Israel's recent announcement that it is building new settlements was met with the usual criticism by the United States. The Americans argue that the Palestinians are less likely to make peace if the Israelis leave them with less land. Although the conventional wisdom, the American argument is mistaken. Israeli settlements are not a force for war, but for peace, because they provide the Palestinians with an incentive to make a peace deal.
To understand how Israeli settlements might promote peace, it is necessary to ask why the Palestinians have been unwilling so far to sign an agreement. Why did the Palestinians turn down Ehud Barak's offer of a Palestinian State in 2000 and why today do they refuse to end terror in order to pursue the Road Map? While the answer is no doubt complicated, there is an essential ingredient that is almost always neglected. An offer of land for peace does not provide the Palestinians with a sufficiently strong incentive to make a deal now.
The Palestinians need not rush to make peace, because they know they can get essentially the same deal in the future. Consequently, the Palestinians are more likely to pursue the benefits that come from currently engaging in terror. In 2000, for example, the Israeli withdrawal from Southern Lebanon appeared to have persuaded the Palestinians that they could benefit from a new intifada that might weaken the Israelis into further concessions. Today, the reason for the delay appears to be different. While the Bush Administration mistakenly thought that a victory in Iraq would force the Palestinians to the bargaining table, the Palestinians may believe that this is a bad time to reach an agreement, when there is an American President who supports the Israeli fight against terror. Thus, the Palestinian leadership will often believe that the reasons for delaying peace outweigh the reasons for settling the conflict.
It should not be doubted that the Palestinians could get essentially the same offer today from Israel that they received in 2000. Although it is hard to imagine the Palestinian leaders changing their behavior, if they were to take strong actions against terror, to fully accept Israel, and to stop teaching hatred towards Jews in their schools, there is no question that the Israeli government would make much the same offer, or would be replaced by a government that was willing to do so. For the Palestinians to settle the conflict now, apparently, they must have additional incentives.
It is here where the settlements can play a crucial role. The settlements are the main exception to the rule that the Palestinians can always receive the same terms in the future. Everyone knows that Israel will never agree to a peace treaty, no matter how much pressure is placed upon it, that will give up the concentrated settlements on the West Bank (as opposed to the isolated settlements, many of which are likely to be forfeited). That is why the Palestinians object so strongly to the settlements.
But that is also why the settlements can be an invaluable tool for peace. The Palestinians can no longer say, "war now, land for peace later, if necessary." Instead, they must accept "war now, but less land for peace later."
Israel could do even more to encourage an agreement and to place the settlements on a firmer public relations and moral footing. Israel should publicly tie its settlement policy to Palestinian terror, promising to stop building additional settlements only when the Palestinians actually fight terrorism. Israel should also explain that the settlements are a form of compensation for the lives lost from terrorism. This type of compensation is especially appropriate, because the settlements generally improve Israel's ability to defend itself.
But is this "settlements for terror" policy fair? Absolutely. First, national rights are inherently collective. If the Palestinians defeated Israel and seized its land, all Palestinians would, in some sense, share in the conquest. When the Palestinians engage in a war and suffer losses, all must bear some of the responsibility. Second, the great majority of Palestinians appear to support Arafat and the other promoters of terror. Finally, this settlement policy may actually help those Palestinians who want to end the conflict. By highlighting the costs that terrorism imposes on Palestinians, the policy may generate Palestinian support for those who oppose the violence.
Israel should continue to build settlements, but should justify its actions as a form of compensation for terrorism and as an inducement for peace. The United States can help this "peace process" by abandoning its practice of criticizing such settlements. Just as facile statements about cycles of violence encourage terrorism, so do criticisms of the settlements. What the United States should say is that the Palestinians have the power to end settlements by stopping terror and making peace.
To understand how Israeli settlements might promote peace, it is necessary to ask why the Palestinians have been unwilling so far to sign an agreement. Why did the Palestinians turn down Ehud Barak's offer of a Palestinian State in 2000 and why today do they refuse to end terror in order to pursue the Road Map? While the answer is no doubt complicated, there is an essential ingredient that is almost always neglected. An offer of land for peace does not provide the Palestinians with a sufficiently strong incentive to make a deal now.
The Palestinians need not rush to make peace, because they know they can get essentially the same deal in the future. Consequently, the Palestinians are more likely to pursue the benefits that come from currently engaging in terror. In 2000, for example, the Israeli withdrawal from Southern Lebanon appeared to have persuaded the Palestinians that they could benefit from a new intifada that might weaken the Israelis into further concessions. Today, the reason for the delay appears to be different. While the Bush Administration mistakenly thought that a victory in Iraq would force the Palestinians to the bargaining table, the Palestinians may believe that this is a bad time to reach an agreement, when there is an American President who supports the Israeli fight against terror. Thus, the Palestinian leadership will often believe that the reasons for delaying peace outweigh the reasons for settling the conflict.
It should not be doubted that the Palestinians could get essentially the same offer today from Israel that they received in 2000. Although it is hard to imagine the Palestinian leaders changing their behavior, if they were to take strong actions against terror, to fully accept Israel, and to stop teaching hatred towards Jews in their schools, there is no question that the Israeli government would make much the same offer, or would be replaced by a government that was willing to do so. For the Palestinians to settle the conflict now, apparently, they must have additional incentives.
It is here where the settlements can play a crucial role. The settlements are the main exception to the rule that the Palestinians can always receive the same terms in the future. Everyone knows that Israel will never agree to a peace treaty, no matter how much pressure is placed upon it, that will give up the concentrated settlements on the West Bank (as opposed to the isolated settlements, many of which are likely to be forfeited). That is why the Palestinians object so strongly to the settlements.
But that is also why the settlements can be an invaluable tool for peace. The Palestinians can no longer say, "war now, land for peace later, if necessary." Instead, they must accept "war now, but less land for peace later."
Israel could do even more to encourage an agreement and to place the settlements on a firmer public relations and moral footing. Israel should publicly tie its settlement policy to Palestinian terror, promising to stop building additional settlements only when the Palestinians actually fight terrorism. Israel should also explain that the settlements are a form of compensation for the lives lost from terrorism. This type of compensation is especially appropriate, because the settlements generally improve Israel's ability to defend itself.
But is this "settlements for terror" policy fair? Absolutely. First, national rights are inherently collective. If the Palestinians defeated Israel and seized its land, all Palestinians would, in some sense, share in the conquest. When the Palestinians engage in a war and suffer losses, all must bear some of the responsibility. Second, the great majority of Palestinians appear to support Arafat and the other promoters of terror. Finally, this settlement policy may actually help those Palestinians who want to end the conflict. By highlighting the costs that terrorism imposes on Palestinians, the policy may generate Palestinian support for those who oppose the violence.
Israel should continue to build settlements, but should justify its actions as a form of compensation for terrorism and as an inducement for peace. The United States can help this "peace process" by abandoning its practice of criticizing such settlements. Just as facile statements about cycles of violence encourage terrorism, so do criticisms of the settlements. What the United States should say is that the Palestinians have the power to end settlements by stopping terror and making peace.