A lot of ink, computer time and hot air is being expended on the issue of settlements in Judea and Samaria, about the moral crisis they produce among Israelis, and whether they should be destroyed or promoted. Most of the rancor seems based on emotions instead of on a logical give and take of positive and negative arguments. Perhaps it is time for a reality check, a sober look at the settlements from a strict military point of view. We'll start with a short definition of terms.
Strategy is the overall political and military game, involving one country's political position and military actions in relation to other countries' political and military moves against it. Tactics are methods by which individual military units (from whole divisions down to the single soldier's level) maneuver to gain a position from which to kill or manipulate their foes.
The greatest single strategic advantage for Israel lies in its positioning among the nations of the Middle East. Surrounded upon nearly all sides except for the Mediterranean Sea, Israel can throw forces in any direction from a minimum number of central points within its borders. Roads and railways stretching north, south and east allow such movements, and are referred to as "interior lines of communication." Interior lines allow an army to operate against a single enemy from multiple directions, or to defend in one area while attacking in another, switching roles when one enemy is defeated.
The Yom Kippur War is a prime example of this, where the Arab armies were unable to sufficiently coordinate widely separated offensives in order to win; whereas, Israel, once reinforced by the USA, was able to reverse the Arab offensives and go on toward what would've been total victory before a cease-fire was imposed. This near-miraculous comeback would've been made much more difficult if Israel had not had the territories it had taken in 1967.
Unfortunately, Israel has until recently been surrendering its natural advantage by allowing a pseudo-state within its borders; i.e., the West Bank area of Judea and Samaria. A hostile Arab state in this region would allow Muslim forces the same interior line advantage that Israel once had, with the potential to isolate Israel's northern and southern halves, while disrupting the IDF response to any hostile actions by surrounding Arab nations or groups. A fence, such as the one being built, is no solution for this except to keep certain terrorist acts outside the arbitrary borderline created by it. Against an organized attack, such a fence can only serve as a secondary line of minimal defense, as was proved by the killing and kidnapping of Israeli soldiers before the recent war.
Ironically, the best means of holding interior lines of communication is to be found in Judea and Samaria. Roads are naturally controlled by junctions and hillsides along the route; no army can afford to leave these unprotected. The Israelites knew that, and built their communities accordingly; overlooking, or actually on, certain well-used roads. Modern Jewish communities in Judea and Samaria fulfill that same purpose, both protecting older routes and even requiring new ones, creating a strategic grid that facilitates movement for commerce and the military.
During World War II, the Soviets made every village a hardened defensive position, particularly at road junctions. A determined German assault could crush these "hedgehogs," but they added to delays that eventually cost the Nazi armies their ultimate victory. Interestingly, the Germans used the same tactics against the advancing Russians later on, costing the Soviets unbelievable casualties.
Essentially, this "blocking force" role is the potentially decisive tactical purpose of each community.
Granted, settlers are not well armed, though they could be justifiably bristling with weaponry for the above reasons. At the very least, such communities serve as "hard" points from which a small reinforcing IDF unit can defend the roads, resupply themselves and other units, and secure evacuation for civilians, while protecting the advance of offensive operations along those same routes. Without these already-established defensive positions, the army would be severely handicapped in defending the nation against attack, if nothing else than by having to devote assets that would've been used elsewhere to protect its own supply and transport routes.
It is tantamount to military and cultural suicide to give up such advantages, and the Zionists of pre-state Israel realized this. The 1948 battles around Kfar Etzion and the Jerusalem highways were battles anchored on settlements, where vital avenues had to be kept open for military and humanitarian purposes. One doubts the very survival of Israel had those communities not been built and defended so vigorously.
Thus, the conclusion drawn from history is that the resettlement of Judea and Samaria is absolutely necessary to the defense of Eretz Yisrael, for both Biblical and practical reasons. The settlements are a tactical solution, by their very existence, in that control of Judea and Samaria is a means of protecting internal movement of the Israeli army from small enemy forces. The settlements are also a strategic solution, in that they allow full use of the IDF's capabilities against a host of adversaries in an emergency.
Does the Israeli government really want to give away such vital territorial and strategic advantages for more duplicitous promises? If it does, and Israeli voters endorse more expulsions, then the Jewish people might as well pack up now and wait for the next bus to New York.
Strategy is the overall political and military game, involving one country's political position and military actions in relation to other countries' political and military moves against it. Tactics are methods by which individual military units (from whole divisions down to the single soldier's level) maneuver to gain a position from which to kill or manipulate their foes.
The greatest single strategic advantage for Israel lies in its positioning among the nations of the Middle East. Surrounded upon nearly all sides except for the Mediterranean Sea, Israel can throw forces in any direction from a minimum number of central points within its borders. Roads and railways stretching north, south and east allow such movements, and are referred to as "interior lines of communication." Interior lines allow an army to operate against a single enemy from multiple directions, or to defend in one area while attacking in another, switching roles when one enemy is defeated.
The Yom Kippur War is a prime example of this, where the Arab armies were unable to sufficiently coordinate widely separated offensives in order to win; whereas, Israel, once reinforced by the USA, was able to reverse the Arab offensives and go on toward what would've been total victory before a cease-fire was imposed. This near-miraculous comeback would've been made much more difficult if Israel had not had the territories it had taken in 1967.
Unfortunately, Israel has until recently been surrendering its natural advantage by allowing a pseudo-state within its borders; i.e., the West Bank area of Judea and Samaria. A hostile Arab state in this region would allow Muslim forces the same interior line advantage that Israel once had, with the potential to isolate Israel's northern and southern halves, while disrupting the IDF response to any hostile actions by surrounding Arab nations or groups. A fence, such as the one being built, is no solution for this except to keep certain terrorist acts outside the arbitrary borderline created by it. Against an organized attack, such a fence can only serve as a secondary line of minimal defense, as was proved by the killing and kidnapping of Israeli soldiers before the recent war.
Ironically, the best means of holding interior lines of communication is to be found in Judea and Samaria. Roads are naturally controlled by junctions and hillsides along the route; no army can afford to leave these unprotected. The Israelites knew that, and built their communities accordingly; overlooking, or actually on, certain well-used roads. Modern Jewish communities in Judea and Samaria fulfill that same purpose, both protecting older routes and even requiring new ones, creating a strategic grid that facilitates movement for commerce and the military.
During World War II, the Soviets made every village a hardened defensive position, particularly at road junctions. A determined German assault could crush these "hedgehogs," but they added to delays that eventually cost the Nazi armies their ultimate victory. Interestingly, the Germans used the same tactics against the advancing Russians later on, costing the Soviets unbelievable casualties.
Essentially, this "blocking force" role is the potentially decisive tactical purpose of each community.
Granted, settlers are not well armed, though they could be justifiably bristling with weaponry for the above reasons. At the very least, such communities serve as "hard" points from which a small reinforcing IDF unit can defend the roads, resupply themselves and other units, and secure evacuation for civilians, while protecting the advance of offensive operations along those same routes. Without these already-established defensive positions, the army would be severely handicapped in defending the nation against attack, if nothing else than by having to devote assets that would've been used elsewhere to protect its own supply and transport routes.
It is tantamount to military and cultural suicide to give up such advantages, and the Zionists of pre-state Israel realized this. The 1948 battles around Kfar Etzion and the Jerusalem highways were battles anchored on settlements, where vital avenues had to be kept open for military and humanitarian purposes. One doubts the very survival of Israel had those communities not been built and defended so vigorously.
Thus, the conclusion drawn from history is that the resettlement of Judea and Samaria is absolutely necessary to the defense of Eretz Yisrael, for both Biblical and practical reasons. The settlements are a tactical solution, by their very existence, in that control of Judea and Samaria is a means of protecting internal movement of the Israeli army from small enemy forces. The settlements are also a strategic solution, in that they allow full use of the IDF's capabilities against a host of adversaries in an emergency.
Does the Israeli government really want to give away such vital territorial and strategic advantages for more duplicitous promises? If it does, and Israeli voters endorse more expulsions, then the Jewish people might as well pack up now and wait for the next bus to New York.