One would think that a continuing and desperate struggle with terrorism, a crumbling economy and a looming war with a rogue regime would be sufficient motivation for any country to keep its government united. But then Israel is not just any country. For 30 years it has been a state fractured along partisan and ideological lines, making unanimity rare on any subject. Israel may be facing its gravest security crisis since the 1973 Yom Kippur war, but the internal war continues as if few have ever heard of Hamas or Islamic Jihad.
Both right and left are responsible for this situation, but so is the electoral system itself. Since 1992, the system, previously recognized by all as incapable of providing Israel with a durable government lasting more than a few years, has grown progressively more fragmented. In that year, the Knesset adopted a law for the direct election of the prime minister, who was to be chosen on a separate ballot from that of the legislature. This law, which followed a series of electoral deadlocks in the previous decade, was designed to provide the prime minister with a strong individual national mandate - much like the President of the United States. So empowered, he would be able to hammer together a majority capable of governing free of intimidation from splinter parties.
It resulted in electoral chaos. Contrary to expectations, those who voted for the prime-minister did not necessarily vote for his party, leaving the country with a proliferation of strengthened smaller parties, some of whom, such as Shas, would quickly learn how to manipulate the system to wield the balance of power. In the 1990s, failure to meet the demands of the smaller parties would result in extreme government destabilization or at worst, crushing no-confidence motions. The Knesset began to resemble a horse-trading bazaar, where political bribery became the common currency of Israeli electoral exchange.
The creation of the 2001 national unity government suggested that a dramatic change to this situation was underway.. Ariel Sharon's government was forged out of a recognition that Palestinian terrorism posed an existential threat to the country's survival. Despite his victory under the old direct election law (which was repealed almost immediately after his victory) , he was able to convince Labor's hawkish leader Benyamin Ben-Eliezer to bring Israel's other major party, Labor, into a unified government. Its centrist platform was exactly what the country needed, a fact reflected in the overwhelming public support it received. When, two months ago, Ariel Sharon fired his Shas ministers for failing to support an important finance bill, the political establishment was shaken. Sharon had succeeded in delivering a rebuff that no other prime minister had managed in years.
Yet personal ambition and hubris popped this balloon. Agitation from the far Left, including the media and assorted politicians, preyed on the continuing spate of terrorist incidents to rile public opinion against the government and against West Bank settlements, creating an atmosphere of antagonism towards both major parties. Worried that there would be little left of his party after new elections, Ben-Eliezer therefore pulled Labor support for the national unity government, forcing Sharon to look to the smaller parties for support. Faced by them with the same intransigent demands experienced by most Israeli prime ministers in the past , he has now found little choice but to call new elections.
Members of the right bear equal responsibility for the collapse of national unity. Former prime-minister Benjamin Netanyahu stood aloof from the government, despite being urged by many quarters to join it. His refusal to do so, and his transparent determination to replace Ariel Sharon as the leader of the Likud party (which almost certainly will become the majority party in the next Knesset), is just another example of a politician who puts personal ambition ahead of national interest. His decision to now join the government comes two years too late.
Whichever right wing leader helms the next government of Israel, either is likely to find that the old system of splinter parties and special interests has returned to haunt them. A greatly reduced Labor party will soon be wondering aloud why it ever chose to voluntarily ride off into the political wilderness. Ultimately, all will be asserting that the only means of avoiding paralysis in a renewed time of crisis is by eschewing partisan or personal interests and uniting behind one leader.
Where, we will then wonder, have we heard this before?
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Avi Davis is the senior fellow of the Freeman Center for Strategic Studies in Los Angeles.
Both right and left are responsible for this situation, but so is the electoral system itself. Since 1992, the system, previously recognized by all as incapable of providing Israel with a durable government lasting more than a few years, has grown progressively more fragmented. In that year, the Knesset adopted a law for the direct election of the prime minister, who was to be chosen on a separate ballot from that of the legislature. This law, which followed a series of electoral deadlocks in the previous decade, was designed to provide the prime minister with a strong individual national mandate - much like the President of the United States. So empowered, he would be able to hammer together a majority capable of governing free of intimidation from splinter parties.
It resulted in electoral chaos. Contrary to expectations, those who voted for the prime-minister did not necessarily vote for his party, leaving the country with a proliferation of strengthened smaller parties, some of whom, such as Shas, would quickly learn how to manipulate the system to wield the balance of power. In the 1990s, failure to meet the demands of the smaller parties would result in extreme government destabilization or at worst, crushing no-confidence motions. The Knesset began to resemble a horse-trading bazaar, where political bribery became the common currency of Israeli electoral exchange.
The creation of the 2001 national unity government suggested that a dramatic change to this situation was underway.. Ariel Sharon's government was forged out of a recognition that Palestinian terrorism posed an existential threat to the country's survival. Despite his victory under the old direct election law (which was repealed almost immediately after his victory) , he was able to convince Labor's hawkish leader Benyamin Ben-Eliezer to bring Israel's other major party, Labor, into a unified government. Its centrist platform was exactly what the country needed, a fact reflected in the overwhelming public support it received. When, two months ago, Ariel Sharon fired his Shas ministers for failing to support an important finance bill, the political establishment was shaken. Sharon had succeeded in delivering a rebuff that no other prime minister had managed in years.
Yet personal ambition and hubris popped this balloon. Agitation from the far Left, including the media and assorted politicians, preyed on the continuing spate of terrorist incidents to rile public opinion against the government and against West Bank settlements, creating an atmosphere of antagonism towards both major parties. Worried that there would be little left of his party after new elections, Ben-Eliezer therefore pulled Labor support for the national unity government, forcing Sharon to look to the smaller parties for support. Faced by them with the same intransigent demands experienced by most Israeli prime ministers in the past , he has now found little choice but to call new elections.
Members of the right bear equal responsibility for the collapse of national unity. Former prime-minister Benjamin Netanyahu stood aloof from the government, despite being urged by many quarters to join it. His refusal to do so, and his transparent determination to replace Ariel Sharon as the leader of the Likud party (which almost certainly will become the majority party in the next Knesset), is just another example of a politician who puts personal ambition ahead of national interest. His decision to now join the government comes two years too late.
Whichever right wing leader helms the next government of Israel, either is likely to find that the old system of splinter parties and special interests has returned to haunt them. A greatly reduced Labor party will soon be wondering aloud why it ever chose to voluntarily ride off into the political wilderness. Ultimately, all will be asserting that the only means of avoiding paralysis in a renewed time of crisis is by eschewing partisan or personal interests and uniting behind one leader.
Where, we will then wonder, have we heard this before?
--------------------------------------------------------
Avi Davis is the senior fellow of the Freeman Center for Strategic Studies in Los Angeles.