Ariel Sharon has most of his right-leaning friends befuddled. Our boy Arik ? the founder of the Likud Party, the darling of the settler movement, the poster boy for no-nonsense anti-terrorism and the very personification of daring military initiative - has, it is feared, transformed himself into Yitzhak Rabin's pale shadow. Much like Rabin, he is commonly viewed in his own circle as a leader who is making strategic blunders that imperil the future security of his country.
Certainly, his Gaza initiative has many distraught. The vacuum left by the retreat of the IDF and the removal of settlements in that territory is unlikely to do anything to enhance Israeli security. Quite the contrary. As the rocket attack on Sderot three weeks ago demonstrated, hundreds of thousands of Israelis, not settlers, will come under the threat of missile attack from terrorist bases in Gaza when the IDF retreats. This will result in a strategic problem whose dimensions will only grow more threatening as the Palestinians demand sovereignty in that area. Territorial control over the airspace, beaches and border crossings of a claimed region is a natural concomitant of sovereignty. Once the Palestinians claim those rights, even with Egyptian supervision, the international pressure may well grow so irresistible that Israel will be forced to cede them. If Israel loses control of these vital security points, the risk of death and injury to Israelis grows exponentially
And so the obvious question: Why has Ariel Sharon seemingly given in on fundamental issues of security, risking the lives of his citizens?
The first part of the answer might be found in the dynamics of Israeli politics. Over the past six years, Sharon watched both the Binyamin Netanyahu and Ehud Barak governments crumble when those leaders failed to deliver on promises of peace and security. Neither of them had absorbed the essential lesson of Israeli politics: that the country's fractious political environment cannot be governed from either the Left (Barak) or the Right ( Netanyahu). Political survival in Israel is dependent on claiming the center, advocating policies that will resonate with a wide range of moderate Israelis. Sharon recognized, soon after taking power in 2001, that he could not survive without a broad base of support from this core, extending well beyond his own natural constituency. Much preferring a national unity government, composed of both Left and Right, he eventually settled for one that was decisively weighted towards the Right. But he bided his time.
Since then, Sharon has assumed the role of a stalwart pragmatist. Policies he once disdained are now central to his political view. This explains his acceptance of the Road Map, including the eventual establishment of a Palestinian state (a position he once bitterly rejected), his refusal to eliminate the Palestinian Authority and its terrorist infrastructure, and his willingness to consider unilateral withdrawal from areas where a majority of Israelis don't believe other Israelis should be living.
But domestic politics is only half the explanation for the Sharon volte face. The flip side is American pressure. Sharon recognizes in George W. Bush a friend unlike any other American president. Yet he also understands that Bush's support comes at a price. Bush, of course, has his own international problems and must prove something to his allies in the war against terror - that he is not toadying up to Sharon and is in fact pursuing a peace agenda in the Middle East. So a deal had to be cut and a compromise position found. Hence, the two leaders' joint endorsement for the Road Map - a plan that, in the end, rewards terrorism with the gift of statehood. And therefore, Sharon's problematic solution for the future of Gaza.
The results seem quite promising for Sharon. His popularity has sky-rocketed, marshalling over 70% support and putting him on the road to becoming the most popular politician in Israeli history. His prime ministerial career has already exceeded in length the tenures of his three immediate predecessors. His centrist policies have calmed the US Administration, which has now made a historic concession to accept Israel's eventual incorporation of certain areas of the West Bank into Israel proper. And the US has now more or less accepted the existence of a defensive barrier dividing Israelis from Palestinians.
Yet, with all the diplomatic and strategic explanations for the change in Sharon's political temperature, the one outstanding reason is often overlooked. Sharon's three predecessors came into office as leaders who publicly paraded Israeli security as their highest priority. Rabin and Barak were esteemed generals. Netanyahu had written the book on combating international terrorism. However, within months of taking office, they all backpedaled on their own stated positions, adopting the concept of bilateral agreements with the Palestinians as the key to future peace. All three were dogmatic, secretive and aloof leaders, who took little counsel from others. All regarded themselves as men of destiny, convinced in the correctness of their policies.
Sharon differs from them in that he believes that it is unilateral measures - not bilateral, that will ensure Israeli security. But much like his predecessors, he has mired himself in an inflexible position. He has taken the same dogmatic approach to resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict - gambling on the false promise of a quick solution when experience indicates that there are no quick fixes. Despite adverse statements from his own intelligence services and military leaders, Sharon forges ahead with a policy whose only true merit is that he believes in it.
One then must wonder at the extraordinary risks Sharon has undertaken to fulfill his agenda. While political opportunism is the stock in trade of any shrewd politician, there are limits when its exercise threatens the lives of a country's citizens. Sharon's place in history may depend on whether he will be seen as having been guided by pragmatism, or whether, like Rabin, Barak and Netanyahu before him, he has fatally ignored his own better instincts for an illusory solution.
Certainly, his Gaza initiative has many distraught. The vacuum left by the retreat of the IDF and the removal of settlements in that territory is unlikely to do anything to enhance Israeli security. Quite the contrary. As the rocket attack on Sderot three weeks ago demonstrated, hundreds of thousands of Israelis, not settlers, will come under the threat of missile attack from terrorist bases in Gaza when the IDF retreats. This will result in a strategic problem whose dimensions will only grow more threatening as the Palestinians demand sovereignty in that area. Territorial control over the airspace, beaches and border crossings of a claimed region is a natural concomitant of sovereignty. Once the Palestinians claim those rights, even with Egyptian supervision, the international pressure may well grow so irresistible that Israel will be forced to cede them. If Israel loses control of these vital security points, the risk of death and injury to Israelis grows exponentially
And so the obvious question: Why has Ariel Sharon seemingly given in on fundamental issues of security, risking the lives of his citizens?
The first part of the answer might be found in the dynamics of Israeli politics. Over the past six years, Sharon watched both the Binyamin Netanyahu and Ehud Barak governments crumble when those leaders failed to deliver on promises of peace and security. Neither of them had absorbed the essential lesson of Israeli politics: that the country's fractious political environment cannot be governed from either the Left (Barak) or the Right ( Netanyahu). Political survival in Israel is dependent on claiming the center, advocating policies that will resonate with a wide range of moderate Israelis. Sharon recognized, soon after taking power in 2001, that he could not survive without a broad base of support from this core, extending well beyond his own natural constituency. Much preferring a national unity government, composed of both Left and Right, he eventually settled for one that was decisively weighted towards the Right. But he bided his time.
Since then, Sharon has assumed the role of a stalwart pragmatist. Policies he once disdained are now central to his political view. This explains his acceptance of the Road Map, including the eventual establishment of a Palestinian state (a position he once bitterly rejected), his refusal to eliminate the Palestinian Authority and its terrorist infrastructure, and his willingness to consider unilateral withdrawal from areas where a majority of Israelis don't believe other Israelis should be living.
But domestic politics is only half the explanation for the Sharon volte face. The flip side is American pressure. Sharon recognizes in George W. Bush a friend unlike any other American president. Yet he also understands that Bush's support comes at a price. Bush, of course, has his own international problems and must prove something to his allies in the war against terror - that he is not toadying up to Sharon and is in fact pursuing a peace agenda in the Middle East. So a deal had to be cut and a compromise position found. Hence, the two leaders' joint endorsement for the Road Map - a plan that, in the end, rewards terrorism with the gift of statehood. And therefore, Sharon's problematic solution for the future of Gaza.
The results seem quite promising for Sharon. His popularity has sky-rocketed, marshalling over 70% support and putting him on the road to becoming the most popular politician in Israeli history. His prime ministerial career has already exceeded in length the tenures of his three immediate predecessors. His centrist policies have calmed the US Administration, which has now made a historic concession to accept Israel's eventual incorporation of certain areas of the West Bank into Israel proper. And the US has now more or less accepted the existence of a defensive barrier dividing Israelis from Palestinians.
Yet, with all the diplomatic and strategic explanations for the change in Sharon's political temperature, the one outstanding reason is often overlooked. Sharon's three predecessors came into office as leaders who publicly paraded Israeli security as their highest priority. Rabin and Barak were esteemed generals. Netanyahu had written the book on combating international terrorism. However, within months of taking office, they all backpedaled on their own stated positions, adopting the concept of bilateral agreements with the Palestinians as the key to future peace. All three were dogmatic, secretive and aloof leaders, who took little counsel from others. All regarded themselves as men of destiny, convinced in the correctness of their policies.
Sharon differs from them in that he believes that it is unilateral measures - not bilateral, that will ensure Israeli security. But much like his predecessors, he has mired himself in an inflexible position. He has taken the same dogmatic approach to resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict - gambling on the false promise of a quick solution when experience indicates that there are no quick fixes. Despite adverse statements from his own intelligence services and military leaders, Sharon forges ahead with a policy whose only true merit is that he believes in it.
One then must wonder at the extraordinary risks Sharon has undertaken to fulfill his agenda. While political opportunism is the stock in trade of any shrewd politician, there are limits when its exercise threatens the lives of a country's citizens. Sharon's place in history may depend on whether he will be seen as having been guided by pragmatism, or whether, like Rabin, Barak and Netanyahu before him, he has fatally ignored his own better instincts for an illusory solution.