The demographic dilemma of the Jewish people in Eretz Yisrael is great. There are currently (end of 2003) 5.2 million Jews in Eretz Yisrael. There are, within Green Line Israel, between one million and one and one half million Arabs. There are, within Judea and Samaria, another two to three million Arabs. And in Gaza, there are also two million Arabs. The Arab birth-rate is among the highest in the world, and they seem to have made a conscious decision to keep it up, regardless of what it costs them economically and socially. There are also at least five million Arabs who call themselves ?Palestinians? and will wish, in any peace agreement, to return to the area west of the Jordan.
The Arab population in the whole of the land of Israel west of the Jordan will certainly, within a half-century, but most likely even before then - perhaps even in ten years - exceed the Jewish one. And it will continue to add numbers in such a way as to eventually be at least twice as large as the Jewish population. That is, as I understand it, until that kind of demographic transition that has occurred in almost every place in the world has occurred among the Palestinian Arabs. The likelihood is it will occur only when they can feel secure in outnumbering the Jews by perhaps as much as three-to-one.
The best possible solution to the Israel-Arab problem from Israel?s point of view is an agreement based on the Elon Plan. This would give Israel security control and sovereignty over the whole of Israel west of the Jordan. But it would not change the demographic trend, or prevent the Palestinians from continuing in their campaign to defeat Israel by taking over Israel from within. The Arab population, with a birth rate two-and-one-half times the Jewish one, will, at some time, become a majority within Green Line Israel, and would then theoretically be able to vote the Jewish state out of existence.
The traditional answer to this problem has been aliyah, but the pool has to a large degree dried up, at least in those relatively poor nations from which people might wish to emigrate. One of the improbable scenarios for the problem being solved is some kind of catastrophe in the United States, which forces the Jewish population to migrate to Israel en masse. Five million Jews would go a long way to solving Israel?s short?term problem. Yet, this now seems a remote and impractical solution given the entrenched prosperous and assimilating character of the American-Jewish community.
Another method Israel might use is in relation to large ?tribes? of crypto-Jews. These might be converted en masse. The Pathans, who number fifteen million, are one such group. And there are others. Even the single million of the Shinlung from Burma would be a big help to Israel as a whole. But the great majorities of these groups show no sign of wanting such a transformation in identity and location. And the process of their real education in Jewish values would most likely take generations. And this without even considering the problem of economically integrating such large populations into Israel.
A third improbable method, and one proposed by many Jewish leaders, is through altering one long-term basic Jewish norm of behavior. Instead of rejecting and making it difficult for converts, we begin an intensive worldwide campaign for conversion. And here, it might be argued that Jews have much to offer as an ideological defense of our way. That is to say, there are strong ?rational arguments? that might be used to explain the great moral and spiritual advantage of being Jewish. The question, however, is again of why, when these arguments have been valid for generations, have so small a portion of mankind adopted them.
It seems improbable that large groups of people throughout the world will, like the King of the Khazars, come to the conclusion that Judaism, and life in Israel, is the superior way, the way in which they can come closest to G-d. This, given the length of Jewish history and the meager number of precedents, seems to be highly unlikely, at least in the numbers required to really mean anything.
A different way entirely is, instead of figuring ways to increase Jews in the land, devise incentives for the Arabs to leave the land. Recently, the American intelligence and counter-terror expert John Loftus suggested that, once the security wall was built, and once Palestinians had little chance of entering Israel to work, there would be a massive emigration out of the chaos and backwardness of the Palestinian Authority-controlled territory. One problem, however, is that there seems no place where the Palestinians are needed or welcome. Another problem is that they, too, have the value of staying on the land. A third problem is that, although Israel has already reduced the number of Arab workers, this apparently has not had significant effect on the rate of emigration.
A second scenario of Arab emigration is a variant of what happened in 1947?48 and, to a lesser degree, in 1967. An Arab military attack on Israel will lead to a counter-attack, in the course of which there will be a large-scale displacement of the population. However, this scenario seems extremely unlikely, as the present Israeli government has, in the face of countless terrorist provocations by the Palestinian Authority, chosen only very limited means of response. And there is no sign whatsover that any Israeli government is likely to take upon itself the worldwide condemnation and moral calumny of simply initiating action to force Arabs out.
Economic incentives to buy Arab property, and enable the sellers to make new lives either on the other side of the river, or in other places of the world, also seem unlikely to have great success. The monetary sums involved are too great for Israel alone to handle. And it is doubtful that anyone else would offer this money simply to make life easier for Israel.
However, there is the possibility that some disaster (whether natural or manmade) would cause massive emigration . But then, this would also probably mean massive emigration of the Jewish population.
There is no end to speculations, to wild improbable possibilities.
And always, in the background, what seems the most realistic possibility, the extrapolation of present trends, an extrapolation that suggests an increasingly crowded Israel will have an increasingly larger Arab community percentage-wise. And that, within the land of Israel as a whole, west of the Jordan, a Jewish minority will have to contend with with an Arab population greater than it in size.
This is to suggest that to rely on wild, improbable possibilities, on ?miracles? is no policy. And that the Jewish people in Israel, and our leaders, must try to think and understand now more practical and realistic answers to this question than have been suggested in this article.
The Arab population in the whole of the land of Israel west of the Jordan will certainly, within a half-century, but most likely even before then - perhaps even in ten years - exceed the Jewish one. And it will continue to add numbers in such a way as to eventually be at least twice as large as the Jewish population. That is, as I understand it, until that kind of demographic transition that has occurred in almost every place in the world has occurred among the Palestinian Arabs. The likelihood is it will occur only when they can feel secure in outnumbering the Jews by perhaps as much as three-to-one.
The best possible solution to the Israel-Arab problem from Israel?s point of view is an agreement based on the Elon Plan. This would give Israel security control and sovereignty over the whole of Israel west of the Jordan. But it would not change the demographic trend, or prevent the Palestinians from continuing in their campaign to defeat Israel by taking over Israel from within. The Arab population, with a birth rate two-and-one-half times the Jewish one, will, at some time, become a majority within Green Line Israel, and would then theoretically be able to vote the Jewish state out of existence.
The traditional answer to this problem has been aliyah, but the pool has to a large degree dried up, at least in those relatively poor nations from which people might wish to emigrate. One of the improbable scenarios for the problem being solved is some kind of catastrophe in the United States, which forces the Jewish population to migrate to Israel en masse. Five million Jews would go a long way to solving Israel?s short?term problem. Yet, this now seems a remote and impractical solution given the entrenched prosperous and assimilating character of the American-Jewish community.
Another method Israel might use is in relation to large ?tribes? of crypto-Jews. These might be converted en masse. The Pathans, who number fifteen million, are one such group. And there are others. Even the single million of the Shinlung from Burma would be a big help to Israel as a whole. But the great majorities of these groups show no sign of wanting such a transformation in identity and location. And the process of their real education in Jewish values would most likely take generations. And this without even considering the problem of economically integrating such large populations into Israel.
A third improbable method, and one proposed by many Jewish leaders, is through altering one long-term basic Jewish norm of behavior. Instead of rejecting and making it difficult for converts, we begin an intensive worldwide campaign for conversion. And here, it might be argued that Jews have much to offer as an ideological defense of our way. That is to say, there are strong ?rational arguments? that might be used to explain the great moral and spiritual advantage of being Jewish. The question, however, is again of why, when these arguments have been valid for generations, have so small a portion of mankind adopted them.
It seems improbable that large groups of people throughout the world will, like the King of the Khazars, come to the conclusion that Judaism, and life in Israel, is the superior way, the way in which they can come closest to G-d. This, given the length of Jewish history and the meager number of precedents, seems to be highly unlikely, at least in the numbers required to really mean anything.
A different way entirely is, instead of figuring ways to increase Jews in the land, devise incentives for the Arabs to leave the land. Recently, the American intelligence and counter-terror expert John Loftus suggested that, once the security wall was built, and once Palestinians had little chance of entering Israel to work, there would be a massive emigration out of the chaos and backwardness of the Palestinian Authority-controlled territory. One problem, however, is that there seems no place where the Palestinians are needed or welcome. Another problem is that they, too, have the value of staying on the land. A third problem is that, although Israel has already reduced the number of Arab workers, this apparently has not had significant effect on the rate of emigration.
A second scenario of Arab emigration is a variant of what happened in 1947?48 and, to a lesser degree, in 1967. An Arab military attack on Israel will lead to a counter-attack, in the course of which there will be a large-scale displacement of the population. However, this scenario seems extremely unlikely, as the present Israeli government has, in the face of countless terrorist provocations by the Palestinian Authority, chosen only very limited means of response. And there is no sign whatsover that any Israeli government is likely to take upon itself the worldwide condemnation and moral calumny of simply initiating action to force Arabs out.
Economic incentives to buy Arab property, and enable the sellers to make new lives either on the other side of the river, or in other places of the world, also seem unlikely to have great success. The monetary sums involved are too great for Israel alone to handle. And it is doubtful that anyone else would offer this money simply to make life easier for Israel.
However, there is the possibility that some disaster (whether natural or manmade) would cause massive emigration . But then, this would also probably mean massive emigration of the Jewish population.
There is no end to speculations, to wild improbable possibilities.
And always, in the background, what seems the most realistic possibility, the extrapolation of present trends, an extrapolation that suggests an increasingly crowded Israel will have an increasingly larger Arab community percentage-wise. And that, within the land of Israel as a whole, west of the Jordan, a Jewish minority will have to contend with with an Arab population greater than it in size.
This is to suggest that to rely on wild, improbable possibilities, on ?miracles? is no policy. And that the Jewish people in Israel, and our leaders, must try to think and understand now more practical and realistic answers to this question than have been suggested in this article.