The world has focused in the last weeks on two questions, "Will Hamas become more moderate now that it is forced to govern?" And "Under what circumstances is it acceptable to deal through a Hamas-led government?"
The test being prescribed for answering these two questions has been reduced to the demand that Hamas issue a statement recognizing Israel's right to exist, renounce violence and accept all prior agreements. This standard is far more lenient than was applied even to Abu Mazen's Fatah-led government. Whether we call this lowering of standards "grade creep" or "dumbing down the Middle East Peace Process," the result will be the same. It will prove to the Palestinian people that terrorism worked.
Before 1988, United States policy forbade contact with the PLO, until Yasser Arafat met the formal conditions imposed by Washington; once conditions were met, a formal US-PLO dialogue began. By 2002, it was clear that the PLO's and the Palestinian Authority's formal commitment to moderation was reflected more in speeches to Western audiences and on paper than in reality. Thus, the international community, led by President George Bush, raised the bar from one of mere rhetoric to one of both words and performance. President Bush's June 24, 2002 speech was followed in the spring of 2003 by the Two-State Solution, dubbed the "Road Map".
Phase I of the Road Map required Arafat and Fatah to "immediately undertake an unconditional cessation of violence... issue [an] unequivocal statement reiterating Israel's right to exist in peace and security... and undertake visible efforts on the ground to arrest, disrupt, and restrain individuals and groups conducting and planning violent attacks on Israelis anywhere." Arrest, disrupt and restrain, not merely renounce or cease terrorism.
Moreover, the Road Map required that a restructured Palestinian security force would begin "sustained, targeted, and effective operations aimed at confronting all those engaged in terror, and dismantlement of terrorist capabilities and infrastructure. This includes commencing confiscation of illegal weapons and consolidation of security authority, free of association with terror and corruption."
Although many supporters of Israel feared that the European Union, Russia or the UN might turn a blind eye to these conditions, and pressure Israel to proceed with further steps under the Road Map despite PA failure to comply, the Quartet remained surprisingly strong and united on this point. In lowering the bar for Hamas, the international community is now taking a giant leap backwards.
Why is it crucial to set the bar this high for Hamas?
According to intelligence sources, even before Hamas came to power, it stopped actively and directly carrying out terrorist acts to ensure popular support among the Palestinian people who have concluded that terrorism is not worth its cost. Moreover, several Hamas leaders have begun proposing a long term truce (hudna) with Israel as long as Israel "ends the occupation," and agrees to the Palestinians' "right of return".
Despite these rhetorical adjustments, Hamas's intentions are clear: by "occupation," Hamas still means to end Israeli governance of any part of the Levant, from the Mediterranean to the Jordan River, including pre-1967 Israel, or even the Israel described by the UN in its November 1947 Partition. Hamas's long term goal remains unchanged by recent events: to evict Israel from the entire region. And Hamas continues to reserve the right to resume terrorism to reach that goal. Meanwhile, it has turned to enabling others, such as Islamic Jihad, through logistical support and training, to perform overt acts of terrorism.
Moreover, unlike secular movements like the PLO, these are goals and methods based not in a rational calculus, but on fundamental ideals regarding the relationship between the Muslim people and God. Concisely, while Hamas seems willing to sheath its bloody knife for now, it has made clear its right and its intent to brandish it once it becomes expedient.
Given its enduring agenda, Hamas's putting on a moderate face should not be a cause for rejoicing, or for the US and Europe to renew pressure on Israel to make concessions. To be satisfied with superficial signs of "moderation" would be a tragic mistake. What is required is genuine change that can only be measured by Hamas's compliance with the same standard applied to the Fatah-run Palestinian Authority. In fact, given Hamas's uncompromising Islamic extremism and definition of the conflict in theological terms, it would be prudent to hold it to an even higher standard.
Those who seek longingly for a Palestinian peace partner may fear that Hamas cannot ever meet such a standard. While I strongly suspect that this is correct, meeting that standard is the only true test for whether any Palestinian group can be such a partner. Giving a pass to an institution that cannot pass does not advance the cause of peace. Worse, it teaches yet another generation of Palestinian children that cheaters do indeed prosper.
The test being prescribed for answering these two questions has been reduced to the demand that Hamas issue a statement recognizing Israel's right to exist, renounce violence and accept all prior agreements. This standard is far more lenient than was applied even to Abu Mazen's Fatah-led government. Whether we call this lowering of standards "grade creep" or "dumbing down the Middle East Peace Process," the result will be the same. It will prove to the Palestinian people that terrorism worked.
Before 1988, United States policy forbade contact with the PLO, until Yasser Arafat met the formal conditions imposed by Washington; once conditions were met, a formal US-PLO dialogue began. By 2002, it was clear that the PLO's and the Palestinian Authority's formal commitment to moderation was reflected more in speeches to Western audiences and on paper than in reality. Thus, the international community, led by President George Bush, raised the bar from one of mere rhetoric to one of both words and performance. President Bush's June 24, 2002 speech was followed in the spring of 2003 by the Two-State Solution, dubbed the "Road Map".
Phase I of the Road Map required Arafat and Fatah to "immediately undertake an unconditional cessation of violence... issue [an] unequivocal statement reiterating Israel's right to exist in peace and security... and undertake visible efforts on the ground to arrest, disrupt, and restrain individuals and groups conducting and planning violent attacks on Israelis anywhere." Arrest, disrupt and restrain, not merely renounce or cease terrorism.
Moreover, the Road Map required that a restructured Palestinian security force would begin "sustained, targeted, and effective operations aimed at confronting all those engaged in terror, and dismantlement of terrorist capabilities and infrastructure. This includes commencing confiscation of illegal weapons and consolidation of security authority, free of association with terror and corruption."
Although many supporters of Israel feared that the European Union, Russia or the UN might turn a blind eye to these conditions, and pressure Israel to proceed with further steps under the Road Map despite PA failure to comply, the Quartet remained surprisingly strong and united on this point. In lowering the bar for Hamas, the international community is now taking a giant leap backwards.
Why is it crucial to set the bar this high for Hamas?
According to intelligence sources, even before Hamas came to power, it stopped actively and directly carrying out terrorist acts to ensure popular support among the Palestinian people who have concluded that terrorism is not worth its cost. Moreover, several Hamas leaders have begun proposing a long term truce (hudna) with Israel as long as Israel "ends the occupation," and agrees to the Palestinians' "right of return".
Despite these rhetorical adjustments, Hamas's intentions are clear: by "occupation," Hamas still means to end Israeli governance of any part of the Levant, from the Mediterranean to the Jordan River, including pre-1967 Israel, or even the Israel described by the UN in its November 1947 Partition. Hamas's long term goal remains unchanged by recent events: to evict Israel from the entire region. And Hamas continues to reserve the right to resume terrorism to reach that goal. Meanwhile, it has turned to enabling others, such as Islamic Jihad, through logistical support and training, to perform overt acts of terrorism.
Moreover, unlike secular movements like the PLO, these are goals and methods based not in a rational calculus, but on fundamental ideals regarding the relationship between the Muslim people and God. Concisely, while Hamas seems willing to sheath its bloody knife for now, it has made clear its right and its intent to brandish it once it becomes expedient.
Given its enduring agenda, Hamas's putting on a moderate face should not be a cause for rejoicing, or for the US and Europe to renew pressure on Israel to make concessions. To be satisfied with superficial signs of "moderation" would be a tragic mistake. What is required is genuine change that can only be measured by Hamas's compliance with the same standard applied to the Fatah-run Palestinian Authority. In fact, given Hamas's uncompromising Islamic extremism and definition of the conflict in theological terms, it would be prudent to hold it to an even higher standard.
Those who seek longingly for a Palestinian peace partner may fear that Hamas cannot ever meet such a standard. While I strongly suspect that this is correct, meeting that standard is the only true test for whether any Palestinian group can be such a partner. Giving a pass to an institution that cannot pass does not advance the cause of peace. Worse, it teaches yet another generation of Palestinian children that cheaters do indeed prosper.