The takeover by Hamas of Gaza is a considerable worsening of Israel's security situation. The good planning, the efficiency with which Hamas routed Fatah in Gaza is a sign that 
More sophisticated arms will continue to enter Hamastan.
re-entering Gaza will by no means be cost-free for Israel. But not entering, waiting, means providing Hamas more time to build a still more potent military force, including longer range missiles.
The mistake of transferring the Philadelphi Route to the Egyptians will continue to be costly. More sophisticated arms will continue to enter Hamastan. Syria and Iran will have an increased place in Gaza, which will become a terror center for the entire Middle East.
Entering Gaza seems to be the required action, and the sooner, the better. However, entering Gaza can also mean something else. It can mean that Hizbullah to the north fires its as-yet unstoppable rockets on northern Israel. It can mean too that Syria, on the Golan Heights, begins firing its missiles at the heart of Israel. And it can mean that Iran, with its long-range missiles, also enters the fray. If this takes place this summer, it means that Iran will most likely not have nuclear warheads, but the damage that can be done from all these missiles is greater by far than anything Israel has ever suffered on its own territory. It is worthwhile here to remember that Israel is a well-developed, industrial, hi-tech nation, which has many significant targets for any enemy to strike at. And the kinds of disruption it might suffer are major ones.
Does this mean we must preempt? Or does it mean we must try to buy time until we develop new technologies that enable us to wholly neutralize the enemy's missiles? Or is the best alternative trying to live in a kind of mutual deterrence situation for as long as we can?
The answers to these questions are not with any laymen but within the Defense Ministry of Israel. Israel is now replacing an incompetent and unqualified Defense Minister with one who knows the subject of Israel's security very well indeed. He, too, of course, made major decisions undermining that security during his term as Prime Minister, including the Lebanese withdrawal and the Jerusalem and Judea- Samaria withdrawal offer to Yasser Arafat (which, fortunately, was not accepted).
Yet, it is reasonable to suggest that a very ambitious Ehud Barak will understand that the way now to the heart of the Israeli voter is through a resounding Israeli military victory. At present, the candidate for most likely target is Gaza. But again, this could ignite the kind of three-front total war that Israel does not want. Such a war, however, wisely conducted and coordinated with the United States, and that at the same time disables the nuclear facilities of Iran, might be the right course of action.
All this is said without mentioning another possible front: Judea and Samaria. Prime Minister Ehud Olmert has spoken of the recent events in Gaza as presenting a new
Another possible front: Judea and Samaria.
opportunity for peace talks with Fatah on the "West Bank." Olmert conceivably could continue along the path of major concession and error, and try to force through a major Israeli withdrawal in Judea and Samaria. Such a withdrawal would most likely help create yet another front. It is, however, very unlikely, given the experience of the other withdrawals and the Israeli public's resistance to any further withdrawal.
Even if Olmert is bluffing in regard to true negotiations with Mahmoud Abbas, the situation is an extremely difficult and dangerous one. It requires the kind of innovativeness, surprise, intelligence, and imaginative daring that the Israeli Defense Forces have displayed many times in their history, most notably in the Six Day War.
More sophisticated arms will continue to enter Hamastan.
re-entering Gaza will by no means be cost-free for Israel. But not entering, waiting, means providing Hamas more time to build a still more potent military force, including longer range missiles. The mistake of transferring the Philadelphi Route to the Egyptians will continue to be costly. More sophisticated arms will continue to enter Hamastan. Syria and Iran will have an increased place in Gaza, which will become a terror center for the entire Middle East.
Entering Gaza seems to be the required action, and the sooner, the better. However, entering Gaza can also mean something else. It can mean that Hizbullah to the north fires its as-yet unstoppable rockets on northern Israel. It can mean too that Syria, on the Golan Heights, begins firing its missiles at the heart of Israel. And it can mean that Iran, with its long-range missiles, also enters the fray. If this takes place this summer, it means that Iran will most likely not have nuclear warheads, but the damage that can be done from all these missiles is greater by far than anything Israel has ever suffered on its own territory. It is worthwhile here to remember that Israel is a well-developed, industrial, hi-tech nation, which has many significant targets for any enemy to strike at. And the kinds of disruption it might suffer are major ones.
Does this mean we must preempt? Or does it mean we must try to buy time until we develop new technologies that enable us to wholly neutralize the enemy's missiles? Or is the best alternative trying to live in a kind of mutual deterrence situation for as long as we can?
The answers to these questions are not with any laymen but within the Defense Ministry of Israel. Israel is now replacing an incompetent and unqualified Defense Minister with one who knows the subject of Israel's security very well indeed. He, too, of course, made major decisions undermining that security during his term as Prime Minister, including the Lebanese withdrawal and the Jerusalem and Judea- Samaria withdrawal offer to Yasser Arafat (which, fortunately, was not accepted).
Yet, it is reasonable to suggest that a very ambitious Ehud Barak will understand that the way now to the heart of the Israeli voter is through a resounding Israeli military victory. At present, the candidate for most likely target is Gaza. But again, this could ignite the kind of three-front total war that Israel does not want. Such a war, however, wisely conducted and coordinated with the United States, and that at the same time disables the nuclear facilities of Iran, might be the right course of action.
All this is said without mentioning another possible front: Judea and Samaria. Prime Minister Ehud Olmert has spoken of the recent events in Gaza as presenting a new
Another possible front: Judea and Samaria.
opportunity for peace talks with Fatah on the "West Bank." Olmert conceivably could continue along the path of major concession and error, and try to force through a major Israeli withdrawal in Judea and Samaria. Such a withdrawal would most likely help create yet another front. It is, however, very unlikely, given the experience of the other withdrawals and the Israeli public's resistance to any further withdrawal. Even if Olmert is bluffing in regard to true negotiations with Mahmoud Abbas, the situation is an extremely difficult and dangerous one. It requires the kind of innovativeness, surprise, intelligence, and imaginative daring that the Israeli Defense Forces have displayed many times in their history, most notably in the Six Day War.