The Golan Heights is a key strategic land for both Israel and Syria. However, both countries are in disagreement over the status of the Golan Heights after the 1967 Six Day War. While the Golan Heights represents the security and survival of the State of Israel, Syria sees the Golan Heights as a way to regain regional power. The dilemma is whether Israel will give up such strategic land in exchange for permanent peace with Syria, while evidence shows that Syria is a leader of international narco-terrorism, a proliferator of military systems of mass destruction, anti-Jewish, and a denier of the Holocaust. Can Syria be a major peace partner while simultaneously harboring terrorists, including a Hamas headquarters? What are the security guarantees offered by Syria? Can Israel afford to give away the Golan Heights just as it gave away the Sinai to Egypt in 1982?
Finally, could Israel risk national security and rely solely on U.S. security guarantees? Make no mistake; an Israel-Syria peace agreement is complex, and has yet to be effectively resolved. Thus, the future of the Golan Heights cannot be taken lightly. Decision-makers must analyze critically the facts for an effective policy, including the possible process for withdrawal and a testing period for full normalization. The fact is that whoever remains in control of the Golan will also control strategic ground and military advantage. Therefore, the decision of adopting a full or a partial withdrawal could affect the existence and security of Israel, taking in consideration that there are only 35 miles from the mountain ridge to Damascus.
Should Israel give up the Golan Heights and at what price?
Historical Background
In order to understand the current political situation, first we must examine the historical context of Israel-Syria relations. While Syria maintains that Israel "stole" the Golan Heights, historically, the connection of the Golan Heights with Israel goes back to Biblical times. It was part of the Jewish homeland. Furthermore, the Great Uprising against the Roman Empire during the battle of Gamla occurred on the Golan Heights.
In fact, Syria, as a separate political entity, did not exist until after the First World War. Until then, it was controlled as a province in the Ottoman Empire (850-1917). In 636 CE, Syria was conquered by the Arabs, becoming part of the fast-growing Islamic Empire. The Golan Heights were ceded to Syria in 1923, as part of a deal between England and France, establishing the northern border between Syria and then-British-controlled Palestine. Golan's Jewish past and the settlement activities during the First and Second Aliyah led the Zionist Organization to demand that the Golan be included within the borders of the Jewish National Home. However, following the War of Independence in 1948, the Golan was seized by the Syrian government.
Therefore, Syria has never had any long historical claim to the Golan Heights. Israel seized the Golan Heights during the Six-Day War on June 10, 1967 after it was attacked by Syria, Egypt, Jordan and Lebanon. Precisely, Syria attacked a kibbutz from the Golan Heights on April 7, 1967, provoking a retaliatory strike, and was defeated by Israel. This defeat was a major blow to the Arabs. Contrary to their goal of destroying Israel, they made her much stronger, demonstrating her military superiority. As a result, Israel regained its territory by conquering the Sinai, eastern Jerusalem, the Golan Heights, and Judea and Samaria, known as the West Bank. Israel annexed the Golan Heights in 1981.
The irony is that Syria, after attacking Israel and losing, now comes back to demand the land lost by its own aggression. The cycle of terror and killing must be stopped, not encouraged. Then why should the peace agreement should be based on an Israeli withdrawal from the Golan Heights?
Military Aspects
Unquestionably, the Golan Heights play a critical role in Israel's national security. The strategic location and topography are vital to block attacks from Syria. The two main military elements of the Golan Heights are its position for artillery and its being a natural tank barrier. Even before the establishment of the State of Israel in May 14, 1948, the Syrians turned the Golan Heights into a military fortress and conducted frequently terrorist attacks against Israeli civilians, along with daily routine shelling of Israeli northern villages.
After 1948, the Golan Heights continued to be used for artillery attack on Israel. For years, this was the pattern of everyday "normal" life in northern Israel, until Syria attacked Israel in 1967. Then, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) climbed the Golan and liberated the Israeli residents of the North from the Syrian military presence on the Golan. In sum, for the 19 years that Syria ruled the Golan (1948-1967), the area was used as a military platform for continuous attacks against the settlements in the Hula, Galilee and the Jordan Valley.
Therefore, for militarily purposes, the strategic location of the Golan Heights is critical mainly for its topographic edge and geographic depth. For instance, during the 1991 Gulf War, the Golan Heights proved valuable with the use of advanced high-tech military and early-warning systems. The mountain ridges constituted a topographical asset. Furthermore, the Golan Heights represents the best effective deterrence and natural tank barrier for Israel, expanding from the eastern mountain ridge, stretching between Mount Hermon in the north and the canyon of the Rokad River in the south.
For example, during the 1973 Yom Kippur War, Israel could fend off the surprise offensive of 1,400 Syrian tanks, with only 177 Israeli tanks. The risk of returning the Golan Heights will deprive Israel of a key strategic point. Consequently, it will leave Israel vulnerable for future threats. A group of retired American generals, after observing the Golan, all concluded that "Israel would be crazy to give up the Golan Heights." The Syrian army is not weak. In certain cases it matches the IDF, such as in tanks and surface-to-surface missiles. Militarily, Syria has the advantage of numbers with an outstanding force.
The Water Supply
Another asset of the Golan Heights is the watershed of the Lake of Galilee, which provides Israel with 30% of its water. On one hand, if Syria takes control of the Golan Heights, can Israel rely on Syria to supply Israel with proper quantity and quality of water? Again, historical evidence shows that Syria violated previous commitments to Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan, Iran and Israel. For example, Syria planned to divert the head waters of the Jordan River that flowed into Israel in January 1964 during the Arab summit meeting in Cairo. This was planned three years before the 1967 Six Day War. Can you imagine what would happen if Syria diverts the waters now, as it planned in 1964? Back then, Jordan, Lebanon and Egypt had their doubts about Syrian's mood; would they now support a future diversion of water, or will they moderate Syria to avoid an Israeli military counterattack?
In the short-term, Israel cannot sacrifice its water security until there is a clear and effective peace agreement. The treaty must include a clear definition of the water issue, demanding a formal Syrian commitment to not try to divert the waters again.
What Are the Security Guarantees of a True, Lasting Peace With Syria?
Israel risks its national security if it puts its trust in a "peace agreement" with Syria because until Syria denounces support for terrorism and stops serving as a safe heaven for terrorist groups, there cannot be "security guarantees." The danger for Israel will be to give away her best "security guarantee" and remain vulnerable to terrorism, as in the case of the Palestinians in Judea and Samaria, known as the West Bank, and Gaza Strip. So far, concessions with the Palestinians show one thing: the more concessions, the more terrorism and increase of homicide bombings. Can Israel, after the evidence of Syria's sponsoring of terrorism, risk having the same "Palestinian experience"? The simple fact is that Israel is paying a painful price for peace. A peace that translates into more homicide bombings, while the international community continues to deny the acts of terrorism sponsored by Yasser Arafat, the Hezbollah and Hamas. Bashar Al-Assad, likewise, supports terrorists in more than one way.
Moreover, the Assads annexed Lebanon to Syria and allowed Al-Qaeda members to settle there. Thus, security guarantees are non-existent while Syria continues to support terrorist groups aiming for the destruction of Israel. Cleverly, Syria uses terrorist groups as a strategic option against Israel.
As former Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin declared, "Whosoever gives up the Golan Heights, abandons the security of the State of Israel." Possession of the Golan allows Israel easy striking range of Damascus, thereby contributing to Israeli deterrence against Syria. If deterrence fails, the Golan position enables Israel to mount attacks against likely staging areas, and deter Scud missile attacks on Israel's cities and mobilization centers.
The problem for a lasting peace is the dictatorship rule of Bashar Al-Assad, who publicly expresses greater hostility toward Israel than his late father. Assad has made abundantly clear his implacable hatred of Israel.
Israel's holding on to the Golan should be almost self-evident.
Could Israel Rely Solely on U.S. Security Guarantees?
If Israel returns the Golan Heights, it will lose a key natural defense. Then, the question is, can Israel rely on U.S. security agreements? Historical evidence shows that guarantees are not always implemented. For instance, in 1957, the U.S. issued a Presidential Executive Order to persuade Israel into a full withdrawal from the Sinai Peninsula. In 1967, the U.S. failed to implement the guarantees when Egypt, Syria and Jordan declared a war on Israel. Some political experts believe that the failure to implement the guarantees was a trigger for the Six-Day War, when Israel gained the Golan Heights, Sinai, Judea and Samaria, and eastern Jerusalem.
Indicating the need for a secure guarantee is that Assad is now seeking the latest Russian weaponry. The other alert sign is Syria's new cozy relationship with the infamous partners of the "axis of evil", Iraq and Iran. That, plus Syria's continued control over Lebanon, poses a clear and greater potential threat to Israel's northern border than ever before. Therefore, any talk of relinquishing the strategic land of the Golan Heights in the foreseeable future is but economic, military and political suicide.
Thus, Israeli decision-makers must weight the pros and cons of relying on U.S. security guarantees. The best security agreement is keeping the Golan Heights. The other point is whether the U.S. can afford to defend Israel from possible attacks if Israel agrees to a full withdrawal. There is demonstrated U.S. inconsistency in foreign policy, exercising firmly the policies of fighting terrorism, especially in the Middle East. Could the U.S. support Israel in her efforts to destroy terrorist infrastructures?
Plainly, the U.S. must abide by its own rules: Either you are with democracy or with terrorists. The rules and risks are clear for all players in the coalition, be it allies or terrorists. Can you imagine what would happen if the U.S. refuses to sign new arms deals with Israel in her quest for survival, as President Gerald Ford did in 1975? Reassessment of U.S. policy that endangers Israel's security will strengthen Syria, a terrorist-sponsoring state, as acknowledged by the U.S., against the interests of the U.S. and Israel.
On the other hand, a partial withdrawal should include a testing period for full normalization, including embassies, similar to the testing period with Egypt. Yet, due to Syria's pro-terrorism position, this approach will be more risky. Israel cannot allow Syria to turn a blind eye to radical Islamists pursing terrorism.
Strategic Decisions for Peace Negotiations
Let's analyze the possible scenarios. On one hand, full withdrawal will mean Syria's strategic strengthening. This option presents two serious problems. First, there is no guarantee that Syria will stop harboring terrorists against Israel. However, a possible incentive to restrain possible attacks would be a financial incentive as part of an economic aid package. In the short-term, full withdrawal will reduce terrorism, subject to Syrian commitment to expel Hezbollah, as Jordan did in 1980. Second, the problem is whether terrorist groups will abide by the Syrian commitment to peace with Israel, or will it prove a second Palestinian-Arafat- terrorist case.
Most likely, Syrian domestic repercussions of making peace with Israel are great. Moreover, Hezbollah and other fundamentalists of Islam would challenge Syria and destabilize the government, because they do not accept the existence of the State of Israel, but seek her destruction. On the other hand, no withdrawal will only increase tensions with Syria and increase terrorism, especially from Israel's northern border. But in that case, Israel will retain her strategic advantage.
Syria faces a conflicted decision if choosing an effective lasting comprehensive peace. Islamic fundamentalists or extremist Jewish nationalists could kill any of the leaders, just as they did with Anwar Sadat when he signed peace with Israel, and with Yitzhak Rabin. The risk will be an immediate end of the Syrian-Iranian alliance, with possible Iranian attacks against Syria.
To avoid another humiliating defeat and confronting the rest of the Arab states and radical Muslim groups, Syria might opt to use weapons of mass destruction against Israel. This scenario could lead to the rebirth of the Cold War, this time as the Awareness War: Terrorism or Democracy. Coalitions will be only among two groups, following the Bush concept, either you are with democracy or with the terrorists. Finally, giving birth to the Third World War, God forbid.
All told, it is doubtful that Syria would pursue a comprehensive peace with Israel.
Therefore, to keep the status quo, Syria may adopt a no-war and no-peace tactic. By gaining the Golan Heights, Syria will no longer feel constrained. The risk would be a challenge to the stability of Turkey, Jordan and Gulf States that follow a pro-U.S. line of thinking.
Suggestions
1. Prior to beginning any peace process, to ensure peace effectiveness, Syria must stop sponsoring terrorism and expel all terrorist groups, especially Hamas and Hezbollah. Syria must also stop supporting Palestinian terrorist attacks.
2. U.S. foreign policy must be firm and consistent in the Middle East. The U.S. must play an active role before, during and after Israel-Syria peace negotiations.
3. Security arrangements must include significant arms- and missile-control elements, the demilitarization of broad areas, and international supervision of weapons of mass destruction that could surprise Israel's survival.
4. Israel must include in any peace agreement a guarantee that Syria will not violate the arrangements even if extremist leaders, who oppose the peace agreement, take power in Syria. In lieu of Israeli control of the Golan, one must carefully consider what would be the real value of an agreement with such a serial violator as Syria.
Conclusion
In sum, Israel must be on the highest state of alert in light of Syrian regional objectives, its support of terrorism, its perspective towards Israel and past historical failure to comply with agreements. The fact is that in this "War of Awareness: Terrorism or Democracy", full withdrawal from the Golan Heights is neither in the best interest of Israel's national security, nor in the U.S. interest in regional stability, and it threatens the only democratic nation in the Middle East. Therefore, as long as Syria provides a safe haven for terrorist groups, such allowing Hezbollah to attack Israel from its border, there cannot be any guarantee for a lasting peace.
Consequently, Syrian demands for a complete Israeli withdrawal from the strategic Golan Heights as a price for a peace deal is not worth paying. Simply, the price is not right. Unlike the land for peace formula with Egypt, in this case, the land for peace formula will not bring full normalization of relations, unless Syria expels terrorists. Evidence has shown that Syria is a serial violator and cannot be trusted. The fact is that a peace settlement based on a framework of land-for-peace represents the weakness of Israel, and the strength of Syria. It is not suitable for both sides and this framework is almost impossible due to high risks and costs.
Israel, at this point, cannot afford to give away her main security ally - the Golan Heights. It would be like giving away not only the "eyes of the country", but the ears too. Would you give up your own eyes and ears?
[This article originally appeared in Pakistan Today, a US-based weekly, on Friday, January 17, 2003 / Juma, Ziq'ad 12, 1423 Hijrah)]
Finally, could Israel risk national security and rely solely on U.S. security guarantees? Make no mistake; an Israel-Syria peace agreement is complex, and has yet to be effectively resolved. Thus, the future of the Golan Heights cannot be taken lightly. Decision-makers must analyze critically the facts for an effective policy, including the possible process for withdrawal and a testing period for full normalization. The fact is that whoever remains in control of the Golan will also control strategic ground and military advantage. Therefore, the decision of adopting a full or a partial withdrawal could affect the existence and security of Israel, taking in consideration that there are only 35 miles from the mountain ridge to Damascus.
Should Israel give up the Golan Heights and at what price?
Historical Background
In order to understand the current political situation, first we must examine the historical context of Israel-Syria relations. While Syria maintains that Israel "stole" the Golan Heights, historically, the connection of the Golan Heights with Israel goes back to Biblical times. It was part of the Jewish homeland. Furthermore, the Great Uprising against the Roman Empire during the battle of Gamla occurred on the Golan Heights.
In fact, Syria, as a separate political entity, did not exist until after the First World War. Until then, it was controlled as a province in the Ottoman Empire (850-1917). In 636 CE, Syria was conquered by the Arabs, becoming part of the fast-growing Islamic Empire. The Golan Heights were ceded to Syria in 1923, as part of a deal between England and France, establishing the northern border between Syria and then-British-controlled Palestine. Golan's Jewish past and the settlement activities during the First and Second Aliyah led the Zionist Organization to demand that the Golan be included within the borders of the Jewish National Home. However, following the War of Independence in 1948, the Golan was seized by the Syrian government.
Therefore, Syria has never had any long historical claim to the Golan Heights. Israel seized the Golan Heights during the Six-Day War on June 10, 1967 after it was attacked by Syria, Egypt, Jordan and Lebanon. Precisely, Syria attacked a kibbutz from the Golan Heights on April 7, 1967, provoking a retaliatory strike, and was defeated by Israel. This defeat was a major blow to the Arabs. Contrary to their goal of destroying Israel, they made her much stronger, demonstrating her military superiority. As a result, Israel regained its territory by conquering the Sinai, eastern Jerusalem, the Golan Heights, and Judea and Samaria, known as the West Bank. Israel annexed the Golan Heights in 1981.
The irony is that Syria, after attacking Israel and losing, now comes back to demand the land lost by its own aggression. The cycle of terror and killing must be stopped, not encouraged. Then why should the peace agreement should be based on an Israeli withdrawal from the Golan Heights?
Military Aspects
Unquestionably, the Golan Heights play a critical role in Israel's national security. The strategic location and topography are vital to block attacks from Syria. The two main military elements of the Golan Heights are its position for artillery and its being a natural tank barrier. Even before the establishment of the State of Israel in May 14, 1948, the Syrians turned the Golan Heights into a military fortress and conducted frequently terrorist attacks against Israeli civilians, along with daily routine shelling of Israeli northern villages.
After 1948, the Golan Heights continued to be used for artillery attack on Israel. For years, this was the pattern of everyday "normal" life in northern Israel, until Syria attacked Israel in 1967. Then, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) climbed the Golan and liberated the Israeli residents of the North from the Syrian military presence on the Golan. In sum, for the 19 years that Syria ruled the Golan (1948-1967), the area was used as a military platform for continuous attacks against the settlements in the Hula, Galilee and the Jordan Valley.
Therefore, for militarily purposes, the strategic location of the Golan Heights is critical mainly for its topographic edge and geographic depth. For instance, during the 1991 Gulf War, the Golan Heights proved valuable with the use of advanced high-tech military and early-warning systems. The mountain ridges constituted a topographical asset. Furthermore, the Golan Heights represents the best effective deterrence and natural tank barrier for Israel, expanding from the eastern mountain ridge, stretching between Mount Hermon in the north and the canyon of the Rokad River in the south.
For example, during the 1973 Yom Kippur War, Israel could fend off the surprise offensive of 1,400 Syrian tanks, with only 177 Israeli tanks. The risk of returning the Golan Heights will deprive Israel of a key strategic point. Consequently, it will leave Israel vulnerable for future threats. A group of retired American generals, after observing the Golan, all concluded that "Israel would be crazy to give up the Golan Heights." The Syrian army is not weak. In certain cases it matches the IDF, such as in tanks and surface-to-surface missiles. Militarily, Syria has the advantage of numbers with an outstanding force.
The Water Supply
Another asset of the Golan Heights is the watershed of the Lake of Galilee, which provides Israel with 30% of its water. On one hand, if Syria takes control of the Golan Heights, can Israel rely on Syria to supply Israel with proper quantity and quality of water? Again, historical evidence shows that Syria violated previous commitments to Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan, Iran and Israel. For example, Syria planned to divert the head waters of the Jordan River that flowed into Israel in January 1964 during the Arab summit meeting in Cairo. This was planned three years before the 1967 Six Day War. Can you imagine what would happen if Syria diverts the waters now, as it planned in 1964? Back then, Jordan, Lebanon and Egypt had their doubts about Syrian's mood; would they now support a future diversion of water, or will they moderate Syria to avoid an Israeli military counterattack?
In the short-term, Israel cannot sacrifice its water security until there is a clear and effective peace agreement. The treaty must include a clear definition of the water issue, demanding a formal Syrian commitment to not try to divert the waters again.
What Are the Security Guarantees of a True, Lasting Peace With Syria?
Israel risks its national security if it puts its trust in a "peace agreement" with Syria because until Syria denounces support for terrorism and stops serving as a safe heaven for terrorist groups, there cannot be "security guarantees." The danger for Israel will be to give away her best "security guarantee" and remain vulnerable to terrorism, as in the case of the Palestinians in Judea and Samaria, known as the West Bank, and Gaza Strip. So far, concessions with the Palestinians show one thing: the more concessions, the more terrorism and increase of homicide bombings. Can Israel, after the evidence of Syria's sponsoring of terrorism, risk having the same "Palestinian experience"? The simple fact is that Israel is paying a painful price for peace. A peace that translates into more homicide bombings, while the international community continues to deny the acts of terrorism sponsored by Yasser Arafat, the Hezbollah and Hamas. Bashar Al-Assad, likewise, supports terrorists in more than one way.
Moreover, the Assads annexed Lebanon to Syria and allowed Al-Qaeda members to settle there. Thus, security guarantees are non-existent while Syria continues to support terrorist groups aiming for the destruction of Israel. Cleverly, Syria uses terrorist groups as a strategic option against Israel.
As former Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin declared, "Whosoever gives up the Golan Heights, abandons the security of the State of Israel." Possession of the Golan allows Israel easy striking range of Damascus, thereby contributing to Israeli deterrence against Syria. If deterrence fails, the Golan position enables Israel to mount attacks against likely staging areas, and deter Scud missile attacks on Israel's cities and mobilization centers.
The problem for a lasting peace is the dictatorship rule of Bashar Al-Assad, who publicly expresses greater hostility toward Israel than his late father. Assad has made abundantly clear his implacable hatred of Israel.
Israel's holding on to the Golan should be almost self-evident.
Could Israel Rely Solely on U.S. Security Guarantees?
If Israel returns the Golan Heights, it will lose a key natural defense. Then, the question is, can Israel rely on U.S. security agreements? Historical evidence shows that guarantees are not always implemented. For instance, in 1957, the U.S. issued a Presidential Executive Order to persuade Israel into a full withdrawal from the Sinai Peninsula. In 1967, the U.S. failed to implement the guarantees when Egypt, Syria and Jordan declared a war on Israel. Some political experts believe that the failure to implement the guarantees was a trigger for the Six-Day War, when Israel gained the Golan Heights, Sinai, Judea and Samaria, and eastern Jerusalem.
Indicating the need for a secure guarantee is that Assad is now seeking the latest Russian weaponry. The other alert sign is Syria's new cozy relationship with the infamous partners of the "axis of evil", Iraq and Iran. That, plus Syria's continued control over Lebanon, poses a clear and greater potential threat to Israel's northern border than ever before. Therefore, any talk of relinquishing the strategic land of the Golan Heights in the foreseeable future is but economic, military and political suicide.
Thus, Israeli decision-makers must weight the pros and cons of relying on U.S. security guarantees. The best security agreement is keeping the Golan Heights. The other point is whether the U.S. can afford to defend Israel from possible attacks if Israel agrees to a full withdrawal. There is demonstrated U.S. inconsistency in foreign policy, exercising firmly the policies of fighting terrorism, especially in the Middle East. Could the U.S. support Israel in her efforts to destroy terrorist infrastructures?
Plainly, the U.S. must abide by its own rules: Either you are with democracy or with terrorists. The rules and risks are clear for all players in the coalition, be it allies or terrorists. Can you imagine what would happen if the U.S. refuses to sign new arms deals with Israel in her quest for survival, as President Gerald Ford did in 1975? Reassessment of U.S. policy that endangers Israel's security will strengthen Syria, a terrorist-sponsoring state, as acknowledged by the U.S., against the interests of the U.S. and Israel.
On the other hand, a partial withdrawal should include a testing period for full normalization, including embassies, similar to the testing period with Egypt. Yet, due to Syria's pro-terrorism position, this approach will be more risky. Israel cannot allow Syria to turn a blind eye to radical Islamists pursing terrorism.
Strategic Decisions for Peace Negotiations
Let's analyze the possible scenarios. On one hand, full withdrawal will mean Syria's strategic strengthening. This option presents two serious problems. First, there is no guarantee that Syria will stop harboring terrorists against Israel. However, a possible incentive to restrain possible attacks would be a financial incentive as part of an economic aid package. In the short-term, full withdrawal will reduce terrorism, subject to Syrian commitment to expel Hezbollah, as Jordan did in 1980. Second, the problem is whether terrorist groups will abide by the Syrian commitment to peace with Israel, or will it prove a second Palestinian-Arafat- terrorist case.
Most likely, Syrian domestic repercussions of making peace with Israel are great. Moreover, Hezbollah and other fundamentalists of Islam would challenge Syria and destabilize the government, because they do not accept the existence of the State of Israel, but seek her destruction. On the other hand, no withdrawal will only increase tensions with Syria and increase terrorism, especially from Israel's northern border. But in that case, Israel will retain her strategic advantage.
Syria faces a conflicted decision if choosing an effective lasting comprehensive peace. Islamic fundamentalists or extremist Jewish nationalists could kill any of the leaders, just as they did with Anwar Sadat when he signed peace with Israel, and with Yitzhak Rabin. The risk will be an immediate end of the Syrian-Iranian alliance, with possible Iranian attacks against Syria.
To avoid another humiliating defeat and confronting the rest of the Arab states and radical Muslim groups, Syria might opt to use weapons of mass destruction against Israel. This scenario could lead to the rebirth of the Cold War, this time as the Awareness War: Terrorism or Democracy. Coalitions will be only among two groups, following the Bush concept, either you are with democracy or with the terrorists. Finally, giving birth to the Third World War, God forbid.
All told, it is doubtful that Syria would pursue a comprehensive peace with Israel.
Therefore, to keep the status quo, Syria may adopt a no-war and no-peace tactic. By gaining the Golan Heights, Syria will no longer feel constrained. The risk would be a challenge to the stability of Turkey, Jordan and Gulf States that follow a pro-U.S. line of thinking.
Suggestions
1. Prior to beginning any peace process, to ensure peace effectiveness, Syria must stop sponsoring terrorism and expel all terrorist groups, especially Hamas and Hezbollah. Syria must also stop supporting Palestinian terrorist attacks.
2. U.S. foreign policy must be firm and consistent in the Middle East. The U.S. must play an active role before, during and after Israel-Syria peace negotiations.
3. Security arrangements must include significant arms- and missile-control elements, the demilitarization of broad areas, and international supervision of weapons of mass destruction that could surprise Israel's survival.
4. Israel must include in any peace agreement a guarantee that Syria will not violate the arrangements even if extremist leaders, who oppose the peace agreement, take power in Syria. In lieu of Israeli control of the Golan, one must carefully consider what would be the real value of an agreement with such a serial violator as Syria.
Conclusion
In sum, Israel must be on the highest state of alert in light of Syrian regional objectives, its support of terrorism, its perspective towards Israel and past historical failure to comply with agreements. The fact is that in this "War of Awareness: Terrorism or Democracy", full withdrawal from the Golan Heights is neither in the best interest of Israel's national security, nor in the U.S. interest in regional stability, and it threatens the only democratic nation in the Middle East. Therefore, as long as Syria provides a safe haven for terrorist groups, such allowing Hezbollah to attack Israel from its border, there cannot be any guarantee for a lasting peace.
Consequently, Syrian demands for a complete Israeli withdrawal from the strategic Golan Heights as a price for a peace deal is not worth paying. Simply, the price is not right. Unlike the land for peace formula with Egypt, in this case, the land for peace formula will not bring full normalization of relations, unless Syria expels terrorists. Evidence has shown that Syria is a serial violator and cannot be trusted. The fact is that a peace settlement based on a framework of land-for-peace represents the weakness of Israel, and the strength of Syria. It is not suitable for both sides and this framework is almost impossible due to high risks and costs.
Israel, at this point, cannot afford to give away her main security ally - the Golan Heights. It would be like giving away not only the "eyes of the country", but the ears too. Would you give up your own eyes and ears?
[This article originally appeared in Pakistan Today, a US-based weekly, on Friday, January 17, 2003 / Juma, Ziq'ad 12, 1423 Hijrah)]