Israel's late national unity government was a rickety affair. Salvaged from the remains of Ehud Barak's ill-fated administration, the structure that rose in its place seemed to bode ill from its very beginning: It boasted a prime minister whose own party was in minority; offered an unwieldy power sharing arrangement that brought ideologies into immediate conflict and represented a citizenry that was in no mood for repeated diplomatic ineptitude and internal bickering . But the working relationship between the triumvirate who ruled this new coalition - Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, Foreign Minister Shimon Peres and Defense Minister Binyamin Ben-Eliezer, defied these expectations. The national unity government became, despite some minor hiccups, one of the smoothest running Israeli administrations of the past 30 years. Not only did it enjoy a record 65% approval rating for most of its tenure, but its main reason for being - to execute a consistent national policy for confronting the existential threat of Palestinian terror, was effectively put in place.
The success of the national unity government was largely a result of Ariel Sharon's wise decision to inhibit his natural tendencies as a right-winger and to govern from the center. In doing so, he gave his unity government partners the room to maneuver away from under the shadow of their Oslo legacy while allowing each an autonomous sphere of influence. All three flourished: Sharon's approval ratings soared, making him the most popular Prime Minister since David Ben-Gurion; Peres, who had served in a largely ceremonial ministerial role under Barak, was restored to national and international prominence in the very twilight of his career; Ben-Eliezer arose from relative obscurity to secure the leadership of his party and win grudging respect from the Israeli right as a hawkish, no nonsense combatant against terror.
With so much going for them, why, then, have the major players brought the coalition to such an abrupt end?
The answers to this question reflect the complex nature of Israeli politics as much as the hubris of Israel's political leaders. Under increasing pressure from his own party's ideological Left wing (which opposes all settlement activity and backs a unilateral withdrawal from the territories) Ben-Eliezer is facing a looming challenge to his leadership. Feeling the need to prove his Left-wing credentials, Ben-Eliezer therefore staged his own variety of political theater last week, when he marched a special police unit into a West Bank outpost to dismantle it. The ensuing fracas between residents and troops caught world attention. Flushed with victory, the Defense Minister felt sufficiently emboldened to oppose Sharon's new budget which had allocated $145 million to the settlements.
Yet he over-reached. Expecting Sharon, who faces his own battle for party leadership, to do anything to keep the national unity government intact, he was caught by surprise when the Prime Minister called his bluff. After that he could not back down without losing vital credibility and then had little alternative but to resign.
The surreal nature of these developments is that if the country does go to elections, Ben- Eliezer knows that he is not running for Prime Minister, but for the role of leader of the opposition. If opinion polls are accurate, Labor is at risk of losing a good portion of its power base. Ben-Eliezer's job will therefore be not to win the national election, but win the battle of the Left. That is, he has to make sure that the far Left parties do not steal Labor's mantle as the party of peace. One poll showed the Meretz party holding its own or even growing, while Labor would decline. The disaster scenario for Labor would be that Meretz becomes the leader of the opposition and not Labor.
In order to avoid a January election, Ariel Sharon may now be forced to form a narrow-based coalition of Right-wing parties. Without Peres' reputation as a promoter of peace to shield him, his course towards an ultimate mandate in October 2003 will be turbulent, exposing him to the storms of domestic scorn, international hostility and economic problems far beyond anything he has yet experienced. But somewhere along that journey he will almost certainly recognize another boat in distress. When this happens, the calm shores of national unity will look, to both Ariel Sharon and Binyamin Ben-Eliezer, very enticing indeed.
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Avi Davis is the senior fellow of the Freeman Center for Strategic Studies in Los Angeles.
The success of the national unity government was largely a result of Ariel Sharon's wise decision to inhibit his natural tendencies as a right-winger and to govern from the center. In doing so, he gave his unity government partners the room to maneuver away from under the shadow of their Oslo legacy while allowing each an autonomous sphere of influence. All three flourished: Sharon's approval ratings soared, making him the most popular Prime Minister since David Ben-Gurion; Peres, who had served in a largely ceremonial ministerial role under Barak, was restored to national and international prominence in the very twilight of his career; Ben-Eliezer arose from relative obscurity to secure the leadership of his party and win grudging respect from the Israeli right as a hawkish, no nonsense combatant against terror.
With so much going for them, why, then, have the major players brought the coalition to such an abrupt end?
The answers to this question reflect the complex nature of Israeli politics as much as the hubris of Israel's political leaders. Under increasing pressure from his own party's ideological Left wing (which opposes all settlement activity and backs a unilateral withdrawal from the territories) Ben-Eliezer is facing a looming challenge to his leadership. Feeling the need to prove his Left-wing credentials, Ben-Eliezer therefore staged his own variety of political theater last week, when he marched a special police unit into a West Bank outpost to dismantle it. The ensuing fracas between residents and troops caught world attention. Flushed with victory, the Defense Minister felt sufficiently emboldened to oppose Sharon's new budget which had allocated $145 million to the settlements.
Yet he over-reached. Expecting Sharon, who faces his own battle for party leadership, to do anything to keep the national unity government intact, he was caught by surprise when the Prime Minister called his bluff. After that he could not back down without losing vital credibility and then had little alternative but to resign.
The surreal nature of these developments is that if the country does go to elections, Ben- Eliezer knows that he is not running for Prime Minister, but for the role of leader of the opposition. If opinion polls are accurate, Labor is at risk of losing a good portion of its power base. Ben-Eliezer's job will therefore be not to win the national election, but win the battle of the Left. That is, he has to make sure that the far Left parties do not steal Labor's mantle as the party of peace. One poll showed the Meretz party holding its own or even growing, while Labor would decline. The disaster scenario for Labor would be that Meretz becomes the leader of the opposition and not Labor.
In order to avoid a January election, Ariel Sharon may now be forced to form a narrow-based coalition of Right-wing parties. Without Peres' reputation as a promoter of peace to shield him, his course towards an ultimate mandate in October 2003 will be turbulent, exposing him to the storms of domestic scorn, international hostility and economic problems far beyond anything he has yet experienced. But somewhere along that journey he will almost certainly recognize another boat in distress. When this happens, the calm shores of national unity will look, to both Ariel Sharon and Binyamin Ben-Eliezer, very enticing indeed.
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Avi Davis is the senior fellow of the Freeman Center for Strategic Studies in Los Angeles.