In the five years that have elapsed since the 9/11 tragedies, US foreign policy in the Arab Middle East has shifted from actively promoting democratic change to the previous policies of realpolitik, which are based more on political and material considerations than on ideological, moral, ethical or idealistic concerns.
At its core, the Bush Doctrine emphasized the importance of promoting democracy as a way to solve many of the long-term political and security problems of the greater Middle East. It argued that American military power and aggressive diplomacy should be used to defeat dictators, challenge an unacceptable status quo, and force states into abandoning weapons of mass destruction and their support for terrorism; all without worrying too much about the need for multilateralism, United Nations or otherwise.
That policy has now changed. The belief that the world can be made peaceful if it can be made free has been superseded by other realities, especially, though not exclusively, the fear of rising radical Islam. The Bush Administration has come to the realization that the Arab Middle East cannot be democratized quite as easily or quickly as had been originally anticipated - if it can be democratized at all. As Seyom Brown wrote recently in the Boston Globe,
While much of American foreign policy over the past five years has been devoted to "nation building," the Administration is now of the view that democracies are not exactly things you can "build" or that can be assembled overnight. For that reason, the Bush Administration has accepted the necessity of making distasteful trade-offs and dealing with unpleasant and unsavory, but necessary, "moderate" dictators and despots who can deliver "stability" (usually at the expense of democracy), if that is necessary to protect America?s larger interests and further American aims.
As Hamas gains political ascendancy in Gaza, Iran exports radical Islam throughout the Middle East, the Muslim Brotherhood threatens the balance of power in Egypt, Lebanon faces the possibility of a Syrian-backed Hizbullah coup d'etat and Iraq explodes into sectarian violence, it would appear that the era of actively promoting democratic change in the region is nearing its end, at least for the foreseeable future. With reformist forces in retreat, in fear, in prison or in exile, the Bush Administration has now made a calculated, tactical foreign policy shift back to supporting ?moderate? secular dictators and despots over ?aggressive? Islamic dictators who represent a greater threat to American interests at home and abroad. In so doing, it has chosen what it considers to be the lesser of the two evils. It now sees Middle Eastern tribal cultures as too resistant to change; secular Middle East dictatorships as too well-entrenched, and Islamic extremists as winning elections in Iraq, Lebanon and the Palestinian territories through the ballot. This suggests to American foreign policy analysts that the Arab Middle East is reflecting its true desires by voting for Islamic parties. That does not bode well for the democratic forces in those countries - especially since these political parties fared so poorly.
Rightly or wrongly, America has relegated the goal of democratizing the Arab Middle East to the back burner for other, more immediate interests, such as securing its energy sources, establishing military bases in strategically important areas of the world and protecting it?s long-term financial interests both domestically and abroad.
In the Palestinian territories, the US knows that Palestinian Authority Chairman Mahmoud Abbas will never be a serious partner for peace and that he is politically impotent. Yet, the Bush Administration continues to fund Fatah, knowing the organization has no intention whatsoever of ceasing its terrorist activities, controlling the hatred in its media, promoting anything resembling democratic change or becoming more moderate towards Israel. It also knows that the organization is vying with Hamas to see who can field the most suicide ?martyrs,? and that it is still plotting final victory over ?the Zionist occupiers.? Yet, despite this knowledge, the Bush Administration continues to bankroll the organization. While the US may have once hoped that Fatah and Hamas would compete for the hearts and minds of the Palestinians by offering to build better roads, better schools and a better future, it has now concluded that both are corrupt and inherently dysfunctional organizations, that a Palestinian civil war is imminent, and that any serious efforts at democratizing their infrastructures (at least for the present) are hopeless. Taking all this into account, it views Fatah as the lesser of the two evils; so, it has cast its lot with them.
Similarly, the Bush Administration has concluded (despite its massive naval, air and marine armada gathering in the Persian Gulf to intimidate Iran) that there are very few options available to prevent the Iranian Islamic Republic from going nuclear. It has therefore taken what it considers to be the more practical (though not necessarily wiser) approach of raising the level of rhetoric, but abandoning the military option inherent in the former Bush Doctrine in favor of greater multilateral negotiations backed by (ineffective) UN resolutions, covert operations amongst Iran?s oppressed minorities (only 51% of Iran is Persian), pumping money into Iranian dissident groups, war games designed to intercept ships carrying weapons of mass destruction, and arguing against any unilateral European concessions.
It has also begun to work more closely with Arab and other Muslim governments that have steadfastly opposed democratic change in their own countries. Since it fears the spread of Islamic radicalism throughout the world and is concerned about its future financial and energy well-being, America is now more amenable to working with Egypt, Jordan, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. These nations are opposed to the rising tide of Islamic extremism in the region and can satisfy other US strategic, political and financial interests. In classic realpolitik fashion, the US administration has reluctantly returned to the policy of previous administrations - that the enemy of my enemy is my friend.
This was not the original goal enunciated by the Bush Doctrine in the aftermath of 9/11. However, the experiences of the Hamas victory in the Palestinian elections, Hizbullah in the Lebanese elections, radical Shiites in the Iraqi elections, and the Muslim Brotherhood in the Egyptian elections, the need to insure secure energy sources, the need for foreign bases to protect American interests abroad, the fear of Iran funding global jihad and defying world opinion in its quest for an Islamic bomb, the spread of radical Islam across Europe, Africa, the Middle East and South Asia, the expanding Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan (and America?s continuing reduction of funds for Afghan reconstruction and development), the arrogance of Syria in openly flaunting UN Resolution 1701, by providing safe haven to some of the world's most dangerous terrorist organizations while re-arming Hizbullah in Lebanon, and the stalemate with nuclear North Korea - all have led to a re-evaluation of American tactics. They are requiring the US to lower its democratic expectations for the region in the belief that a return to realpolitik is both necessary and critical to protect current and future American interests.
The truth is that in order to invade Afghanistan and Iraq, the United States has had to befriend numerous authoritarian and semi-authoritarian regimes, including China, Pakistan, Russia, Saudi Arabia and Uzbekistan. In the final analysis, "realism" does not necessarily mean abandoning democratic reform in the Arab world or the noble ideals of the Bush Doctrine. It does, however, imply that these goals may have to be pursued over a much longer period of time. The Cold War, after all, spanned five decades. It may take that long for the democratic aspirations set out by the Bush Doctrine for the Arab world to succeed. In the meantime, America has decided to return to business as usual.
At its core, the Bush Doctrine emphasized the importance of promoting democracy as a way to solve many of the long-term political and security problems of the greater Middle East. It argued that American military power and aggressive diplomacy should be used to defeat dictators, challenge an unacceptable status quo, and force states into abandoning weapons of mass destruction and their support for terrorism; all without worrying too much about the need for multilateralism, United Nations or otherwise.
That policy has now changed. The belief that the world can be made peaceful if it can be made free has been superseded by other realities, especially, though not exclusively, the fear of rising radical Islam. The Bush Administration has come to the realization that the Arab Middle East cannot be democratized quite as easily or quickly as had been originally anticipated - if it can be democratized at all. As Seyom Brown wrote recently in the Boston Globe,
Belatedly, the debate in (the Bush) Administration appears to have been won by those who recognize that equating successful counter-terrorism with implanting democracy is na?ve... and also embarrassing to... undemocratic governments (like Pakistan) that the United States is courting not only for help in combating terrorism, but also for reasons of arms control, access to energy, military bases, and hospitality to US investments (including Jordan, the United Arab Emirates, Kazakhstan, and of course China).Events over the past several years have had a sobering effect on the Administration. After a succession of significant political setbacks, the Bush White House has come to the conclusion that it is confronting a culture in the Middle East that is (by Western standards) dysfunctional, authoritarian, paternalistic, tribal, violent, expansionist and increasingly Islamic - a culture, in essence, that lacks any significant understanding of democracy, democratic processes or democratic traditions. It has concluded that democracy in the Arab world cannot be laid down like Astroturf or treated like a commodity that the US can export or donate to countries steeped in an entirely different culture.
While much of American foreign policy over the past five years has been devoted to "nation building," the Administration is now of the view that democracies are not exactly things you can "build" or that can be assembled overnight. For that reason, the Bush Administration has accepted the necessity of making distasteful trade-offs and dealing with unpleasant and unsavory, but necessary, "moderate" dictators and despots who can deliver "stability" (usually at the expense of democracy), if that is necessary to protect America?s larger interests and further American aims.
As Hamas gains political ascendancy in Gaza, Iran exports radical Islam throughout the Middle East, the Muslim Brotherhood threatens the balance of power in Egypt, Lebanon faces the possibility of a Syrian-backed Hizbullah coup d'etat and Iraq explodes into sectarian violence, it would appear that the era of actively promoting democratic change in the region is nearing its end, at least for the foreseeable future. With reformist forces in retreat, in fear, in prison or in exile, the Bush Administration has now made a calculated, tactical foreign policy shift back to supporting ?moderate? secular dictators and despots over ?aggressive? Islamic dictators who represent a greater threat to American interests at home and abroad. In so doing, it has chosen what it considers to be the lesser of the two evils. It now sees Middle Eastern tribal cultures as too resistant to change; secular Middle East dictatorships as too well-entrenched, and Islamic extremists as winning elections in Iraq, Lebanon and the Palestinian territories through the ballot. This suggests to American foreign policy analysts that the Arab Middle East is reflecting its true desires by voting for Islamic parties. That does not bode well for the democratic forces in those countries - especially since these political parties fared so poorly.
Rightly or wrongly, America has relegated the goal of democratizing the Arab Middle East to the back burner for other, more immediate interests, such as securing its energy sources, establishing military bases in strategically important areas of the world and protecting it?s long-term financial interests both domestically and abroad.
In the Palestinian territories, the US knows that Palestinian Authority Chairman Mahmoud Abbas will never be a serious partner for peace and that he is politically impotent. Yet, the Bush Administration continues to fund Fatah, knowing the organization has no intention whatsoever of ceasing its terrorist activities, controlling the hatred in its media, promoting anything resembling democratic change or becoming more moderate towards Israel. It also knows that the organization is vying with Hamas to see who can field the most suicide ?martyrs,? and that it is still plotting final victory over ?the Zionist occupiers.? Yet, despite this knowledge, the Bush Administration continues to bankroll the organization. While the US may have once hoped that Fatah and Hamas would compete for the hearts and minds of the Palestinians by offering to build better roads, better schools and a better future, it has now concluded that both are corrupt and inherently dysfunctional organizations, that a Palestinian civil war is imminent, and that any serious efforts at democratizing their infrastructures (at least for the present) are hopeless. Taking all this into account, it views Fatah as the lesser of the two evils; so, it has cast its lot with them.
Similarly, the Bush Administration has concluded (despite its massive naval, air and marine armada gathering in the Persian Gulf to intimidate Iran) that there are very few options available to prevent the Iranian Islamic Republic from going nuclear. It has therefore taken what it considers to be the more practical (though not necessarily wiser) approach of raising the level of rhetoric, but abandoning the military option inherent in the former Bush Doctrine in favor of greater multilateral negotiations backed by (ineffective) UN resolutions, covert operations amongst Iran?s oppressed minorities (only 51% of Iran is Persian), pumping money into Iranian dissident groups, war games designed to intercept ships carrying weapons of mass destruction, and arguing against any unilateral European concessions.
It has also begun to work more closely with Arab and other Muslim governments that have steadfastly opposed democratic change in their own countries. Since it fears the spread of Islamic radicalism throughout the world and is concerned about its future financial and energy well-being, America is now more amenable to working with Egypt, Jordan, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. These nations are opposed to the rising tide of Islamic extremism in the region and can satisfy other US strategic, political and financial interests. In classic realpolitik fashion, the US administration has reluctantly returned to the policy of previous administrations - that the enemy of my enemy is my friend.
This was not the original goal enunciated by the Bush Doctrine in the aftermath of 9/11. However, the experiences of the Hamas victory in the Palestinian elections, Hizbullah in the Lebanese elections, radical Shiites in the Iraqi elections, and the Muslim Brotherhood in the Egyptian elections, the need to insure secure energy sources, the need for foreign bases to protect American interests abroad, the fear of Iran funding global jihad and defying world opinion in its quest for an Islamic bomb, the spread of radical Islam across Europe, Africa, the Middle East and South Asia, the expanding Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan (and America?s continuing reduction of funds for Afghan reconstruction and development), the arrogance of Syria in openly flaunting UN Resolution 1701, by providing safe haven to some of the world's most dangerous terrorist organizations while re-arming Hizbullah in Lebanon, and the stalemate with nuclear North Korea - all have led to a re-evaluation of American tactics. They are requiring the US to lower its democratic expectations for the region in the belief that a return to realpolitik is both necessary and critical to protect current and future American interests.
The truth is that in order to invade Afghanistan and Iraq, the United States has had to befriend numerous authoritarian and semi-authoritarian regimes, including China, Pakistan, Russia, Saudi Arabia and Uzbekistan. In the final analysis, "realism" does not necessarily mean abandoning democratic reform in the Arab world or the noble ideals of the Bush Doctrine. It does, however, imply that these goals may have to be pursued over a much longer period of time. The Cold War, after all, spanned five decades. It may take that long for the democratic aspirations set out by the Bush Doctrine for the Arab world to succeed. In the meantime, America has decided to return to business as usual.