[Part one of this article can be read at http://www.israelnationalnews.com/article.php3?id=4509.]
Immediately after the announcement of the creation of his own political party, Ariel Sharon began his attacks on the Likud. At a press conference in Tel Aviv, he declared: "The alternative [i.e., the Likud] is no better than the ruling party!"
He told the journalists present at the press conference that, "for him a political party was only a means and not an end in itself [emphasis added]. Sharon stated that he could not believe in a political framework that has lost its basic content. If good ideas cannot be fulfilled within a given framework, it was perfectly appropriate to seek alternative means."
Knowing in retrospect that eventually Sharon would become the leader of the Likud, it is interesting to note that Sharon "assured those present that he would under no circumstances return to the Likud [emphasis added], even if his own political attempts failed."
Sharon not only promised never to return to the Likud, but he also accepted a "moderate political tone intended to make his party appear to have a love for peace and a willingness to make concessions in order to achieve it." He wanted to present his new party, Shlomzion, to the voters as a sturdy and respected body, and he therefore "negotiated with a variety of political figures, demonstrating a remarkable willingness to compromise and reformulate his political positions."
Among others, Sharon approached Yossi Sarid, a very well-known left-wing politician, and asked for a meeting. He offered to Sarid the opportunity to join Shlomzion, with the guarantee of being given the second position on the party's list of candidates. Sarid asked, "How do you think we can appear on the same list while our outlooks are so different?" Sharon responded that he was convinced that the public was less concerned with foreign policy and the Arab conflict than it was with domestic and social issues. "'We both seek the well-being of the people of Israel. What can be the big difference between us?' Sharon told the incredulous Sarid."
Future Meretz leader Yossi Sarid was not the only leftist politician whom Sharon courted. He also tried to enlist the small Independent Liberal party, well known for its dovish positions. When its leader Moshe Kol asked Sharon whom he would send to negotiate, Sharon answered, "Wait and see."
The next several paragraphs from Uzi Benziman's book, which we quote here verbatim, are a must read for everyone who wants to understand Sharon's readiness to part with Jewish land:
"To everyone's surprise, Amos Kenan, a famous journalist known for his extreme dovish position and advocacy for full recognition of the rights of Palestinians, appeared as Sharon's representative. When asked how he could possibly reconcile his support for Sharon with anything he believed in, he answered that they were good friends and he was convinced that Sharon could make a major impact for the good in bringing about the changes necessary for the country.
"Amos Kenan's role as Sharon's liaison did not end here. Kenan was instructed by Sharon to try to arrange a meeting between Sharon and Yasser Arafat or one of his deputies. ...A meeting was tentatively scheduled to take place in Paris, but at last minute, the PLO leadership turned down this chance.
"...Sharon's dovish position went so far that even Uri Avneri, the champion of a free and independent Palestinian state, was prompted to discuss his possible connection to Shlomzion."
We must pause here to allow readers to catch their breath. One can bet that not many knew of Sharon's flirting with Yossi Sarid and Uri Avneri, and his attempts to meet Yasser Arafat, at a time when the PLO was already considered a mortal enemy of the Jewish state.
However, Benziman's story not only reveals Sharon's lack of ideological principles, but also clearly shows that the line he uses today of making "painful concessions" with the promise to "never sacrifice the security of Israeli citizens" has its precedent. As Benziman writes, "In discussion with Kenan, Sharon agreed to the transfer of the entire West Bank to Palestinian sovereignty on condition that all security arrangements be left in the hands of Israel."
It is hard to imagine where Sharon and Israel would be today if his overtures to the leftist camp had succeeded. But, though in his negotiations with the Independent Liberals, he "did not fight for any of the key polices he had so strongly advocated at the founding of the Shlomzion party," the alliance failed. This happened because in contrast to Sharon, the leaders of the Independent Liberals cherished their positions and were concerned that "Sharon's previous declarations presented too great a risk for this old and respected party."
When his attempts to attract the well-known political blocs and figures from the Left failed, Sharon changed course. "He now portrayed himself as the guardian of the extreme right-wing, forever faithful to the tenets of nationalism. He preached the need to expand Jewish settlements on the West Bank and solemnly warned of impending war, certain to start 'in the coming summer or fall'." He met with the leaders of Gush Emunim, "the key proponents of the idea of 'Greater Israel'," but they, perhaps knowing of Sharon's previous flirting with the leftist politicians, refused to support him officially. "In anger, Sharon declared that he no longer wanted to see or hear from 'those whores.'"
Sharon became desperate, sensing that Shlomzion had very little chance of achieving anything beyond the minimum representation in the Knesset. Therefore, forgetting his previous declarations that he would never return to the Likud, "he began taking steps to assure his own political future by reopening his talks with the Likud." The negotiations did not go well because the leaders of the Liberal Party, earlier betrayed by Sharon, adamantly opposed the inclusion of Shlomzion in the Likud list. Finally, when it became clear to Sharon that the Likud would submit its list without Shlomzion, he conceded to all of the Likud's demands, meaning that "Sharon would receive the sixth position on the new Likud list and the other Shlomzion candidates would be relegated to unrealistic positions between the 47th and 51st candidates."
However, even this was not the end of the story. The leaders of the Likud managed to torpedo Sharon's final efforts at joining the party. Sharon was extremely disappointed. He told Menachem Begin, who called to let him know that he was unable to persuade his colleagues to accept Sharon, "I am more than ever convinced of the wisdom of my move to leave the Likud. Anyone who saw the ugly maneuverings of the Likud knows why it is impossible to join forces with such a party."
When the Likud won the election, while Shlomzion obtained only the minimum two mandates, Sharon called Begin to congratulate him. "Your place is with us," responded Begin.
The circle was complete. After promptly writing, on Begin's advice, "a conciliation letter to Ehrilch [the leader of the Liberal Party]," the prodigal son returned to the Likud that he had smeared so heavily. The adventure with Shlomzion was over. The party had served its purpose and was no longer needed.
Benziman writes:
"Those who had joined Shlomzion as a political organization in the hope of establishing a new political party capable of change were disappointed. The warnings of those who had reported that Sharon would use people for his own personal interest and then discard them should have been heeded. They understood that the leadership of the Likud would remain within Herut and given the tenuous state of Begin's health, Sharon was preparing for the battle of succession. But there was no stopping Sharon. With the same energy and determination that he had invested in establishing the party a mere six months ago, he now set about dismantling it."
In addition to dismantling the Shlomzion party, Sharon needed to repair the damage to his image that was done while he had been courting left-wing politicians. He understood very well that if he were to succeed Begin, his road to absolute power would go only through Herut. Benziman writes that Sharon needed "to become completely assimilated into Herut. He therefore began assiduously courting Herut staffers and creating the impression of being the most avid supporter of Herut's ideology."
[Part 2 of 3]
Immediately after the announcement of the creation of his own political party, Ariel Sharon began his attacks on the Likud. At a press conference in Tel Aviv, he declared: "The alternative [i.e., the Likud] is no better than the ruling party!"
He told the journalists present at the press conference that, "for him a political party was only a means and not an end in itself [emphasis added]. Sharon stated that he could not believe in a political framework that has lost its basic content. If good ideas cannot be fulfilled within a given framework, it was perfectly appropriate to seek alternative means."
Knowing in retrospect that eventually Sharon would become the leader of the Likud, it is interesting to note that Sharon "assured those present that he would under no circumstances return to the Likud [emphasis added], even if his own political attempts failed."
Sharon not only promised never to return to the Likud, but he also accepted a "moderate political tone intended to make his party appear to have a love for peace and a willingness to make concessions in order to achieve it." He wanted to present his new party, Shlomzion, to the voters as a sturdy and respected body, and he therefore "negotiated with a variety of political figures, demonstrating a remarkable willingness to compromise and reformulate his political positions."
Among others, Sharon approached Yossi Sarid, a very well-known left-wing politician, and asked for a meeting. He offered to Sarid the opportunity to join Shlomzion, with the guarantee of being given the second position on the party's list of candidates. Sarid asked, "How do you think we can appear on the same list while our outlooks are so different?" Sharon responded that he was convinced that the public was less concerned with foreign policy and the Arab conflict than it was with domestic and social issues. "'We both seek the well-being of the people of Israel. What can be the big difference between us?' Sharon told the incredulous Sarid."
Future Meretz leader Yossi Sarid was not the only leftist politician whom Sharon courted. He also tried to enlist the small Independent Liberal party, well known for its dovish positions. When its leader Moshe Kol asked Sharon whom he would send to negotiate, Sharon answered, "Wait and see."
The next several paragraphs from Uzi Benziman's book, which we quote here verbatim, are a must read for everyone who wants to understand Sharon's readiness to part with Jewish land:
"To everyone's surprise, Amos Kenan, a famous journalist known for his extreme dovish position and advocacy for full recognition of the rights of Palestinians, appeared as Sharon's representative. When asked how he could possibly reconcile his support for Sharon with anything he believed in, he answered that they were good friends and he was convinced that Sharon could make a major impact for the good in bringing about the changes necessary for the country.
"Amos Kenan's role as Sharon's liaison did not end here. Kenan was instructed by Sharon to try to arrange a meeting between Sharon and Yasser Arafat or one of his deputies. ...A meeting was tentatively scheduled to take place in Paris, but at last minute, the PLO leadership turned down this chance.
"...Sharon's dovish position went so far that even Uri Avneri, the champion of a free and independent Palestinian state, was prompted to discuss his possible connection to Shlomzion."
We must pause here to allow readers to catch their breath. One can bet that not many knew of Sharon's flirting with Yossi Sarid and Uri Avneri, and his attempts to meet Yasser Arafat, at a time when the PLO was already considered a mortal enemy of the Jewish state.
However, Benziman's story not only reveals Sharon's lack of ideological principles, but also clearly shows that the line he uses today of making "painful concessions" with the promise to "never sacrifice the security of Israeli citizens" has its precedent. As Benziman writes, "In discussion with Kenan, Sharon agreed to the transfer of the entire West Bank to Palestinian sovereignty on condition that all security arrangements be left in the hands of Israel."
It is hard to imagine where Sharon and Israel would be today if his overtures to the leftist camp had succeeded. But, though in his negotiations with the Independent Liberals, he "did not fight for any of the key polices he had so strongly advocated at the founding of the Shlomzion party," the alliance failed. This happened because in contrast to Sharon, the leaders of the Independent Liberals cherished their positions and were concerned that "Sharon's previous declarations presented too great a risk for this old and respected party."
When his attempts to attract the well-known political blocs and figures from the Left failed, Sharon changed course. "He now portrayed himself as the guardian of the extreme right-wing, forever faithful to the tenets of nationalism. He preached the need to expand Jewish settlements on the West Bank and solemnly warned of impending war, certain to start 'in the coming summer or fall'." He met with the leaders of Gush Emunim, "the key proponents of the idea of 'Greater Israel'," but they, perhaps knowing of Sharon's previous flirting with the leftist politicians, refused to support him officially. "In anger, Sharon declared that he no longer wanted to see or hear from 'those whores.'"
Sharon became desperate, sensing that Shlomzion had very little chance of achieving anything beyond the minimum representation in the Knesset. Therefore, forgetting his previous declarations that he would never return to the Likud, "he began taking steps to assure his own political future by reopening his talks with the Likud." The negotiations did not go well because the leaders of the Liberal Party, earlier betrayed by Sharon, adamantly opposed the inclusion of Shlomzion in the Likud list. Finally, when it became clear to Sharon that the Likud would submit its list without Shlomzion, he conceded to all of the Likud's demands, meaning that "Sharon would receive the sixth position on the new Likud list and the other Shlomzion candidates would be relegated to unrealistic positions between the 47th and 51st candidates."
However, even this was not the end of the story. The leaders of the Likud managed to torpedo Sharon's final efforts at joining the party. Sharon was extremely disappointed. He told Menachem Begin, who called to let him know that he was unable to persuade his colleagues to accept Sharon, "I am more than ever convinced of the wisdom of my move to leave the Likud. Anyone who saw the ugly maneuverings of the Likud knows why it is impossible to join forces with such a party."
When the Likud won the election, while Shlomzion obtained only the minimum two mandates, Sharon called Begin to congratulate him. "Your place is with us," responded Begin.
The circle was complete. After promptly writing, on Begin's advice, "a conciliation letter to Ehrilch [the leader of the Liberal Party]," the prodigal son returned to the Likud that he had smeared so heavily. The adventure with Shlomzion was over. The party had served its purpose and was no longer needed.
Benziman writes:
"Those who had joined Shlomzion as a political organization in the hope of establishing a new political party capable of change were disappointed. The warnings of those who had reported that Sharon would use people for his own personal interest and then discard them should have been heeded. They understood that the leadership of the Likud would remain within Herut and given the tenuous state of Begin's health, Sharon was preparing for the battle of succession. But there was no stopping Sharon. With the same energy and determination that he had invested in establishing the party a mere six months ago, he now set about dismantling it."
In addition to dismantling the Shlomzion party, Sharon needed to repair the damage to his image that was done while he had been courting left-wing politicians. He understood very well that if he were to succeed Begin, his road to absolute power would go only through Herut. Benziman writes that Sharon needed "to become completely assimilated into Herut. He therefore began assiduously courting Herut staffers and creating the impression of being the most avid supporter of Herut's ideology."
[Part 2 of 3]