By Bennett Zimmerman, Dr. Roberta Seid, and Dr. Michael L. Wise
Arab Demographic Momentum has become part of the Israeli lexicon. In this theory, population growth in the Arab sector will overwhelm the Jewish population as 'baby boom' generations give birth to an even greater number of children. Arab births will accelerate even if birth rates remain stable or drop slightly, because such a large number of women will enter their childbearing years.
But the evidence is now in: demographic momentum exists -- but the momentum is occurring among Jews, not Arabs. Not only has the momentum not occurred in the Arab sector, but Arab birth levels have begun to fall, while births for Jews are continuing to grow.
Jewish births grew rapidly, from 80,000 per year in 1995 to 96,000 in 2000 and to over 105,000 in 2005. The first three months of 2006 already show Jewish births running at an annual rate of 107,600 births. The demographic outlook for Jews has been improving because the Jewish total fertility rate (TFR), or the number of children a woman is likely to bear over her lifetime, has been rising. In 2005, it reached 2.7, the highest rate in any advanced industrial nation. While the ultra-Orthodox contributed to this rise, secular Israelis and the immigrants from the FSU also experienced increasing fertility. When Aliyah and returning Israelis (averaging over 20,000 per year from 2001 to 2004), are added to the mix, the demographic weight of the Jewish sector grows even further.
In contrast, the absolute number of births in the Israeli Arab sector grew from 36,500 births in 1995 to 40,800 in 2000 and has stagnated at the 41,000 level for five straight years. In 2005, the number of Israeli Arab births fell markedly to 38,800. The overall Israeli Arab fertility figure (which includes Israeli Muslim and Christian Arabs, and Druze) declined from 4.4 in 2000 to 4.0 in 2004 and will likely show another drop when the Israel Central Bureau of Statistics releases its fertility calculation for 2005. The first three months of 2006 show that Arab births are occurring at an annualized rate of 36,000 births, a figure now below 1995 levels. Israel recently enacted policies that are impacting the highest fertility sectors of the Israeli Arab population. In 2004, the government stopped granting stipends for every child born to a family, restricting them to only the first two children born. There was an immediate drop in Bedouin pregnancies.
From 1995 until today, the Jewish percentage of total births in Israel has risen from 68.8% to 75.0% of total births in the country. When net Aliyah (adding returning Israelis and subtracting emigration), which averaged over 20,000 per year from 2001 to 2004, are added to the mix, the demographic weight of the Jewish sector grows even further. With Aliyah and returning Israelis (averaging over 20,000 per year from 2001 to 2004), the demographic weight of the Jewish sector grows even further - with 78% of all new Israelis coming from the Jewish sector.
The problem with demographic predictions is that they apply yesterday's or today's fertility rates to tomorrow's forecast. However, earlier childbearing patterns may have little relationship to the number of children the next generation will have. By applying the Muslim TFR rates from the 1960s (between 9-10 births per woman) to forecasts, Israeli demographers had projected that Israeli Arabs would overtake Israeli Jews by 1990. When the TFR dropped to 5.4 in the early 1980s and 4.7 in the second half of the decade, demographers applied this rate to their next series of forecasts. However, by 2005, the Arab TFR had dropped even further, to 4.0, echoing the more dramatic drops reported throughout the Middle East where most nations display fertility levels near 3 births per woman (while countries such as Iran have displayed fertility below two births per woman).
Furthermore, today's Israeli Arab women, who are having fewer children in their late teens and twenties, might have fewer children into their thirties than today's 30-year-olds, who still display the fertility characteristics of earlier generations. On the other hand, Israeli Jewish women in their twenties might carry their choice to have more children into their thirties, at numbers above those displayed by today's 30-year-olds. Such behavior would act to further increase Jewish TFR rates while Arab rates would continue to fall.
The practice of applying yesterday's activity to tomorrow's forecast is a common mistake. The United Nations Population Division had confidently predicted in 2000 that the world's population would balloon to 12 billion people by 2050. Remarkably enough, four years later, they dramatically revised the forecast and now predict that today's 6.3 billion global population will plateau at 9 billion persons by 2050.
With constantly changing birth patterns, what is a forecaster to do? To have any relevance, a forecast must constantly be updated with the most current information and any changes in trend. The Gallup organization recently published the results of a survey that showed a convergence in desired family size among Jews and Arabs west of the Jordan. The ideal family size has fallen to 5.1 for Arabs in Gaza and 4.5 in the West Bank. The desired family size among Israeli Jews and Israeli Arabs is now identical at 3.7. While Gallup found no difference in the preferred number of children by younger Israelis, younger West Bankers aged 15-19 believe an ideal family should have 4.1 children, versus their older relatives, over 50 years of age, who believe the ideal family has 5.0 children. The convergence in desired birth activity among Israeli Jews, Israeli Arabs, and particularly among younger West Bankers is likely to further impact the future demographic outlook for Israel and the West Bank, where Jews now form a two-thirds majority.
Demographers had concentrated on past patterns in the Arab population, while they were blinded to evidence of a slowdown in the Arab sector and the demographic revolution already being measured among Jews. By focusing on the past, forecasters anticipated demographic momentum in the wrong sector and produced an outlook that couldn't even get the present correct, let alone the future.
Bennett Zimmerman, Roberta Seid, and Michael L. Wise are authors of Arab Population in the West Bank and Gaza: The Million Person Gap, recently published by the Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies in Israel. "Forecast for Israel and West Bank 2025" debuted at the Herzliya Policy Conference in Israel and at the American Enterprise Institute in Washington DC. The studies can be found at www.pademographics.com
Arab Demographic Momentum has become part of the Israeli lexicon. In this theory, population growth in the Arab sector will overwhelm the Jewish population as 'baby boom' generations give birth to an even greater number of children. Arab births will accelerate even if birth rates remain stable or drop slightly, because such a large number of women will enter their childbearing years.
But the evidence is now in: demographic momentum exists -- but the momentum is occurring among Jews, not Arabs. Not only has the momentum not occurred in the Arab sector, but Arab birth levels have begun to fall, while births for Jews are continuing to grow.
Jewish births grew rapidly, from 80,000 per year in 1995 to 96,000 in 2000 and to over 105,000 in 2005. The first three months of 2006 already show Jewish births running at an annual rate of 107,600 births. The demographic outlook for Jews has been improving because the Jewish total fertility rate (TFR), or the number of children a woman is likely to bear over her lifetime, has been rising. In 2005, it reached 2.7, the highest rate in any advanced industrial nation. While the ultra-Orthodox contributed to this rise, secular Israelis and the immigrants from the FSU also experienced increasing fertility. When Aliyah and returning Israelis (averaging over 20,000 per year from 2001 to 2004), are added to the mix, the demographic weight of the Jewish sector grows even further.
In contrast, the absolute number of births in the Israeli Arab sector grew from 36,500 births in 1995 to 40,800 in 2000 and has stagnated at the 41,000 level for five straight years. In 2005, the number of Israeli Arab births fell markedly to 38,800. The overall Israeli Arab fertility figure (which includes Israeli Muslim and Christian Arabs, and Druze) declined from 4.4 in 2000 to 4.0 in 2004 and will likely show another drop when the Israel Central Bureau of Statistics releases its fertility calculation for 2005. The first three months of 2006 show that Arab births are occurring at an annualized rate of 36,000 births, a figure now below 1995 levels. Israel recently enacted policies that are impacting the highest fertility sectors of the Israeli Arab population. In 2004, the government stopped granting stipends for every child born to a family, restricting them to only the first two children born. There was an immediate drop in Bedouin pregnancies.
From 1995 until today, the Jewish percentage of total births in Israel has risen from 68.8% to 75.0% of total births in the country. When net Aliyah (adding returning Israelis and subtracting emigration), which averaged over 20,000 per year from 2001 to 2004, are added to the mix, the demographic weight of the Jewish sector grows even further. With Aliyah and returning Israelis (averaging over 20,000 per year from 2001 to 2004), the demographic weight of the Jewish sector grows even further - with 78% of all new Israelis coming from the Jewish sector.
The problem with demographic predictions is that they apply yesterday's or today's fertility rates to tomorrow's forecast. However, earlier childbearing patterns may have little relationship to the number of children the next generation will have. By applying the Muslim TFR rates from the 1960s (between 9-10 births per woman) to forecasts, Israeli demographers had projected that Israeli Arabs would overtake Israeli Jews by 1990. When the TFR dropped to 5.4 in the early 1980s and 4.7 in the second half of the decade, demographers applied this rate to their next series of forecasts. However, by 2005, the Arab TFR had dropped even further, to 4.0, echoing the more dramatic drops reported throughout the Middle East where most nations display fertility levels near 3 births per woman (while countries such as Iran have displayed fertility below two births per woman).
Furthermore, today's Israeli Arab women, who are having fewer children in their late teens and twenties, might have fewer children into their thirties than today's 30-year-olds, who still display the fertility characteristics of earlier generations. On the other hand, Israeli Jewish women in their twenties might carry their choice to have more children into their thirties, at numbers above those displayed by today's 30-year-olds. Such behavior would act to further increase Jewish TFR rates while Arab rates would continue to fall.
The practice of applying yesterday's activity to tomorrow's forecast is a common mistake. The United Nations Population Division had confidently predicted in 2000 that the world's population would balloon to 12 billion people by 2050. Remarkably enough, four years later, they dramatically revised the forecast and now predict that today's 6.3 billion global population will plateau at 9 billion persons by 2050.
With constantly changing birth patterns, what is a forecaster to do? To have any relevance, a forecast must constantly be updated with the most current information and any changes in trend. The Gallup organization recently published the results of a survey that showed a convergence in desired family size among Jews and Arabs west of the Jordan. The ideal family size has fallen to 5.1 for Arabs in Gaza and 4.5 in the West Bank. The desired family size among Israeli Jews and Israeli Arabs is now identical at 3.7. While Gallup found no difference in the preferred number of children by younger Israelis, younger West Bankers aged 15-19 believe an ideal family should have 4.1 children, versus their older relatives, over 50 years of age, who believe the ideal family has 5.0 children. The convergence in desired birth activity among Israeli Jews, Israeli Arabs, and particularly among younger West Bankers is likely to further impact the future demographic outlook for Israel and the West Bank, where Jews now form a two-thirds majority.
Demographers had concentrated on past patterns in the Arab population, while they were blinded to evidence of a slowdown in the Arab sector and the demographic revolution already being measured among Jews. By focusing on the past, forecasters anticipated demographic momentum in the wrong sector and produced an outlook that couldn't even get the present correct, let alone the future.
Bennett Zimmerman, Roberta Seid, and Michael L. Wise are authors of Arab Population in the West Bank and Gaza: The Million Person Gap, recently published by the Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies in Israel. "Forecast for Israel and West Bank 2025" debuted at the Herzliya Policy Conference in Israel and at the American Enterprise Institute in Washington DC. The studies can be found at www.pademographics.com