Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon's plan for an Israeli pullout of Gaza and a few more settlements in the Shomron has found initially extensive approval among Jews in the Diaspora.
At first glance, this is understandable. The absence of a credible Palestinian negotiating partner, combined with Israel's vigorous desire to create a more peaceful atmosphere in the Middle East, has made a partial segregation from the Palestinian Arabs appear to be a step in the right direction.
But before we leap, let's look. Let's pay attention to the serious voices of dissent that have become stronger in the last weeks. Avi Dichter, outgoing head of Intelligence, declared a few months ago in front of the Knesset Defense and Foreign Affairs Committee that the evacuation of the northern Shomron would reproduce the earlier situation in the south of Lebanon, because the firing of mortar shells can be stopped only by Israeli forces on the ground. Israel's former Foreign Minister Shlomo Ben-Ami, a member of the Labor party, as well as Shabtai Shavit, former head of Intelligence, stated in unison that the unilateral abandonment of the Gaza Strip under prevailing conditions would destabilize the region to a frightening degree.
"The plan does not create the necessary minimum of balance that would enable long-term co-existence," said Shavit.
The objections these men and others raise fall under two general headings. One is leadership. Many in Israel and abroad see Abu Mazen, the current Palestinian Authority president, as representing a basic change in the strategic goals of the Palestinians. However, Abu Mazen's past activities as a close confidante of the late Yasser Arafat and his alarmingly militant statements about the future status of Jerusalem and the "right of return" cast doubts on this.
"Abu Mazen is not Arafat," Zalman Shoval, Israel's previous Ambassador in Washington, stated last month, "but his objectives ? not only according to intelligence assessments, but according to his own statements, as well ? are no different from those of his predecessor."
Still, the Gaza pullout offers an appropriate opportunity to verify Abu Mazen's support for peace, and to test his influence for pursuing peace within the Palestinian Authority. This giant endeavor ? the compulsory evacuation of some 10,000 Israeli citizens ? could be set up in complete agreement and coordination with the Palestinian authorities. Lacking such agreement, the Disengagement may cause a devastating aftermath.
In the absence of clear-cut accords with Abu Mazen, the security situation in Israel will decisively degrade. Outgoing Chief of General Staff Moshe Yalon said recently that in addition to Sderot, many other places will be surprised with missiles from the Gaza Strip. Terrorist groups would proclaim Israel's unilateral step as their own victory, and this is likely to aggravate future negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians.
"Retreat without getting anything in return is liable to be interpreted by some as surrender and likely to strengthen extremist forces," former general security chief Ami Ayalon stated.
The political situation will become much more complicated, and the pressure on Israel to continue making unilateral steps will ? also according to the Israeli foreign minister ? be enormously intensified. The pullout from Gaza now is considered as a step within the "Road Map" and no longer as a unilateral act in the absence of a Palestinian interlocutor. After the withdrawal, the United Nations, the European Union and even the United States will most probably force Israel to make additional, far-reaching, one-sided concessions.
The inner discord in Israel could become huge and almost unbridgeable, especially as Israelis are getting nothing from Palestinians in return. We should not forget that the large majority who in the last elections voted for Sharon and the Likud did so because he and the party were strictly against any unilateral abandonment of territories ? which is exactly the policy Sharon advocates now. He defied the will of his party that opposed the Gaza pullout and refused to conduct a referendum, even though the Israelis of Gaza confirmed that they would have accepted the results of a referendum.
The Jewish ethos would be strongly tarnished. Images of dozens of synagogues and Torah centers, built with the full backing of the Israeli government, violently destroyed by the Jews themselves, will be satellite-transmitted all over the world. What terrible negative impression will such devastating pictures leave with all viewers, Jews and non-Jews alike! It is and remains incomprehensible that such a traumatic action should happen without a binding accord with the Palestinians.
Finally, the Zionist ethos would be substantially enfeebled by a unilateral pullout from Gaza. A big, impressive settlement in the desert, explicitly subsidized by the government, in which barren land was made fertile in a miraculous way and in the style of Zionist pioneering spirit, is on the verge of being devastated by Israel itself. A large swath of land that had been settled by Jews in the days before the 1948 War of Independence now shall become "free of Jews" without any quid pro quo. By contrast, an orderly turnover of the Gaza Strip would allow many practical problems to be solved, such as the "fate" of the Israeli houses, farms and orchards there. On the condition that the Palestinians deliver real tradeoffs, the Disengagement could become a meaningful step towards a potential co-existence between Israel and its Palestinian neighbours.
A relinquishing of the Gaza Strip to the Palestinians is not to be rejected principally. An abandonment of the Gaza Strip ? if done in the scope of a bilateral peace process involving Abu Mazen - would certainly weaken the strong opposition against Disengagement. The settlers' great sacrifice then would make more sense.
One-sided concessions under the given circumstances are dangerously counter-productive. In this, former Minister Nathan Sharansky stands by his political credo consistently, unflinchingly, and in remarkable openness, without consideration of any potential damage his political career might suffer in Israel. Sharansky's thesis is that democracies do not war with each other, and that a peace with the Palestinians therefore can only be achieved when their authorities have implemented democratic reforms. According to him, Israel gives up far too much when it pulls out of Gaza before the Palestinian government has fulfilled its promises for democratisation and other reforms, which must include forswearing all future terrorism.
It is not surprising that the backing for Sharon's disengagement program has fallen below 50 percent (the exact figure of 48 percent includes Israeli Arabs). People fail to understand why Israel does not require from the new Palestinian leaders meaningful bilateral negotiations for peace, especially as Israel prepares to do something so remarkable and unprecedented for the sake of peace.
[Reprinted from today's issue of the Jewish Journal of Greater Los Angeles.]
At first glance, this is understandable. The absence of a credible Palestinian negotiating partner, combined with Israel's vigorous desire to create a more peaceful atmosphere in the Middle East, has made a partial segregation from the Palestinian Arabs appear to be a step in the right direction.
But before we leap, let's look. Let's pay attention to the serious voices of dissent that have become stronger in the last weeks. Avi Dichter, outgoing head of Intelligence, declared a few months ago in front of the Knesset Defense and Foreign Affairs Committee that the evacuation of the northern Shomron would reproduce the earlier situation in the south of Lebanon, because the firing of mortar shells can be stopped only by Israeli forces on the ground. Israel's former Foreign Minister Shlomo Ben-Ami, a member of the Labor party, as well as Shabtai Shavit, former head of Intelligence, stated in unison that the unilateral abandonment of the Gaza Strip under prevailing conditions would destabilize the region to a frightening degree.
"The plan does not create the necessary minimum of balance that would enable long-term co-existence," said Shavit.
The objections these men and others raise fall under two general headings. One is leadership. Many in Israel and abroad see Abu Mazen, the current Palestinian Authority president, as representing a basic change in the strategic goals of the Palestinians. However, Abu Mazen's past activities as a close confidante of the late Yasser Arafat and his alarmingly militant statements about the future status of Jerusalem and the "right of return" cast doubts on this.
"Abu Mazen is not Arafat," Zalman Shoval, Israel's previous Ambassador in Washington, stated last month, "but his objectives ? not only according to intelligence assessments, but according to his own statements, as well ? are no different from those of his predecessor."
Still, the Gaza pullout offers an appropriate opportunity to verify Abu Mazen's support for peace, and to test his influence for pursuing peace within the Palestinian Authority. This giant endeavor ? the compulsory evacuation of some 10,000 Israeli citizens ? could be set up in complete agreement and coordination with the Palestinian authorities. Lacking such agreement, the Disengagement may cause a devastating aftermath.
In the absence of clear-cut accords with Abu Mazen, the security situation in Israel will decisively degrade. Outgoing Chief of General Staff Moshe Yalon said recently that in addition to Sderot, many other places will be surprised with missiles from the Gaza Strip. Terrorist groups would proclaim Israel's unilateral step as their own victory, and this is likely to aggravate future negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians.
"Retreat without getting anything in return is liable to be interpreted by some as surrender and likely to strengthen extremist forces," former general security chief Ami Ayalon stated.
The political situation will become much more complicated, and the pressure on Israel to continue making unilateral steps will ? also according to the Israeli foreign minister ? be enormously intensified. The pullout from Gaza now is considered as a step within the "Road Map" and no longer as a unilateral act in the absence of a Palestinian interlocutor. After the withdrawal, the United Nations, the European Union and even the United States will most probably force Israel to make additional, far-reaching, one-sided concessions.
The inner discord in Israel could become huge and almost unbridgeable, especially as Israelis are getting nothing from Palestinians in return. We should not forget that the large majority who in the last elections voted for Sharon and the Likud did so because he and the party were strictly against any unilateral abandonment of territories ? which is exactly the policy Sharon advocates now. He defied the will of his party that opposed the Gaza pullout and refused to conduct a referendum, even though the Israelis of Gaza confirmed that they would have accepted the results of a referendum.
The Jewish ethos would be strongly tarnished. Images of dozens of synagogues and Torah centers, built with the full backing of the Israeli government, violently destroyed by the Jews themselves, will be satellite-transmitted all over the world. What terrible negative impression will such devastating pictures leave with all viewers, Jews and non-Jews alike! It is and remains incomprehensible that such a traumatic action should happen without a binding accord with the Palestinians.
Finally, the Zionist ethos would be substantially enfeebled by a unilateral pullout from Gaza. A big, impressive settlement in the desert, explicitly subsidized by the government, in which barren land was made fertile in a miraculous way and in the style of Zionist pioneering spirit, is on the verge of being devastated by Israel itself. A large swath of land that had been settled by Jews in the days before the 1948 War of Independence now shall become "free of Jews" without any quid pro quo. By contrast, an orderly turnover of the Gaza Strip would allow many practical problems to be solved, such as the "fate" of the Israeli houses, farms and orchards there. On the condition that the Palestinians deliver real tradeoffs, the Disengagement could become a meaningful step towards a potential co-existence between Israel and its Palestinian neighbours.
A relinquishing of the Gaza Strip to the Palestinians is not to be rejected principally. An abandonment of the Gaza Strip ? if done in the scope of a bilateral peace process involving Abu Mazen - would certainly weaken the strong opposition against Disengagement. The settlers' great sacrifice then would make more sense.
One-sided concessions under the given circumstances are dangerously counter-productive. In this, former Minister Nathan Sharansky stands by his political credo consistently, unflinchingly, and in remarkable openness, without consideration of any potential damage his political career might suffer in Israel. Sharansky's thesis is that democracies do not war with each other, and that a peace with the Palestinians therefore can only be achieved when their authorities have implemented democratic reforms. According to him, Israel gives up far too much when it pulls out of Gaza before the Palestinian government has fulfilled its promises for democratisation and other reforms, which must include forswearing all future terrorism.
It is not surprising that the backing for Sharon's disengagement program has fallen below 50 percent (the exact figure of 48 percent includes Israeli Arabs). People fail to understand why Israel does not require from the new Palestinian leaders meaningful bilateral negotiations for peace, especially as Israel prepares to do something so remarkable and unprecedented for the sake of peace.
[Reprinted from today's issue of the Jewish Journal of Greater Los Angeles.]