with one heart’, who were purified of the ‘I’ concern, and of the yetser ha’ra, and who declared whole-heartedly: ‘All that Hashem says, we will do and we will obey’, could be commanded to accept these, as ‘ordinances’, not as ‘charity’, but as the Will of Hashem, no less than the ten commandments which preceded them’.
Rav David Hofstedter adds:’The משפטים are those Mitzvot understood by our intellect: ‘things which, had they not been enacted, should have been enacted’ - unlike the חוקים, which are the decree of the King, and beyond human understanding.
‘We therefore have to wonder, how the Mitzvah of the ‘Jewish slave’, which is the first given in our Parasha, can be considered as a משפט? All of its details, such as the slave going free in the seventh year, and the drilling of his ear, cannot be understand by the human mind, and are clearly decrees of the Supreme Being - and, as such, they should be included in the חוקים.
‘This requires us to say, that the Torah comes to teach us here, that there is an enormous difference between ordinances based on human intellect, and those commanded by the Torah, as the latter are those of the Creator, and are totally different than the ordinances that the sages of the nations create, from their minds.
‘True: the foundation of משפטים: ordinances is that they are required by the right-thinking mind, and without them, society could not exist; and, for this reason, all societies enact ordinances for their government, those of the Torah, whilst their general nature may be understood by our minds, their details, and the manner in which they are to be performed, are far above, and beyond, our understanding.
‘This comes to teach us, that, even in the משפטים, our understanding is, in reality, a superficial one, and, as with all Mitzvot, their essence is beyond our comprehension.
‘Thus, we learn that we are to perform these משפטים, not because our intellect tells us to perform them, or for reasons that they seem to us as ‘the right thing to do’, but because they are the decree of the King, whoch are far beyond our power to understand, and are to be performed ONLY because it is His Will.
‘They are not subject to the considerations of the time, or other changes - as are the ordinances of socities, but are immutable and eternal.’
A concluding insight from the Ktav Sofer:’The Midrash says: Moshe Rabbeinu said to Bnei Israel: Hashem gave you the Torah, but if you don’t keep the ordinances, He will take back His Torah from you, because He only gave you the Torah, on condition that you keep the Ordinances’.
‘In what way are the ordinances different from the rest of the Mitzvot, in that only in respect of them, is this warning given?
‘The answer is that one who does not keep the משפטים- the ordinances between man and man - his performance of other Mitzvot is also ‘as if’ not performed. Thus, for example, the most ‘perfect’ performance of the Mitzvah of the arba minim, if they are stolen, is all to nought.
‘This, homiletically, is the meaning of the words ‘And these are the Mishpatim that you shall place BEFORE THEM’: before all the other Mitzvot, ‘come’ these mishpatim, because if they are not observed, the other Mitzvot will also not be observed.’
לרפואת נועם עליזה בת זהבה רבקה ונחום אלימלך רפאל בן זהבה רבקה, בתוך שאר חולי עמנו.