Wars have their own logic. But it is a logic thick with contradictions and limp assumptions. So, it is not surprising that in the course of any given war, the reversals and the revisions are more pronounced than the presumptions and the predictions. Our war in Iraq is about to undergo a revision of epochal proportions. The Democratic sweep in the recent mid-term election, Secretary Rumsfeld's dismissal and the formation of the Iraq Study Group (ISG) are all predictive of a considerable mid-course correction. In the meanwhile, public support for the war is fast approaching its nadir.
The enormity of this impending shift can only be appreciated if we compare the buoyant atmospherics at the beginning of the war and the fog of fallibility that prevails today. In the beginning of the war, people like Paul Wolfowitz, Doug Feith and David Wurser were like viceroys in the citadels of power. Today, it is James Baker, Brent Scowcroft and Robert Gates that congregate in the Oval Office. In his 2002 State of the Union address, George Bush placed Iran at the vertex of the "axis of evil." That was then. Today, in an unprecedented volte-face, Baker and Gates are talking about talking to the Iranians and the Syrians.
It is not altogether clear why anyone would expect the Iranians to be receptive to any collaborative effort with respect to Iraq. The Iranians are quite content to let the United States slowly twist in the withering winds of Iraq. The Unites States, in their view, is the only real impediment to their regional ambitions. What's more, to close an encounter with the Great Satan might compromise their ascendant role as Islam's great avenger. Yet, in the midst of these seemingly intractable differences, there is a strange counterpoint emanating from Washington. The president has repeatedly and emphatically stated his opposition to Iran's quest for nuclear weapons. Baker, on the other hand, is cuddling up to the Iranians in the expectation that they will somehow help redefine the American presence in Iraq and elsewhere in the Middle East. That dichotomy is not particularly reassuring.
The great divide between those who would stay the course and those who believe that the war has lost its purpose will undoubtedly be bridged long before the 2008 presidential election. It would be political suicide if the Republicans entered the race with the stay-the-course albatross hanging over their heads. As for the Democrats, they obviously believe that the mandate they received in the recent election could, if played right, put them on the royal road to the White House. If we put this all together, it would be prudent to anticipate a full, or perhaps a phased, withdrawal in the coming months (a "phased withdrawal" is merely a deferred full withdrawal). So, what might this all mean?
To begin with, if a few thousand jihadis can neutralize the world's most sophisticated military machine, then they, the jihadis, might begin to think that everything is possible. If the United States pulls out of Iraq, most of the so-called moderate states in the region will begin to have serious misgivings about the staying power of the United States. These misgivings could easily congeal into a rejection of an American presence in the Middle East.
Turning toward Israel, it is worth noting that the contours of Israel's foreign policy have almost always been formulated so as to conform with the American interest. But that interest is in the process of being redefined. The end result of that redefining process will, in all likelihood, be a more diffident policy towards the Middle East. A more diffident policy might also mean that the current symbiotic relationship between Washington and Jerusalem might also be redefined. Anticipating such a development, Israel would be well advised to hearken unto the psalmist, who would remind us that "it is better to take refuge in HaShem than to put your trust in princes."
All of this is something other than careless chatter. Some of the functionaries in the Iraq Study Group have never been overly sympathetic to the Jewish State. Almost all are proponents of a two-state solution. For those of us who are concerned about Israel's survival, the two-state solution smacks of the "Final Solution." Baker's declared intention to talk to the Iranians and Syrians only adds to our anxieties. Predictably, the talks will revolve around the question of Palestinian statehood and the Golan Heights. And just as predictable, Israel will wind up bearing the brunt of any accommodation we have with Iran and Syria. Then there is Scowcroft and his partisans who, it is worth recalling, were against the war before there was a war. It's all but certain that some of their reservations about the war will find their way into the ISG's final report. Again, all of these particulars would argue for an early withdrawal.
So, suppose there is an early withdrawal from Iraq, what might we expect? If the Americans leave, so will the insurgents - only they will redeploy in Judea, Samaria, Gaza and on the Golan Heights. There is something else we can count on if Israel surrenders Judea, Samaria and the Golan. When the Jews move out, the rockets will move in. As long as the Arab world is gripped by a Nazi-like fever about Israel and the Jews, every concession, every truce is another solicitation for national suicide.
The enormity of this impending shift can only be appreciated if we compare the buoyant atmospherics at the beginning of the war and the fog of fallibility that prevails today. In the beginning of the war, people like Paul Wolfowitz, Doug Feith and David Wurser were like viceroys in the citadels of power. Today, it is James Baker, Brent Scowcroft and Robert Gates that congregate in the Oval Office. In his 2002 State of the Union address, George Bush placed Iran at the vertex of the "axis of evil." That was then. Today, in an unprecedented volte-face, Baker and Gates are talking about talking to the Iranians and the Syrians.
It is not altogether clear why anyone would expect the Iranians to be receptive to any collaborative effort with respect to Iraq. The Iranians are quite content to let the United States slowly twist in the withering winds of Iraq. The Unites States, in their view, is the only real impediment to their regional ambitions. What's more, to close an encounter with the Great Satan might compromise their ascendant role as Islam's great avenger. Yet, in the midst of these seemingly intractable differences, there is a strange counterpoint emanating from Washington. The president has repeatedly and emphatically stated his opposition to Iran's quest for nuclear weapons. Baker, on the other hand, is cuddling up to the Iranians in the expectation that they will somehow help redefine the American presence in Iraq and elsewhere in the Middle East. That dichotomy is not particularly reassuring.
The great divide between those who would stay the course and those who believe that the war has lost its purpose will undoubtedly be bridged long before the 2008 presidential election. It would be political suicide if the Republicans entered the race with the stay-the-course albatross hanging over their heads. As for the Democrats, they obviously believe that the mandate they received in the recent election could, if played right, put them on the royal road to the White House. If we put this all together, it would be prudent to anticipate a full, or perhaps a phased, withdrawal in the coming months (a "phased withdrawal" is merely a deferred full withdrawal). So, what might this all mean?
To begin with, if a few thousand jihadis can neutralize the world's most sophisticated military machine, then they, the jihadis, might begin to think that everything is possible. If the United States pulls out of Iraq, most of the so-called moderate states in the region will begin to have serious misgivings about the staying power of the United States. These misgivings could easily congeal into a rejection of an American presence in the Middle East.
Turning toward Israel, it is worth noting that the contours of Israel's foreign policy have almost always been formulated so as to conform with the American interest. But that interest is in the process of being redefined. The end result of that redefining process will, in all likelihood, be a more diffident policy towards the Middle East. A more diffident policy might also mean that the current symbiotic relationship between Washington and Jerusalem might also be redefined. Anticipating such a development, Israel would be well advised to hearken unto the psalmist, who would remind us that "it is better to take refuge in HaShem than to put your trust in princes."
All of this is something other than careless chatter. Some of the functionaries in the Iraq Study Group have never been overly sympathetic to the Jewish State. Almost all are proponents of a two-state solution. For those of us who are concerned about Israel's survival, the two-state solution smacks of the "Final Solution." Baker's declared intention to talk to the Iranians and Syrians only adds to our anxieties. Predictably, the talks will revolve around the question of Palestinian statehood and the Golan Heights. And just as predictable, Israel will wind up bearing the brunt of any accommodation we have with Iran and Syria. Then there is Scowcroft and his partisans who, it is worth recalling, were against the war before there was a war. It's all but certain that some of their reservations about the war will find their way into the ISG's final report. Again, all of these particulars would argue for an early withdrawal.
So, suppose there is an early withdrawal from Iraq, what might we expect? If the Americans leave, so will the insurgents - only they will redeploy in Judea, Samaria, Gaza and on the Golan Heights. There is something else we can count on if Israel surrenders Judea, Samaria and the Golan. When the Jews move out, the rockets will move in. As long as the Arab world is gripped by a Nazi-like fever about Israel and the Jews, every concession, every truce is another solicitation for national suicide.