?Again, people will say that I am furnishing the Anti-Semites with weapons. Why so? Because I admit the truth??-- Theodor Herzl. The Jewish State.
Since the inception of modern Zionism, a little more than a century has passed. In the course of that century, Zionism has demonstrated fantastic achievements in areas such as land development, industry, agriculture, technological progress, military advancement and so on. But there is one specific area in which it has miserably failed - Arab-Jewish relations. The main reason for this is that for the entire century, everything possible was done to avoid even bringing up the issue. What is worse, the problem was always ignored under the assumption that it would eventually resolve itself. Jewish leaders used every means at their disposal to avoid coming to terms with the truth that Arab-Jewish relations have always been, and still are, a significant problem that requires active efforts at a resolution. While the Arabs raised the issue immediately from the outset, beginning with the very first waves of aliyah, the Jews pretended that the problem did not exist.
Already on June 24, 1891, Arab leaders for the first time vocally protested against Jewish settlement in Palestine. They sent a telegram from Jerusalem, signed by 500 people, to the Grand Vizier in Constantinople, asking him to prohibit Russian Jews from entering Palestine and from acquiring land there. These were the two basic demands which the Arabs never abandoned thereafter: a halt to Jewish immigration into Palestine and an end to land purchase by them. Jewish leaders always believed that they would be able to coexist with the Arabs. They imagined it would be only natural for the Arabs who inhabited Eretz Yisrael to remain there peacefully, living together with the arriving Jews, because that is exactly how the arriving Jews felt about living together with the Arabs. In defense of the Zionists, it may be said that the lack of any national identification among the non-Jewish population of Eretz Yisrael at the beginning of the twentieth century gave the Jews some cause to regard the Arab-Jewish relations problem as being non-existent. Another reason may have been the friendly and peaceful overtures of the Emir Feisal, who wrote to American Zionist leader Felix Frankfurter in 1919 that the Arabs "look with the deepest sympathy on the Zionist movement" and that they will "wish the Jews a most hearty welcome home." But the greatest role was most likely played by wishful thinking.
Even so, the most far-seeing of the Zionist leaders, such as Itzhak Tabenkin and Arthur Ruppin, warned of the impending disaster. Especially clear in bringing up this question was Ze'ev Jabotinsky, who profoundly understood that the issue of Arab-Jewish relations would be the most critical one for the entire Zionist enterprise. Indeed, as history has moved forward, it has become increasingly clear that the success of Zionism now hinges in the most critical way on this single pivotal issue.
In any case, now is not the time to get into the detailed history of Arab-Jewish relations, trying to determine whose fault it is that the Jews and the Arabs are unable to live together peacefully in Eretz Yisrael. Objectively, blame can be laid on both sides. On the Jewish side, the greatest fault lies with allowing the problem to develop to such a great extent, without looking for a solution. It should have been dealt with long ago, when the solution itself was much easier. That does not mean that now the appropriate thing to do is to sit idly, waiting for miracles to happen. On the contrary, the fifty-four years since the creation of the Jewish state have sharply emphasized the problem itself. Its resolution has became a task of utmost importance.
The goal of Zionism was always the return of Jews to Zion and the creation there of a Jewish state. This goal has remained unchanged and is no less urgent today (Ariel Sharon's stated aim of attracting another million Jews to the Jewish state is completely in line with it). The problem arises when one tries to define what is meant by "a Jewish state." In reality, however, the term itself is pretty self-explanatory - it is a state for the Jews. To put it differently, it is an ethnically homogeneous state, not unlike many of the European countries (though even this definition is somewhat inaccurate, since Jews are not a distinct ethnic group per se). Let us not be afraid to be accused of racism. This idea has nothing to do with any claims of racial superiority of Jews versus non-Jews, if only because "Jew" is not a racial characteristic and skin color is not a defining trait of Jews. The idea is simply that the Jewish nation, Am Yisrael, the people of Israel, must have a state to call their own.
Those who suffer from pangs of acute liberal sensitivity should keep in mind that an ethnically homogeneous state is not a dirty word and does not constitute a threat to mankind. Many such states already exist. Falling most precisely into this category are Japan and Finland. For some reason, no one complains that in order to become a Japanese citizen, for instance, one must not only be born to Japanese parents but, in addition, must be born in Japan itself. At the same time, even the slightest hint of curtailing the political rights of Israeli Arabs causes an uproar in the whole world, first and foremost among Israeli Jews themselves. The events of the second half of the twentieth century have provided more than ample evidence of the fact that mono-national states are generally more stable than multinational ones. Some convincing examples of this may be found in the disintegration of Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union, as opposed to the significantly greater stability of Western European nations. The United States is a notable exception, of course, but as such it is an anomaly.
As if this wasn't enough, Arab-Jewish relations are complicated by the fact that the entire Arab world has been bent on Israel's destruction, since the founding of the Jewish state. This deep-seated Arab hatred towards the Jews needs to be acknowledged and absolutely must be taken into account, when considering any resolution of the Arab-Jewish conflict. It is especially important not to repeat the mistakes made by Jewish leaders at the beginning of the last century.
Since the factors that threaten her existence are so numerous, Israel must reduce them to an absolute minimum. Two vitally important conditions for Israel's survival are eliminating the demographic threat to the Jewish character of the state from Israeli Arabs and guaranteeing Israel's sufficient strategic military depth. For obvious reasons, the option of creating a new Palestinian state in Judea, Samaria and Gaza (known collectively as Yesha), which is so popular today among "enlightened" circles, does not even remotely achieve either one of these conditions (also, for reasons discussed elsewhere, by this author and others, a Palestinian state in Yesha is virtually guaranteed to be unviable, and promises to be a ticking time bomb). However, both of these crucial goals can be immediately attained if Israel defines as her strategic aim the relocation of the Arabs from the confines of western Eretz Yisrael (a term that refers to all the land west of the Jordan River).
The issue of transfer is a taboo topic in Israel. It is assumed a priori that transfer is impossible, unachievable and immoral to boot. Even to touch upon the subject is politically incorrect. However, carried out in a planned and controlled way, with suitable compensation and assistance provided to those being resettled, and especially with international support, any moral issues immediately drop out of the picture. In addition, as this article aims to demonstrate, the transfer of the Arabs is indeed achievable and it is only the unwillingness of Israeli leaders to discuss it or carry it out that stands in the way. In the present situation the leaders blame the people and the people blame the leaders, complaining that neither one nor the other want it to happen. In reality, however, the situation looks completely different. According to an annual national security public opinion poll, conducted by the Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies of Tel Aviv University at the end of February 2002, and overseen by Prof. Asher Arian, 46% of Israeli Jews favored transferring Palestinian Arabs out of Yesha. At the same time 31% favored transferring Israeli Arabs out of Israel proper. When the question of transfer was posed in a more roundabout way, 60% of respondents said that they were in favor of encouraging Israeli Arabs to leave the country. As far as the leaders are concerned, one can read a February 6 report from Jerusalem in The Christian Science Monitor, which quoted Sharon's spokesman, Ra'anan Gissin, who said, "If the Palestinians suddenly had a change of heart and decided to move elsewhere, that would be great, but Sharon realizes that transfer cannot be carried out, because of the attitude of the Israeli public. What Elon is saying [about transfer] is not something that seems possible to us today."
For all those who declare that transfer is unachievable and impractical, it is worth recalling the words of Theodor Herzl that "if the Jews wish to have a State, they will have it." When these words were written in the book The Jewish State they were only a utopian dream. Herzl wrote, ?The plan [to create a Jewish state] would of course, seem absurd if a single individual attempted to carry it out; but if worked out by a number of Jews in co-operation it would appear perfectly rational, and its accomplishment would present no insurmountable difficulties. The idea depends only on the number of its supporters.?
The dream of the great Jewish prophet has materialized. The Jews have built their state. To be more precise, they have made many important steps on the road to its realization. However, without the final step - the transfer of the Arabs - the task of building the Jewish state cannot be considered complete. Perhaps if the Arab attitude toward the presence of Jewish sovereignty in Eretz Yisrael had been different, this would not be necessary. However, history has made it clear that this is the only way to achieve a permanent and stable resolution to the conflict. And each passing day without resolving the issue weakens Israel more and more, bringing closer the inevitable demise to which the present course of action will lead.
There are three major reasons that make the transfer of the Arabs out of Eretz Yisrael an absolute necessity. First, physically putting some distance between Israel and the Palestinian Arabs will completely eradicate any capacity (and, in the long run, desire as well) they have for violence toward Jews. Secondly, it will eliminate the demographic threat to the Jewish state. And thirdly, it will allow Israel to further develop under conditions most appropriate for the Jewish nation ? ?the people that dwells alone.?
While many in principle support the idea of transfer itself, even if they are hesitant to talk about it, the practical issue of how to carry it out becomes a real stumbling block. The problem originates from the fact that not a single plan for such a transfer has ever been developed since Israel's creation. Though the idea has been periodically discussed on the pages of the Israeli press, no one has seriously looked at its logistics. All discussion always ended with the same statement, "Well it was certainly necessary to exercise the transfer option back in 1948 (or 1967 or 1973), but now it is too late, and the train is long gone." This defeatist approach reminds one of a sick man refusing to accept medicine under the pretext that, while he should have definitely taken it earlier, now it is too late, and there is no reason to take it now, since he hasn't already taken it. Meaning that he prefers to die instead of trying to recover from his illness.
To rephrase Herzl, it is long past time to say that, if the Jews wish to transfer out the Arabs, they will do it. This is not to say that it will be easy or painless. However, it can be done, and in order for it to become a reality, a strategy of transfer must be developed. The plan proposed below should in no way be considered as the only possible option or the most correct course of action. Its sole purpose is to demonstrate that it is possible to create a reasonably straightforward way to carry out the transfer. However, no matter what the details are, successfully implementing the transfer plan will be a complex operation that must be approached simultaneously at all levels. As such, it must include the following components:
A. Information campaign in the international arena;
B. Information and explanation campaign among Israeli Jews;
C. Information campaign among Yesha Arabs and encouragement of resettlement;
D. Information campaign among Israeli Arabs;
E. Israel's actions in Yesha and the relocation itself.
[End Part 1 of 4]
----------------------------------
Boris Shusteff is an engineer. He is also a research associate with the Freeman Center for Strategic Studies.
Since the inception of modern Zionism, a little more than a century has passed. In the course of that century, Zionism has demonstrated fantastic achievements in areas such as land development, industry, agriculture, technological progress, military advancement and so on. But there is one specific area in which it has miserably failed - Arab-Jewish relations. The main reason for this is that for the entire century, everything possible was done to avoid even bringing up the issue. What is worse, the problem was always ignored under the assumption that it would eventually resolve itself. Jewish leaders used every means at their disposal to avoid coming to terms with the truth that Arab-Jewish relations have always been, and still are, a significant problem that requires active efforts at a resolution. While the Arabs raised the issue immediately from the outset, beginning with the very first waves of aliyah, the Jews pretended that the problem did not exist.
Already on June 24, 1891, Arab leaders for the first time vocally protested against Jewish settlement in Palestine. They sent a telegram from Jerusalem, signed by 500 people, to the Grand Vizier in Constantinople, asking him to prohibit Russian Jews from entering Palestine and from acquiring land there. These were the two basic demands which the Arabs never abandoned thereafter: a halt to Jewish immigration into Palestine and an end to land purchase by them. Jewish leaders always believed that they would be able to coexist with the Arabs. They imagined it would be only natural for the Arabs who inhabited Eretz Yisrael to remain there peacefully, living together with the arriving Jews, because that is exactly how the arriving Jews felt about living together with the Arabs. In defense of the Zionists, it may be said that the lack of any national identification among the non-Jewish population of Eretz Yisrael at the beginning of the twentieth century gave the Jews some cause to regard the Arab-Jewish relations problem as being non-existent. Another reason may have been the friendly and peaceful overtures of the Emir Feisal, who wrote to American Zionist leader Felix Frankfurter in 1919 that the Arabs "look with the deepest sympathy on the Zionist movement" and that they will "wish the Jews a most hearty welcome home." But the greatest role was most likely played by wishful thinking.
Even so, the most far-seeing of the Zionist leaders, such as Itzhak Tabenkin and Arthur Ruppin, warned of the impending disaster. Especially clear in bringing up this question was Ze'ev Jabotinsky, who profoundly understood that the issue of Arab-Jewish relations would be the most critical one for the entire Zionist enterprise. Indeed, as history has moved forward, it has become increasingly clear that the success of Zionism now hinges in the most critical way on this single pivotal issue.
In any case, now is not the time to get into the detailed history of Arab-Jewish relations, trying to determine whose fault it is that the Jews and the Arabs are unable to live together peacefully in Eretz Yisrael. Objectively, blame can be laid on both sides. On the Jewish side, the greatest fault lies with allowing the problem to develop to such a great extent, without looking for a solution. It should have been dealt with long ago, when the solution itself was much easier. That does not mean that now the appropriate thing to do is to sit idly, waiting for miracles to happen. On the contrary, the fifty-four years since the creation of the Jewish state have sharply emphasized the problem itself. Its resolution has became a task of utmost importance.
The goal of Zionism was always the return of Jews to Zion and the creation there of a Jewish state. This goal has remained unchanged and is no less urgent today (Ariel Sharon's stated aim of attracting another million Jews to the Jewish state is completely in line with it). The problem arises when one tries to define what is meant by "a Jewish state." In reality, however, the term itself is pretty self-explanatory - it is a state for the Jews. To put it differently, it is an ethnically homogeneous state, not unlike many of the European countries (though even this definition is somewhat inaccurate, since Jews are not a distinct ethnic group per se). Let us not be afraid to be accused of racism. This idea has nothing to do with any claims of racial superiority of Jews versus non-Jews, if only because "Jew" is not a racial characteristic and skin color is not a defining trait of Jews. The idea is simply that the Jewish nation, Am Yisrael, the people of Israel, must have a state to call their own.
Those who suffer from pangs of acute liberal sensitivity should keep in mind that an ethnically homogeneous state is not a dirty word and does not constitute a threat to mankind. Many such states already exist. Falling most precisely into this category are Japan and Finland. For some reason, no one complains that in order to become a Japanese citizen, for instance, one must not only be born to Japanese parents but, in addition, must be born in Japan itself. At the same time, even the slightest hint of curtailing the political rights of Israeli Arabs causes an uproar in the whole world, first and foremost among Israeli Jews themselves. The events of the second half of the twentieth century have provided more than ample evidence of the fact that mono-national states are generally more stable than multinational ones. Some convincing examples of this may be found in the disintegration of Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union, as opposed to the significantly greater stability of Western European nations. The United States is a notable exception, of course, but as such it is an anomaly.
As if this wasn't enough, Arab-Jewish relations are complicated by the fact that the entire Arab world has been bent on Israel's destruction, since the founding of the Jewish state. This deep-seated Arab hatred towards the Jews needs to be acknowledged and absolutely must be taken into account, when considering any resolution of the Arab-Jewish conflict. It is especially important not to repeat the mistakes made by Jewish leaders at the beginning of the last century.
Since the factors that threaten her existence are so numerous, Israel must reduce them to an absolute minimum. Two vitally important conditions for Israel's survival are eliminating the demographic threat to the Jewish character of the state from Israeli Arabs and guaranteeing Israel's sufficient strategic military depth. For obvious reasons, the option of creating a new Palestinian state in Judea, Samaria and Gaza (known collectively as Yesha), which is so popular today among "enlightened" circles, does not even remotely achieve either one of these conditions (also, for reasons discussed elsewhere, by this author and others, a Palestinian state in Yesha is virtually guaranteed to be unviable, and promises to be a ticking time bomb). However, both of these crucial goals can be immediately attained if Israel defines as her strategic aim the relocation of the Arabs from the confines of western Eretz Yisrael (a term that refers to all the land west of the Jordan River).
The issue of transfer is a taboo topic in Israel. It is assumed a priori that transfer is impossible, unachievable and immoral to boot. Even to touch upon the subject is politically incorrect. However, carried out in a planned and controlled way, with suitable compensation and assistance provided to those being resettled, and especially with international support, any moral issues immediately drop out of the picture. In addition, as this article aims to demonstrate, the transfer of the Arabs is indeed achievable and it is only the unwillingness of Israeli leaders to discuss it or carry it out that stands in the way. In the present situation the leaders blame the people and the people blame the leaders, complaining that neither one nor the other want it to happen. In reality, however, the situation looks completely different. According to an annual national security public opinion poll, conducted by the Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies of Tel Aviv University at the end of February 2002, and overseen by Prof. Asher Arian, 46% of Israeli Jews favored transferring Palestinian Arabs out of Yesha. At the same time 31% favored transferring Israeli Arabs out of Israel proper. When the question of transfer was posed in a more roundabout way, 60% of respondents said that they were in favor of encouraging Israeli Arabs to leave the country. As far as the leaders are concerned, one can read a February 6 report from Jerusalem in The Christian Science Monitor, which quoted Sharon's spokesman, Ra'anan Gissin, who said, "If the Palestinians suddenly had a change of heart and decided to move elsewhere, that would be great, but Sharon realizes that transfer cannot be carried out, because of the attitude of the Israeli public. What Elon is saying [about transfer] is not something that seems possible to us today."
For all those who declare that transfer is unachievable and impractical, it is worth recalling the words of Theodor Herzl that "if the Jews wish to have a State, they will have it." When these words were written in the book The Jewish State they were only a utopian dream. Herzl wrote, ?The plan [to create a Jewish state] would of course, seem absurd if a single individual attempted to carry it out; but if worked out by a number of Jews in co-operation it would appear perfectly rational, and its accomplishment would present no insurmountable difficulties. The idea depends only on the number of its supporters.?
The dream of the great Jewish prophet has materialized. The Jews have built their state. To be more precise, they have made many important steps on the road to its realization. However, without the final step - the transfer of the Arabs - the task of building the Jewish state cannot be considered complete. Perhaps if the Arab attitude toward the presence of Jewish sovereignty in Eretz Yisrael had been different, this would not be necessary. However, history has made it clear that this is the only way to achieve a permanent and stable resolution to the conflict. And each passing day without resolving the issue weakens Israel more and more, bringing closer the inevitable demise to which the present course of action will lead.
There are three major reasons that make the transfer of the Arabs out of Eretz Yisrael an absolute necessity. First, physically putting some distance between Israel and the Palestinian Arabs will completely eradicate any capacity (and, in the long run, desire as well) they have for violence toward Jews. Secondly, it will eliminate the demographic threat to the Jewish state. And thirdly, it will allow Israel to further develop under conditions most appropriate for the Jewish nation ? ?the people that dwells alone.?
While many in principle support the idea of transfer itself, even if they are hesitant to talk about it, the practical issue of how to carry it out becomes a real stumbling block. The problem originates from the fact that not a single plan for such a transfer has ever been developed since Israel's creation. Though the idea has been periodically discussed on the pages of the Israeli press, no one has seriously looked at its logistics. All discussion always ended with the same statement, "Well it was certainly necessary to exercise the transfer option back in 1948 (or 1967 or 1973), but now it is too late, and the train is long gone." This defeatist approach reminds one of a sick man refusing to accept medicine under the pretext that, while he should have definitely taken it earlier, now it is too late, and there is no reason to take it now, since he hasn't already taken it. Meaning that he prefers to die instead of trying to recover from his illness.
To rephrase Herzl, it is long past time to say that, if the Jews wish to transfer out the Arabs, they will do it. This is not to say that it will be easy or painless. However, it can be done, and in order for it to become a reality, a strategy of transfer must be developed. The plan proposed below should in no way be considered as the only possible option or the most correct course of action. Its sole purpose is to demonstrate that it is possible to create a reasonably straightforward way to carry out the transfer. However, no matter what the details are, successfully implementing the transfer plan will be a complex operation that must be approached simultaneously at all levels. As such, it must include the following components:
A. Information campaign in the international arena;
B. Information and explanation campaign among Israeli Jews;
C. Information campaign among Yesha Arabs and encouragement of resettlement;
D. Information campaign among Israeli Arabs;
E. Israel's actions in Yesha and the relocation itself.
[End Part 1 of 4]
----------------------------------
Boris Shusteff is an engineer. He is also a research associate with the Freeman Center for Strategic Studies.