In an emotion-filled announcement on Wednesday, July 30, at the Prime Minister's Residence in Jerusalem, Ehud Olmert declared his intention to resign. Still unanswered is if, in fact, he will resign; and if so, when?
In his announcement, Olmert detailed an extensive list of his administration's stellar achievements, included in which he emphasized Israel's improved security situation. "The North is quiet," he proclaimed, "and Israel's 
He feels any sacrifice would be worthwhile if it would create a diplomatic legacy for his dear friend George Bush.
deterrent capability has been incomparably bolstered."

He feels any sacrifice would be worthwhile if it would create a diplomatic legacy for his dear friend George Bush.
deterrent capability has been incomparably bolstered." His loyalists believe his achievements would motivate activists within the two percent of popular support he has managed to retain to lead a spontaneous groundswell urging him to rescind his resignation.
While he did say he would not run in the Kadima primary scheduled for late September, his "resignation" guarantees he will remain in his position at a minimum until late September or early October. Given the complexities of Israel's convoluted succession procedure and its myriad interpretations, there is a real possibility Olmert will continue as Prime Minister until February or March of 2009. This will allow him time to meet again with Mahmoud Abbas, his partner in peace, and to conclude his conception of a peace agreement.
Most perplexing about his stated intention to resign is that it came subsequent to his high-profile performance at the recent inaugural session of the new Union for the Mediterranean in Paris. Olmert could barely contain his enthusiasm as he proclaimed an historical breakthrough with Abbas. Immediately following his meeting, he declared, "It seems to me that we have never been as close to the possibility of reaching an accord as we are today." Though he acknowledged major Israeli concessions would be required, he feels any sacrifice would be worthwhile if it would create a diplomatic legacy for his dear friend George Bush, by concluding an agreement prior to the end of 2008.
Though the Paris confab may be remembered as one of Olmert's greatest successes, a negative moment did unfortunately occur. As Olmert approached Bashar al-Assad, ostensibly to shake his hand, the Syrian leader turned and presented Olmert his posterior. Fortunately for all involved, Assad maintained the dignity of the moment and did not drop his trousers. (This was seen as an indication of his respect for Olmert, and further interpreted as Assad's desire for a peaceful solution between Israel and Syria.)
The Paris meetings did, however, reinforce the importance of the parties working together, and many now believe peace is imminent. The most glaring example of a budding relationship is the recent exchange with Hizbullah. By the wonderful manner in which Hizbullah conducted themselves, Olmert feels they are a party to work with. Olmert described the exchange as "in Israel's best interest," as fair and equitable, and led his cabinet to overwhelmingly approve it. The exchange stands as a fine example of Ehud Olmert's leadership.
It would be unfair, though, to ascribe all the credit for this historical exchange to Olmert alone. Outspoken supporters of this uniquely conceived exchange, Tzipi Livni, Ehud Barak, Shaul Mofaz, Haim Ramon and Meir Sheetrit should certainly be remembered for the part they played. Particularly as they now ask the people of Israel to consider their judgment and voting records as candidates for the highest office in the land.
There is little doubt these seasoned leaders of Israel wrestled mightily with the potential political ramifications of their fateful decision. It appears, however, their sense of shame, seemingly dulled by the positions of power to which they so assiduously cling, was nowhere to be found. They either did not anticipate the disgrace they would bring upon the country or perhaps they reasoned it was not important enough a consideration.
At least Shimon Peres declared, "It's not a happy choice," upon signing the pardon that would set Samir Kuntar free, the terrorist whose claim to fame is crushing the skull of an innocent four-year-old girl on the rocks on the beach in Nahariya. An observer of this solemn signing ceremony noted that Peres almost dropped his pen as he struggled to hold his nose.
Nevertheless, Olmert's vision of a two-state solution has gained momentum with many in the two percent that still support him, and Olmert has never let a window of opportunity pass him by. This, and freeing Palestinian terrorists, will remain his focus for the time remaining between his resignation and his departure. He is ready to relinquish Israel's sovereignty over Jerusalem, to surrender Judea, Samaria, the holy city of Hebron, and a direct route to the Ein Gedi Spa, to create a Palestinian state on 97 percent of Israel's heartland. He has conceded a corridor between Gaza and the West Bank, which will divide what is left of Israel in half. Ariel, Maaleh Adumim and Efrat will be discussed later, if there is a later.
His vision of two peace-loving states living side by side requires the support of his cabinet. He knows how trustworthy they are. He also knows he is already supported by Israel's allies in the European Union and in the United Nations, Russia, Egypt, Jordan and Saudi Arabia. He is guided by the example of successive Israeli governments before him, which also attempted to divide Israel and strengthen the Palestinians. He too, like the esteemed leaders of those now defunct governments, has provided weapons and ammunition to the Palestinian Authority in their battle against terrorism. Unfortunately, they have found their way to Fatah and the Tanzim, so they can fight terrorism. It's "peace in our time" all over again.
Supporters of this approach argue that efforts to strengthen PA Chairman Mahmoud Abbas against Hamas have been ineffective until now because insufficient weaponry was provided. Thus, newer and more efficient weaponry, in increased quantity, is needed by Abbas. Will Olmert provide the Arabs modern warfare training, armored vehicles, tanks, and artillery to enhance their war-making ability against Hamas? It would be natural, given Israel's prowess in aerial warfare, to begin development of a Palestinian Air Force. Abbas would not then have to rely on his past success in battle against Hamas. 
So much left for Olmert to achieve and with so little time remaining.


So much left for Olmert to achieve and with so little time remaining.

That leaves only one outstanding issue to be resolved. Abbas' demand for the "right of return" to Israel of millions of Arab refugees scattered around the world. They do not want to return to a new Arab state, but only to Israel. They expect to get back the jobs they lost 60 years ago, their businesses, their beautiful homes, fields, and orchards, and receive monetary reparations for having to live in far away places like Canada. Olmert is firm on this issue and it seems like he will accept no more than four to five million additional Arabs, and their natural offspring, perhaps only a few million, into Israel. Clearly, Abbas must demonstrate some flexibility if he truly seeks peace.
With so much left for Olmert to achieve and with so little time remaining, his supporters must rally and allow him to pursue his vision. His devoted cabinet must continue their selfless leadership, and remain as role models of trustworthiness, thoughtful decision making, and exemplary personal behavior. With Abbas then having defeated Hamas, a new era of peace and love will fill the land. Happy days will be here again and all Israel's problems will be gone, except one: getting rid of Olmert.