Prime Minister Ariel Sharon's disengagement plan is dead in the sand, but not yet buried.
While I agree with the idea of consolidating Israel's position to increase its security in the fullest sense, I question whether the plan would have succeeded in doing so. While the notion of separation has broad support in Israel, in principal, the devil is in the details. How to get from A to B? The Roadmap is certainly not the way. Nor is the Disengagement Plan as it exists.
In fact the Plan was not a plan but a decision, Sharon's decision.
When the IDF brass questioned whether it would make Israel more secure, Sharon shut them up saying that he had decided and that their job was to make a plan to execute it in the most secure way. Now we learn, "In talks with the director of the National Security Council, Giora Eiland, the heads of the defence establishment have voiced numerous misgivings about the plan. They say it's full of holes," according to one reporter.
To win support for the Plan, Sharon promised that the Israel would not leave Gaza with its tail between its legs, but would defeat the terrorists first. This was disingenuous. As anyone who has had to weed a lawn knows, the weeds come back if you cease to tend it; the same with terrorists. So cleaning them out as a one-shot deal serves no purpose. It's just for show. Ultimately, you must have a plan in place to deal with the terrorists on an ongoing basis. Sharon was not prepared to have the IDF remain seized of the responsibility - after all, Israel was disengaging - so he resorted to the Egyptians as his proxy or enforcer. The same Egyptians, who are in violation of the Camp David Accords requiring them to prevent such things as the tunnels from coming into existence in the first place, are now to be relied upon to maintain security for Israel. He made no attempt to argue why they could now be relied upon. Experience tells us they can't.
To add insult to injury, he resurrected Yasser Arafat, offering him a travel plan if only he would promise to cooperate with the suppression of terror in Gaza. How desperate can Sharon be? What's a snowball's chance in Hell?
How can anyone have any confidence in PM Sharon's resolve to deal with the terrorist threat in Gaza, when he orders the IDF to abort Operation Rainbow before it was finished, let alone allowing it to remain in control assuming it was allowed to finish. It reminds me of Yitzchak Rabin's boast when selling Israelis a bill of goods regarding Oslo, that the IDF could always go back in and retake the area. Easier promised then done.
Sharon knew that he could not sell the deal on its own, so he enlisted President George Bush's help to secure approval. The best he could get was a letter from Bush in which Bush offered his assurances that Palestinian refugees should be settled in the new state rather than in Israel and that it was unrealistic for Israel to withdraw to the pre-1967 lines. Even so, Bush got a lot of flak from doing so and he has backed off somewhat. The problem with the letter is that it offered nothing tangible to begin with. Had it been categorical and binding on the US, the Disengagement Plan might have won approval. Bush gave too little in the belief that it was enough. So both he and Sharon lost.
Even for such limited Presidential support, leaving Gaza was not enough. Israel had to give commitments, not assurances, that it would put the fence where the US wanted it to go, would evacuate Jews from four settlements in Judea and would agree to freeze settlements. When asked for financial support for the enormous cost of uprooting Jews, the US refused and went so far as to demand that these Jews not be settled in Judea or Samaria. The US was getting a bargain and Israel was getting zilch.
Finally, Sharon never explained why every inch of Gaza had to be evacuated. If he intended to keep 10% of Judea and Samaria, why not keep 10% of Gaza? If the Plan advocated keeping Gush Katif, for instance, which is attached to the Philadelphi Corridor, which is attached to Israel, Israel would not have to evacuate the 7,500 Jews who live there and would thereby remain in control of the border. This, too, might have ensured approval.
Debkafile reports that the US has enlisted Jordan to control terrorism in the West Bank and Egypt to do so in Gaza. Part of this arrangement would involve Arafat being put out to pasture. The US, it appears, has engineered the end of terror for the most part, which Sharon was unable to do. Both Jordan's King Abdullah and Egypt's Hosni Mubarak are on record as calling for Arafat to give up control. In exchange, Israel must abide by its commitments to Bush scrupulously. Time will tell whether this can be put into effect. The plan to rely on Jordan and Egypt to control terror has been worked on for over a year. What goes on below the radar is more important than the show that is put on.
Separation remains the right idea, but it must be done in the right way. There should be no security vacuum, the ultimate border should be along demographic lines with an exchange of populations and no Arab "right of return".
While I agree with the idea of consolidating Israel's position to increase its security in the fullest sense, I question whether the plan would have succeeded in doing so. While the notion of separation has broad support in Israel, in principal, the devil is in the details. How to get from A to B? The Roadmap is certainly not the way. Nor is the Disengagement Plan as it exists.
In fact the Plan was not a plan but a decision, Sharon's decision.
When the IDF brass questioned whether it would make Israel more secure, Sharon shut them up saying that he had decided and that their job was to make a plan to execute it in the most secure way. Now we learn, "In talks with the director of the National Security Council, Giora Eiland, the heads of the defence establishment have voiced numerous misgivings about the plan. They say it's full of holes," according to one reporter.
To win support for the Plan, Sharon promised that the Israel would not leave Gaza with its tail between its legs, but would defeat the terrorists first. This was disingenuous. As anyone who has had to weed a lawn knows, the weeds come back if you cease to tend it; the same with terrorists. So cleaning them out as a one-shot deal serves no purpose. It's just for show. Ultimately, you must have a plan in place to deal with the terrorists on an ongoing basis. Sharon was not prepared to have the IDF remain seized of the responsibility - after all, Israel was disengaging - so he resorted to the Egyptians as his proxy or enforcer. The same Egyptians, who are in violation of the Camp David Accords requiring them to prevent such things as the tunnels from coming into existence in the first place, are now to be relied upon to maintain security for Israel. He made no attempt to argue why they could now be relied upon. Experience tells us they can't.
To add insult to injury, he resurrected Yasser Arafat, offering him a travel plan if only he would promise to cooperate with the suppression of terror in Gaza. How desperate can Sharon be? What's a snowball's chance in Hell?
How can anyone have any confidence in PM Sharon's resolve to deal with the terrorist threat in Gaza, when he orders the IDF to abort Operation Rainbow before it was finished, let alone allowing it to remain in control assuming it was allowed to finish. It reminds me of Yitzchak Rabin's boast when selling Israelis a bill of goods regarding Oslo, that the IDF could always go back in and retake the area. Easier promised then done.
Sharon knew that he could not sell the deal on its own, so he enlisted President George Bush's help to secure approval. The best he could get was a letter from Bush in which Bush offered his assurances that Palestinian refugees should be settled in the new state rather than in Israel and that it was unrealistic for Israel to withdraw to the pre-1967 lines. Even so, Bush got a lot of flak from doing so and he has backed off somewhat. The problem with the letter is that it offered nothing tangible to begin with. Had it been categorical and binding on the US, the Disengagement Plan might have won approval. Bush gave too little in the belief that it was enough. So both he and Sharon lost.
Even for such limited Presidential support, leaving Gaza was not enough. Israel had to give commitments, not assurances, that it would put the fence where the US wanted it to go, would evacuate Jews from four settlements in Judea and would agree to freeze settlements. When asked for financial support for the enormous cost of uprooting Jews, the US refused and went so far as to demand that these Jews not be settled in Judea or Samaria. The US was getting a bargain and Israel was getting zilch.
Finally, Sharon never explained why every inch of Gaza had to be evacuated. If he intended to keep 10% of Judea and Samaria, why not keep 10% of Gaza? If the Plan advocated keeping Gush Katif, for instance, which is attached to the Philadelphi Corridor, which is attached to Israel, Israel would not have to evacuate the 7,500 Jews who live there and would thereby remain in control of the border. This, too, might have ensured approval.
Debkafile reports that the US has enlisted Jordan to control terrorism in the West Bank and Egypt to do so in Gaza. Part of this arrangement would involve Arafat being put out to pasture. The US, it appears, has engineered the end of terror for the most part, which Sharon was unable to do. Both Jordan's King Abdullah and Egypt's Hosni Mubarak are on record as calling for Arafat to give up control. In exchange, Israel must abide by its commitments to Bush scrupulously. Time will tell whether this can be put into effect. The plan to rely on Jordan and Egypt to control terror has been worked on for over a year. What goes on below the radar is more important than the show that is put on.
Separation remains the right idea, but it must be done in the right way. There should be no security vacuum, the ultimate border should be along demographic lines with an exchange of populations and no Arab "right of return".