[Parts one and two of this article can be read at http://www.israelnationalnews.com/article.php3?id=4509 and http://www.israelnationalnews.com/article.php3?id=4513, respectively.]
The main reason behind Ariel Sharon's restlessness, which pushed him toward the creation and subsequent destruction of Shlomzion, was his inability or unwillingness to do what he was told to do by others. During his military career, he had always made it clear that he was the only one who knew what to do and how it should be done. Nearly in all of his positions, he continually and loudly challenged the orders of his commanders. He had the same problem in civilian life, as well.
Appointed in 1977 as agriculture minister, and chairman of the cabinet committee on settlement, Sharon was in charge of defining and implementing the government's policy for the settlement of Judea, Samaria and Gaza, in addition to his agricultural responsibilities. He realized very quickly that the Ministry of Agriculture was futile for his ambitions. Thus, he simply ignored the needs of his ministry.
Benziman writes that during his tenure Sharon made only "two important decisions in the field of agriculture proper: to increase the resources devoted to the growing of flowers and the expansion of the poultry industry. Both proved catastrophic and resulted in the bankruptcy or near collapse of many farms." The reason for the failure was Sharon's "ignoring the advice of experts in the field as well as his desire to impress everyone with the grand scale of his actions."
At the same time, Sharon's grand vision was a blessing for the proponents of expanding the settlement enterprise. It would be impossible to find anyone more energetic and forceful in his actions than Sharon. Following the so-called "Sharon plan", he "initiated the establishment of as many new settlements as possible. Although most consisted of only a small handful of settlers, he saw them as the nucleus for their future development."
The nationalist camp must be eternally grateful to Sharon, because he saw the development of settlements as a "potent tool to intervene in all aspects of government policy." This was a time when Israel conducted peace negotiations with Egypt. Certainly Sharon wanted to play an important role in it. However, he was not allowed into the small group that was making the decisions, which consisted of Menachem Begin, Moshe Dayan, and later, Ezer Weizman. In spite of this, Sharon found a way to be influential. He did it through settlement construction.
Uzi Benziman writes: "Settlements were being established with no thought for their future viability and with no connection to any broad Zionist vision, but solely to enhance Sharon's own political reputation and to provide him with a means to intervene in the decision-making process regarding the peace talks with Egypt."
Several times, at sensitive moments in the negotiations, Sharon initiated new settlement construction, making sure that the information was leaked to the press. It happened in January and then in March 1978. But even when, in April, Begin made a change in the decision-making process in such a way that the cabinet committee on defense, rather than Sharon's committee on settlements became responsible for approving the establishment of new settlements, Sharon remained successful at forcing the government into a corner.
One of the greatest incentives for Sharon's deeds was his "competition" with Ezer Weizman. He was envious of the fact that Weizman had been chosen above him for the defense minister position, which he coveted. Benziman writes: "His perceived rivalry with Weizman was so extreme that it could be said that the timing behind the settlement initiatives was planned mainly to embarrass and confound Weizman at critical junctures in the peace negotiations, rather than to promote Israeli settlements on the West Bank."
Benziman makes one more point in explaining Sharon's often-unpredictable settlement policy. He brings attention to the fact that every time Sharon was removed from involvement in the peace process with Egypt, he accelerated the building of settlements. And to the contrary, each time he was brought into making decisions related to establishing peace with Egypt, his settlement activity subsided.
Certainly the best-known story is Sharon's involvement in the destruction of Yamit. After twelve days of negotiations at Camp David between the Israelis and the Egyptians, almost all issues were resolved, with the exception of the Israeli settlements in northern Sinai. Begin was in an extremely difficult situation, especially because prior to his departure for Camp David he promised the settlers that under no conditions would he forsake them.
General Avraham Tamir, Sharon's former comrade-in-arms and a member of the Israeli delegation, was regularly updating Sharon on the developments. When the talks stalled, Tamir called Sharon and told him that if he were to call Begin and to tell him that he, Sharon, the champion of settlement policy would support the evacuation of settlements, this would encourage Begin to make his last concession.
The choice was Sharon's. Based on his "persistent declaration of support for the establishment of new settlements and his frequent criticism of the peace process with Egypt," one would be surprised that Tamir even made this request at all. However, apparently Tamir knew that Sharon's lack of a nationalist ideology would allow him to speak from both sides of his mouth.
Perhaps he remembered Sharon's "willingness to limit all new settlements to a mere military presence on the West Bank in his talks with Yigael Yadin in 1977," when Sharon was creating Shlomzion. Or maybe he recalled that after Gamal Abd El-Nasser's death, Sharon shocked everybody with his proposal for achieving peace with Egypt.
This last episode went as follows. It happened when Sharon was appointed to be a member of a high-level team to come up with alternatives for achieving peace with the new Egyptian leader. Benziman writes:
"Sharon presented a detailed proposal under which Egypt would have complete civilian control over the entire of the Sinai Peninsula, while the Israeli army would continue to maintain military control for 15 years. During this time, each side would have the opportunity of examining the other, with the goal of shortening this period of military occupation as some measure of mutual trust was developed. Egypt would commit itself to reopening the Suez Canal and reconstructing the canal-zone cities, and Israel would withdraw its forces from the canal waterline. Sharon's proposal startled everyone on the General Staff: how could this moderation be reconciled with his belligerence toward Egypt since the Six Day War?"
The answer came very soon. The proposal that formed the basis of the General Staff's recommendation was not accepted by Prime Minister Golda Meir. For Sharon, that meant that his plan was rejected, i.e., that somebody else was going to make major decisions instead of him. His reaction could have been predictable. He immediately changed course and "adopted a position completely opposite to the one he proposed to the General Staff. He now called for the rapid settlement of the eastern Sinai and for the effective annexation of this area and the Gaza strip."
Translated into plain language, Sharon was actually saying with his new approach, "If you did not like my suggestion, fine. But now I am going to make your life hell. I will do everything to undermine your plans. In the end, you will understand that I was right and you will come back to me begging for help."
So now, when Tamir called him, it was the moment when they needed him. It is he, Sharon, who would make the call that would "transform the country." And Sharon called Begin and told him that "making concessions was preferable to ending talks at an impasse over the fate of the settlements." This one telephone call demonstrated, as Benziman puts it, that "his position on settlements had not been based either on emotional or ideological grounds."
It is worth remembering that Sharon continued playing his role of defender of the settlers until the very last moment. Although he told Begin that he supported the evacuation of the settlements, he voted against the peace treaty when it was brought to a vote at the cabinet level, keeping the hopes of the settlers alive. However, when the time came for the Knesset vote, he voted in favor of the treaty, and then personally directed the activities to destroy Jewish life in Yamit and all of Sinai.
Seeing today that Sharon is ready to uproot 21 settlements in the Gaza Strip and four in northern Samaria, we must admit that Sharon told the truth when he said in a Haaretz's 2001 interview that he has not changed. It is exactly because he has not changed that he announced several years ago that he made a mistake by destroying Yamit. This statement allowed him to improve his position as a true right-wing leader, which he maximally exploited in order to become prime minister. It is exactly because he has not changed that he wants to transfer the Jews out of Gaza today.
Make no mistake - there should be no doubt whatsoever that Sharon really cares about Israel's safety and wants Israel to prevail over her enemies. But that doesn't mean that he cares any less about remaining in power. It is precisely because he knows that Israel is the only superpower in the Middle East that he is ready to part with the Gaza Strip. He believes that with all her military superiority and might, Israel can afford this loss. Perhaps he is not even sure himself of how far Israel will need to go with future concessions. That is not important for him right now. Today, with his power base in the Likud crumbling, he desperately needs to attract the Israeli center and the Left, which is why he feels that abandoning Gaza will do the trick for him.
Menachem Begin's Likud election platform of 1977 clearly stated: "The right of the Jewish people to the land of Israel is eternal and indisputable... therefore... between the sea and Jordan there will only be Israeli sovereignty." Long ago, Elimelech Rimalt explained to Sharon that the party membership card is a symbol of one's loyalty to a particular political philosophy. By declaring his readiness to forfeit Israel's sovereignty over parts of the land between the sea and Jordan, Sharon shows his disloyalty to the Likud.
This only proves that Sharon does not belong to the Likud, and the healthy nationalist forces within the party must direct their efforts towards demonstrating to its voters the incompatibility between Sharon and the Likud's ideology. They should make it clear that the Likud with Sharon is not Begin's Likud any more. It is either the Likud or Sharon. They cannot keep walking together.
And at the same time, they should also emphasize that Sharon is not only wrong about his decision to destroy Jewish life in Gaza and northern Samaria, but that he does not have a monopoly on the truth, which is clear from the many wrong judgments made during his long career.
Actually, it is just enough to recall that on September 19, 1973, Sharon declared, "Israel now awaits a period of unparalleled quiet in terms of national security. ...In terms of our country's defense, we are now in the most advantageous position Israel has ever seen and, in fact, given the nature of our current borders, we face no security problems whatsoever...."
Two and a half weeks later, history proved Sharon to be completely wrong. The Yom Kippur War, the bloodiest in Israel's history, and that which brought the Jewish state to the verge of destruction, started on October 6, 1973.
[Part 3 of 3]
The main reason behind Ariel Sharon's restlessness, which pushed him toward the creation and subsequent destruction of Shlomzion, was his inability or unwillingness to do what he was told to do by others. During his military career, he had always made it clear that he was the only one who knew what to do and how it should be done. Nearly in all of his positions, he continually and loudly challenged the orders of his commanders. He had the same problem in civilian life, as well.
Appointed in 1977 as agriculture minister, and chairman of the cabinet committee on settlement, Sharon was in charge of defining and implementing the government's policy for the settlement of Judea, Samaria and Gaza, in addition to his agricultural responsibilities. He realized very quickly that the Ministry of Agriculture was futile for his ambitions. Thus, he simply ignored the needs of his ministry.
Benziman writes that during his tenure Sharon made only "two important decisions in the field of agriculture proper: to increase the resources devoted to the growing of flowers and the expansion of the poultry industry. Both proved catastrophic and resulted in the bankruptcy or near collapse of many farms." The reason for the failure was Sharon's "ignoring the advice of experts in the field as well as his desire to impress everyone with the grand scale of his actions."
At the same time, Sharon's grand vision was a blessing for the proponents of expanding the settlement enterprise. It would be impossible to find anyone more energetic and forceful in his actions than Sharon. Following the so-called "Sharon plan", he "initiated the establishment of as many new settlements as possible. Although most consisted of only a small handful of settlers, he saw them as the nucleus for their future development."
The nationalist camp must be eternally grateful to Sharon, because he saw the development of settlements as a "potent tool to intervene in all aspects of government policy." This was a time when Israel conducted peace negotiations with Egypt. Certainly Sharon wanted to play an important role in it. However, he was not allowed into the small group that was making the decisions, which consisted of Menachem Begin, Moshe Dayan, and later, Ezer Weizman. In spite of this, Sharon found a way to be influential. He did it through settlement construction.
Uzi Benziman writes: "Settlements were being established with no thought for their future viability and with no connection to any broad Zionist vision, but solely to enhance Sharon's own political reputation and to provide him with a means to intervene in the decision-making process regarding the peace talks with Egypt."
Several times, at sensitive moments in the negotiations, Sharon initiated new settlement construction, making sure that the information was leaked to the press. It happened in January and then in March 1978. But even when, in April, Begin made a change in the decision-making process in such a way that the cabinet committee on defense, rather than Sharon's committee on settlements became responsible for approving the establishment of new settlements, Sharon remained successful at forcing the government into a corner.
One of the greatest incentives for Sharon's deeds was his "competition" with Ezer Weizman. He was envious of the fact that Weizman had been chosen above him for the defense minister position, which he coveted. Benziman writes: "His perceived rivalry with Weizman was so extreme that it could be said that the timing behind the settlement initiatives was planned mainly to embarrass and confound Weizman at critical junctures in the peace negotiations, rather than to promote Israeli settlements on the West Bank."
Benziman makes one more point in explaining Sharon's often-unpredictable settlement policy. He brings attention to the fact that every time Sharon was removed from involvement in the peace process with Egypt, he accelerated the building of settlements. And to the contrary, each time he was brought into making decisions related to establishing peace with Egypt, his settlement activity subsided.
Certainly the best-known story is Sharon's involvement in the destruction of Yamit. After twelve days of negotiations at Camp David between the Israelis and the Egyptians, almost all issues were resolved, with the exception of the Israeli settlements in northern Sinai. Begin was in an extremely difficult situation, especially because prior to his departure for Camp David he promised the settlers that under no conditions would he forsake them.
General Avraham Tamir, Sharon's former comrade-in-arms and a member of the Israeli delegation, was regularly updating Sharon on the developments. When the talks stalled, Tamir called Sharon and told him that if he were to call Begin and to tell him that he, Sharon, the champion of settlement policy would support the evacuation of settlements, this would encourage Begin to make his last concession.
The choice was Sharon's. Based on his "persistent declaration of support for the establishment of new settlements and his frequent criticism of the peace process with Egypt," one would be surprised that Tamir even made this request at all. However, apparently Tamir knew that Sharon's lack of a nationalist ideology would allow him to speak from both sides of his mouth.
Perhaps he remembered Sharon's "willingness to limit all new settlements to a mere military presence on the West Bank in his talks with Yigael Yadin in 1977," when Sharon was creating Shlomzion. Or maybe he recalled that after Gamal Abd El-Nasser's death, Sharon shocked everybody with his proposal for achieving peace with Egypt.
This last episode went as follows. It happened when Sharon was appointed to be a member of a high-level team to come up with alternatives for achieving peace with the new Egyptian leader. Benziman writes:
"Sharon presented a detailed proposal under which Egypt would have complete civilian control over the entire of the Sinai Peninsula, while the Israeli army would continue to maintain military control for 15 years. During this time, each side would have the opportunity of examining the other, with the goal of shortening this period of military occupation as some measure of mutual trust was developed. Egypt would commit itself to reopening the Suez Canal and reconstructing the canal-zone cities, and Israel would withdraw its forces from the canal waterline. Sharon's proposal startled everyone on the General Staff: how could this moderation be reconciled with his belligerence toward Egypt since the Six Day War?"
The answer came very soon. The proposal that formed the basis of the General Staff's recommendation was not accepted by Prime Minister Golda Meir. For Sharon, that meant that his plan was rejected, i.e., that somebody else was going to make major decisions instead of him. His reaction could have been predictable. He immediately changed course and "adopted a position completely opposite to the one he proposed to the General Staff. He now called for the rapid settlement of the eastern Sinai and for the effective annexation of this area and the Gaza strip."
Translated into plain language, Sharon was actually saying with his new approach, "If you did not like my suggestion, fine. But now I am going to make your life hell. I will do everything to undermine your plans. In the end, you will understand that I was right and you will come back to me begging for help."
So now, when Tamir called him, it was the moment when they needed him. It is he, Sharon, who would make the call that would "transform the country." And Sharon called Begin and told him that "making concessions was preferable to ending talks at an impasse over the fate of the settlements." This one telephone call demonstrated, as Benziman puts it, that "his position on settlements had not been based either on emotional or ideological grounds."
It is worth remembering that Sharon continued playing his role of defender of the settlers until the very last moment. Although he told Begin that he supported the evacuation of the settlements, he voted against the peace treaty when it was brought to a vote at the cabinet level, keeping the hopes of the settlers alive. However, when the time came for the Knesset vote, he voted in favor of the treaty, and then personally directed the activities to destroy Jewish life in Yamit and all of Sinai.
Seeing today that Sharon is ready to uproot 21 settlements in the Gaza Strip and four in northern Samaria, we must admit that Sharon told the truth when he said in a Haaretz's 2001 interview that he has not changed. It is exactly because he has not changed that he announced several years ago that he made a mistake by destroying Yamit. This statement allowed him to improve his position as a true right-wing leader, which he maximally exploited in order to become prime minister. It is exactly because he has not changed that he wants to transfer the Jews out of Gaza today.
Make no mistake - there should be no doubt whatsoever that Sharon really cares about Israel's safety and wants Israel to prevail over her enemies. But that doesn't mean that he cares any less about remaining in power. It is precisely because he knows that Israel is the only superpower in the Middle East that he is ready to part with the Gaza Strip. He believes that with all her military superiority and might, Israel can afford this loss. Perhaps he is not even sure himself of how far Israel will need to go with future concessions. That is not important for him right now. Today, with his power base in the Likud crumbling, he desperately needs to attract the Israeli center and the Left, which is why he feels that abandoning Gaza will do the trick for him.
Menachem Begin's Likud election platform of 1977 clearly stated: "The right of the Jewish people to the land of Israel is eternal and indisputable... therefore... between the sea and Jordan there will only be Israeli sovereignty." Long ago, Elimelech Rimalt explained to Sharon that the party membership card is a symbol of one's loyalty to a particular political philosophy. By declaring his readiness to forfeit Israel's sovereignty over parts of the land between the sea and Jordan, Sharon shows his disloyalty to the Likud.
This only proves that Sharon does not belong to the Likud, and the healthy nationalist forces within the party must direct their efforts towards demonstrating to its voters the incompatibility between Sharon and the Likud's ideology. They should make it clear that the Likud with Sharon is not Begin's Likud any more. It is either the Likud or Sharon. They cannot keep walking together.
And at the same time, they should also emphasize that Sharon is not only wrong about his decision to destroy Jewish life in Gaza and northern Samaria, but that he does not have a monopoly on the truth, which is clear from the many wrong judgments made during his long career.
Actually, it is just enough to recall that on September 19, 1973, Sharon declared, "Israel now awaits a period of unparalleled quiet in terms of national security. ...In terms of our country's defense, we are now in the most advantageous position Israel has ever seen and, in fact, given the nature of our current borders, we face no security problems whatsoever...."
Two and a half weeks later, history proved Sharon to be completely wrong. The Yom Kippur War, the bloodiest in Israel's history, and that which brought the Jewish state to the verge of destruction, started on October 6, 1973.
[Part 3 of 3]