"Judges and executors of justice shall you establish for yourselves in all of your gates.... Righteousness, righteousness shall you pursue in order that you may live and inherit the land which the Lord your G-d is giving to you." (Deuteronomy 16:18; 17: 8-10, 14)
A close reading of this week's Biblical portion of Shoftim reveals that critical to the people of Israel inheriting the 
Critical to the people of Israel inheriting the land is the resolve to maintain a high standard of justice.
land is the resolve to maintain a high standard of justice, particularly the appointment of righteous judges, "who will not prevent justice, or show favoritism before the law or take bribes of any kind." (ibid, 19)
When the Torah speaks of pursuing righteousness, it reiterates the word tzedek, "Righteousness, righteousness shall you pursue," a repetition that prompts a number of important interpretations. For example, 'pursuing' another religious court if the local court is deemed inadequate for the needs of the litigants (Rashi, ad loc). Or the penetrating words of Rabbi Menachem Mendl of Kotzk: 'pursuing' justice by means of justice, so that your goals as well as your means are just.
I would add that even the basic 'administrative' elements of courtroom management must be just: to begin on time without keeping the litigants waiting; neither rushing the case through, nor causing the litigants to feel that they haven't been adequately heard; and still concluding each case with as much dispatch as possible.
Further on in our portion, the Torah adds another critical criterion for true justice: "When there will arise a matter for judgment which is too wondrous for you [a case which is not cut-and-dry, which requires extra consideration on the part of the judges]... you shall come to... the judge who shall be in those days...." (Deuteronomy 17:8,9) Rashi explains that we must rely on the sages of each particular era for the judgment at hand, so that "Jephtha in his generation is as good as Samuel in his generation."
This notion is further elucidated by Rabbi Levi Yitzchak of Berditchev in his masterful Kedushat Levi, under the rubric tayku, a Talmudic acronym. The four Hebrew letters - tof, yud, kuf, vov - summarize the judicial principle in extremely difficult adjudications: "Tishbi [Elijah the Prophet] will answer your questions and ponderings [in the Messianic Age]." 'Why Elijah?' asks Rabbi Levi Yitzchak. After all, when the resurrection takes place, won't our teacher Moses, a far greater halakhic authority than Elijah, also be resurrected? And Moses' teacher was G-d Himself.
The answer Rabbi Levi Yitzchak provides to his seemingly naive question is exquisitely profound. Moses died close to 4,000 years ago; Elijah, according to the Biblical account, was "translated" live into heaven and regularly returns to earth, appearing at every circumcision and at every Passover Seder. Since Elijah understands the travail, hopes and the complexity of the generation of the redemption, only he can answer the questions for that generation. In terms of our portion's instruction, this means that a judge must be sensitive to the specific needs and cries of his particular generation.
There is yet, however, the most important criteria for a judge. When Yitro, the Midianite priest, first suggests that his son-in-law Moses set up a court system of district judges, we were also presented with their qualifications: "You shall choose from the entire nation men of valor [hayil], G-d fearers, men of probity who hate dishonest profit." (Exodus 18:21)
The great legalist-theologian Maimonides (1135-1204) defines the word hayil (a word which connotes a soldier in the army of the Divine) as follows: "Men of valor refers to those who are valiantly mighty with regard to the commandments, punctilious in their own observance. ....And under the rubric of 'men of valor' is the stipulation that they have a courageous heart to rescue the oppressed from the hands of the oppressor, as in the matter of which it is Scripturally written, 'And Moses rose up, and saved [the shepherdesses]' from the hands of the more powerful shepherds.... And just as Moses was humble, so must every judge be humble." (Mishneh Torah, Sanhedrin 2,7)
Rabbi Shlomo Daichovsky, one of the most learned and incisive judges on the Religious High Court in Jerusalem, asks [in his "Epistle to my Fellow Judges," 25 Shevat 5768 and published in T'chumin, Winter 5768], "How is it possible for me to be a valiant fighter on behalf of the oppressed, which requires the recognition of one's power to exercise one's strength against the guilty party, and yet at the same time for me to be humble, which requires self-abnegation and nullification before every person? These are two conflicting and contrasting characteristics."
Rabbi Daichovsky concludes that humility is critical only when the judge is not sitting in judgment; when the judge is seated on the throne of judgment, he must be a valiant and self-conscious fighter, fearlessly struggling against injustice as though "a sword is resting against his neck and hell is opened up under his feet." (Babylonian Talmud, Sanhedrin 7, Rambam there) "The judge must be ready to enter Gehenom and to face a murderous sword in defense of his legal decision... he must take responsibility and take risks, just like a soldier at war, who dares not worry about saving his own soul" or walking upon the safe (and more stringent) halakhic ground.
Rabbi Daichovsky reminds his fellow judges about Rabbi Zecharia ben Avkulis (Babylonian Talmud, Gittin 53a), who refused to sanction the sacrificial blemished lamb of the Roman Emperor sent to the Temple because those on the "Right" would accuse him of acting too leniently regarding Temple sacrifices; and yet, at the same time, he refused to sanction sentencing the spy to death because those on the "Left" would accuse him of acting too harshly by putting someone to death for merely bringing a blemished sacrifice. The Talmud concludes, "The humility of Rabbi Zecharia ben Avkulis destroyed our Temple, burnt our Sanctuary, and exiled us from our homeland."
Rabbi Daichovsky exhorts his fellow judges not to fear any human being when they render a decision, not even 
Rabbi Daichovsky exhorts his fellow judges not to fear any human being when they render a decision.
great halakhic authorities who may disagree with their judgments, because these illustrious scholars did not hear the case that his colleagues are judging; they did not look into the eyes of the woman refused a divorce, and therefore are not vouchsafed the same heavenly aid as the judges who are involved with the litigants eye-to-eye and heart-to-heart (see Maimonides, "Laws of Sanhedrin" 23,9). Hence, it is clear that a judge must be fearless and courageous, a fierce spokesperson for the rights of the oppressed.
Tragically, the majority of the judges of the Religious High Court in Israel do not heed the wise counsel of Rabbi Daichovsky. They do not hear the cries of the oppressed women refused divorces by recalcitrant and greedy husbands; they are insensitive to the desperate national need to find appropriate ways to convert the close to 400,000 Gentiles living as Israeli citizens, often risking and losing their lives in the wars of our national survival.
There are manifold solutions within the Talmud and Rishonim to free "chained" women or to bring the Gentiles among us under the wings of the Divine presence. Instead, our judges often choose to follow the safe path, to rule in accordance with every stringency, to deafen their ears to the cries of the agunah in favor of the ultra-Orthodox anti-Talmudic insistence on "purity of Israel," to refuse to nullify sham and shameful marriages, but hasten to nullify conversions performed by respected religious authorities like Rabbi Haim Druckman - nullifications (clearly forbidden by Maimonides) that wreak havoc on innumerable Jewish families. Given such judges, do we merit our inheritance in the land of our forebears?