In a week of commemorations, there is one other remembrance that is passing by blithely unnoticed. September 5th marks the 30th anniversary of the Munich Massacre, a terrorist attack at the Munich Olympic Games that ended with the deaths of 11 Israeli athletes and five Arab terrorists. Ineptitude, carelessness, and a willful disregard for human life and safety all characterized the events of that day. The word, though, that best describes the course of events in Munich thirty years ago is ?failure?.
Failure came in abundance. First; the failure of the German Olympic Organizing Committee to provide adequate security for the athletes in the Olympic Village. Second; the decision of the Olympic committee not to stop the Games even after two Israeli athletes had been murdered. Third; the refusal of Germany?s political leadership to allow the Israelis to bring in their own crack anti-terrorism squad to rescue their own people in their own way. Finally and most notoriously, was the failure of the counterattack on the helicopters at the Munich airport, which was so disastrously bungled that it has been used ever since as an example of how not to combat terrorism. The greatest failure of all, however, has only recently been revealed. Following the airport shoot out, in which all the Israeli captives were killed, the three surviving terrorists were brought into custody. Germany vowed to put them on trial, but before it could do so Palestinian extremists hijacked a Lufthansa jet carrying only 12 German citizens and 5 crewmen. The German government entered into negotiations with the hijackers and it was agreed between them that the three surviving Munich terrorists would be released in exchange for the passengers and crew.
The exchange, it has been revealed, was a set up. The German government had collaborated in the hijacking to prevent any further terrorist atrocities on its soil and to avoid the possibility of an embarrassing expose of German inefficiency during a trial. Those close to then Chancellor Willie Brandt have acknowledged that this decision was made at the highest levels. The Germans, in the end, appeased terrorism and thereby acknowledged that in the world?s political arena, terrorism could actually win. Thus courage and tenacity were not the only casualties of September 1972. Until that day, terrorism had played only a minor role in world affairs, its antics peripheral to the greater drama being played out in the Cold War. In fact, terrorism rarely had much success in achieving political goals and was not given serious attention. Satellite, real time news coverage of the Olympic Games, however, gave the terrorists a theretofore unparalleled injection of resolve. It opened wide a media channel of millions of viewers to whom they could present their grievances and their ?cause?, and gave their demands the immediate impact of a declaration of war in a powerful demonstration of political theater.
For this reason, September 5, 1972 marked a significant turning point in the way the world came to view terrorism. It gave terrorist leaders a voice on the world stage, a grave development highlighted by an address from Yasser Arafat, an acknowledged terrorist, before the General Assembly of the United Nations in November 1974. Thereafter, Arafat was accorded head of government status by the UN and by numerous states hitherto opposed to terrorism.
Sadly, the lessons conveyed by the events in Munich have yet to penetrate Europe?s political consciousness. Fearing a spill over of terrorism into their own countries, European leaders have only been nominal players in the battle against terror over the past thirty years, and since September 11th outwardly chary of outright condemnation of terrorism wherever it occurs. French President Jacques Chirac has referred to suicide bombers as freedom fighters, and both Belgian and Norwegian leaders have on occasion shown a profound inability to distinguish between terrorism and a genuine political process, whether it involves Palestinian militia or Basque separatists. The unwillingness of Europe to see the state-sponsored terrorism of Saddam Hussein as a threat to world peace is just another example of a moral indifference more easily defined as cowardice.
The United States has become a different place since September 11th of last year, but for Europe time really does seem to have stood still. While no one should wish harm on another people, one does have to wonder whether it will take a devastating attack on a central French or German institution for Europe to finally absorb the tragic lessons -and failures- of Munich, 1972.
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Avi Davis is the senior fellow of the Freeman Center for Strategic Studies and a senior editorial columnist for the non-line magazine Jewsweek.com
Failure came in abundance. First; the failure of the German Olympic Organizing Committee to provide adequate security for the athletes in the Olympic Village. Second; the decision of the Olympic committee not to stop the Games even after two Israeli athletes had been murdered. Third; the refusal of Germany?s political leadership to allow the Israelis to bring in their own crack anti-terrorism squad to rescue their own people in their own way. Finally and most notoriously, was the failure of the counterattack on the helicopters at the Munich airport, which was so disastrously bungled that it has been used ever since as an example of how not to combat terrorism. The greatest failure of all, however, has only recently been revealed. Following the airport shoot out, in which all the Israeli captives were killed, the three surviving terrorists were brought into custody. Germany vowed to put them on trial, but before it could do so Palestinian extremists hijacked a Lufthansa jet carrying only 12 German citizens and 5 crewmen. The German government entered into negotiations with the hijackers and it was agreed between them that the three surviving Munich terrorists would be released in exchange for the passengers and crew.
The exchange, it has been revealed, was a set up. The German government had collaborated in the hijacking to prevent any further terrorist atrocities on its soil and to avoid the possibility of an embarrassing expose of German inefficiency during a trial. Those close to then Chancellor Willie Brandt have acknowledged that this decision was made at the highest levels. The Germans, in the end, appeased terrorism and thereby acknowledged that in the world?s political arena, terrorism could actually win. Thus courage and tenacity were not the only casualties of September 1972. Until that day, terrorism had played only a minor role in world affairs, its antics peripheral to the greater drama being played out in the Cold War. In fact, terrorism rarely had much success in achieving political goals and was not given serious attention. Satellite, real time news coverage of the Olympic Games, however, gave the terrorists a theretofore unparalleled injection of resolve. It opened wide a media channel of millions of viewers to whom they could present their grievances and their ?cause?, and gave their demands the immediate impact of a declaration of war in a powerful demonstration of political theater.
For this reason, September 5, 1972 marked a significant turning point in the way the world came to view terrorism. It gave terrorist leaders a voice on the world stage, a grave development highlighted by an address from Yasser Arafat, an acknowledged terrorist, before the General Assembly of the United Nations in November 1974. Thereafter, Arafat was accorded head of government status by the UN and by numerous states hitherto opposed to terrorism.
Sadly, the lessons conveyed by the events in Munich have yet to penetrate Europe?s political consciousness. Fearing a spill over of terrorism into their own countries, European leaders have only been nominal players in the battle against terror over the past thirty years, and since September 11th outwardly chary of outright condemnation of terrorism wherever it occurs. French President Jacques Chirac has referred to suicide bombers as freedom fighters, and both Belgian and Norwegian leaders have on occasion shown a profound inability to distinguish between terrorism and a genuine political process, whether it involves Palestinian militia or Basque separatists. The unwillingness of Europe to see the state-sponsored terrorism of Saddam Hussein as a threat to world peace is just another example of a moral indifference more easily defined as cowardice.
The United States has become a different place since September 11th of last year, but for Europe time really does seem to have stood still. While no one should wish harm on another people, one does have to wonder whether it will take a devastating attack on a central French or German institution for Europe to finally absorb the tragic lessons -and failures- of Munich, 1972.
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Avi Davis is the senior fellow of the Freeman Center for Strategic Studies and a senior editorial columnist for the non-line magazine Jewsweek.com