Matters of war and peace involve issues of mutual perception as much as ideologies or interests. Historically, when enemies perceived each other to be strong, the deterrent effect of that perception prevented war. During the Cold War, the concept of "mutually assured destruction" led both America and the former Soviet Union to conclude that nuclear war was a "zero-sum game" that neither could win.


History is replete with wars that were caused by incorrect perceptions.

Similarly, history tells us that peace can prevail when enemies perceive themselves as weak. After the Hundred Years' War (1337-1453) ravaged much of England and France, the memory of that destruction kept both nations out of direct conflict with one another for more than two centuries.


Unfortunately, history is replete with wars that were caused by incorrect perceptions of an enemy's true power. In World War II, Hitler miscalculated the collective strength of the Allies in the European theater just as Japanese General Hideki Tojo underestimated the massive power of the United States in the Far East. Admiral Yamamoto, commander of the Japanese fleet, wrote in his diary immediately following the attack on Pearl Harbor: "I fear we have awakened a sleeping giant."


Nowhere, however, are these misperceptions of power more clearly delineated than in the Arab-Israeli conflict. When Israel withdrew from southern Lebanon in 2000, the fact that it withdrew so quickly, abandoning equipment to Hizbullah and placing Israel's Lebanese Christian allies at grave risk, signaled weakness to its enemies. Hizbullah and the Palestinians concluded that Israel was not prepared to accept casualties in defense of its national interests.


In the summer of 2000, Prime Minister Ehud Barak offered Yasser Arafat unthinkable concessions, including a Palestinian state with East Jerusalem as its capital, control of the Temple Mount and ninety-five percent of the West Bank. Arafat balked, concluding that each Israeli concession signaled weakness and the hope of greater opportunities if he turned up the violence. Within three months of the Lebanon withdrawal, he unleashed the second intifada.


Again, between 2000 and 2006, despite Israel's knowledge that Hizbullah was building massive reinforced underground concrete bunkers along its northern border, the Israeli government refused to authorize the necessary action to destroy the threat. Despite overwhelming evidence that Hizbullah was rearming, Israel made no attempt to interfere with the transfer of Iranian weapons to Damascus, refrained from attacking Syrian convoys transferring those advanced weapons to Hizbullah in Lebanon, and failed to attack Hizbullah missile sites in southern Lebanon. This restraint reinforced Hizbullah's perception of Israeli weakness, and that perception ultimately led to the Second Lebanon War last summer.


What Israel perceives as restraint in the face of provocation, Hizbullah, Hamas and the other enemies of Israel perceive as opportunity in the face of weakness. Although Israel emerged from the Lebanon War tarnished but victorious (objectively speaking),

Israel is hearing the same "extermination rhetoric" it heard four decades ago.

subjectively, in the eyes of Hizbullah and rest of the Arab world, Israel had been "exposed" as weak, disorganized, demoralized and, most of all, no longer invincible. With uninterrupted Iranian and Syrian financial, military and logistical support behind it, Hizbullah was able to damage an Israeli naval cruiser, rain 4,000 missiles down on Israel's northern population, force over a million Israelis to live in bomb shelters for weeks, and destroy many of Israel's armored vehicles with advanced Iranian RPGs - all of which created the perception of vulnerability, weakness and fear.


In the south, the Israeli withdrawal from Gaza during the summer of 2005 was interpreted as yet another manifestation of Israel's weakness. As a result, Hamas, the Al-Aksa Martyrs Brigade and Islamic Jihad continue to prepare for war. By fighting a defensive war, based on the faulty strategy that aggression can be contained or otherwise "managed," the government of Israel has created the false perception of weakness in the minds of its enemies.


This will have serious repercussions because, perceptions aside, the truth is that the Israeli war machine continues to retain the capacity to vanquish not only Hizbullah and Hamas, but any state (Arab or Persian) that threatens its existence. Unfortunately, in the eyes of these enemies (whose delusions of grandeur are surpassed only by their unmitigated arrogance), the perception is that Israel is now ripe for the taking; and Israel has done little to alter that perception.


When Hamas spokesmen deliver sermons in Palestinian mosques citing the religious duty of the faithful to slaughter "the Zionist occupiers," and Palestinian television broadcasts these sermons live, when the Palestinian Ministry of Higher Education introduces 12th-grade textbooks denying the Holocaust ever happened, while the Prime Minister of Israel continues to conduct "business as usual" with the Palestinian Authority President - who has neither the ability nor the intention of stopping the incitement and hatred - the perception of Israeli weakness is reinforced.


When the Prime Minister of Israel gives his approval to the training and arming of the Hamas-dominated Palestinian security services, knowing from past experience the probability that both will, at some point in the near future, be turned against IDF soldiers, the perception of Israeli weakness is reinforced.


When the Saudi Initiative (which includes, inter alia, a call for the "right of return of Palestinian refugees") is presented to Israel as "non-negotiable," and the government of Israel responds that the initiative is "interesting," the perception of Israeli weakness is reinforced.


When, in the face of negative Arab responses, the Prime Minister proposes that Israel enter into talks with any available combination of Arab governments, the perception of Israeli weakness is reinforced.


When Israeli security sources document that Hamas is preparing for war, and is constructing tunnels and underground concrete bunkers along the lines of Hizbullah's fortifications in southern Lebanon, that Hamas is being financed by, and armed with advanced weaponry from, Iran, and that it is providing missiles for Islamic Jihad's attacks on Israel - all without fear of massive Israeli retaliation - the perception of Israeli weakness is reinforced.


When senior Israeli defense officials warn of an unprecedented missile build-up on the Syrian side of the Golan Heights and note Syrian threats to "liberate" the Heights by force, while the government of Israel continues to signal a willingness to deal with Syria, the perception of Israeli weakness is reinforced.


In the Middle East, if history is any judge, this perception will inevitably lead to war. In democratic societies, seeking a resolution of international issues through negotiation, mediation and compromise is considered standard diplomatic practice. But in the Arab Middle East, where the lines between the interests of secular nationalists (who seek the establishment of a viable, stable Palestinian state) and radical Islamists (who want an Islamic Palestinian state and a judenrein Middle East) are fading fast, any effort at

Israel has created the false perception of weakness.

compromise is perceived as an opportunity to vanquish the weaker adversary.


The probability is that Israel's enemies in Gaza, the West Bank, Lebanon, Syria and Iran have incorrectly concluded that Israeli resolve is faltering and that its fighting spirit can be broken. That perception is not only wrong, it's dangerous.


Today, Israel is hearing the same "extermination rhetoric" it heard four decades ago in the months and weeks preceding the Six-Day War. What we are witnessing is a replay of history, tragic as it is, because the false perception of Israeli weakness can only end when the perception of Israeli invincibility has been restored in the minds of Israel's enemies. Unfortunately, as has so often been the case, it will take a major war to do it.