...give me peace and we'll give up the atom. That's the whole story.
Shimon Peres, December 22, 1995 Israel's policy of "opacity" or "deliberate ambiguity" on nuclear weapons is now faintly ridiculous. In essence, Shimon Peres already undermined Israel's longstanding commitment to keeping the bomb in the "basement" only weeks after he succeeded Yitzhak Rabin as Prime Minister. At that time, speaking with a group of Israeli newspaper and magazine editors, Peres advanced the idea of unilateral denuclearization in exchange for "peace."
Aside from the inherent foolishness of Peres's offer (Israel's
relinquishment of nuclear weapons would assuredly invite genocidal war by
several enemy states), the proposal was extended apart from any coherent
strategic doctrine. Such doctrine, however, could provide Israel with broad
policy frameworks from which particular decisions and tactics might be
extracted. In fashioning its strategic doctrine, Israel must begin by
addressing the following major questions: Should Israel begin to identify certain general elements of its nuclear arsenal and nuclear plans? Would it be in Israel's best security interests to make certain others aware, in prudentially general terms, of its nuclear targeting doctrine; its retaliatory and counterretaliatory capacities; its willingess under particular conditions to preempt; its willingess under particular conditions to undertake nuclear warfighting; and its capacities for ballistic missile defense?
Although the answers to these questions would be necessarily
complex and very general, one thing is clear: The Arab/Islamic awareness of
an Israeli bomb does not automatically imply that Israel has credible
nuclear deterrence. After all, if Israel's nuclear arsenal were seen as
vulnerable to first-strikes it might not persuade enemy states to resist
attacking the Jewish State. Similarly, if Israel's political leadership were
seen to be unwilling to resort to nuclear weapons in reprisal for anything
but unconventional and fully annihilatory strikes, these enemy states may
not be deterred. If Israel's nuclear weapons were seen as too large and too
destructive and too indiscriminate for rational use, deterrence could fail.
If Israel's targeting doctrine were seen to be predominantly "countercity"
oriented, Israel might be judged less willing to retaliate and/or less
capable of actually fighting a nuclear war. If Israel's targeting doctrine
were judged to be predominantly "counterforce" targeted (that is ,
targeted on enemy state weapons and supporting military infrastructures),
enemy states could so fear an Israeli first-strike that they would
consider more seriously striking first themselves.
Aware of the countercity/counterforce implications, Israel's leaders
must quickly determine not only the best configuration of these two
targeting doctrines, but also the most favorable means and levels of
disclosure. How shall enemy states best be apprised of Israel's targeting
doctrine so that these states would be deterred from various forms of
first-strike and retaliatory strike actions? In any event, it is not enough
that Israel's enemies merely know that the Jewish State has nuclear
weapons. They must also be convinced that these arms are secure and
usable and that Israel's leadership is actually willing to launch these
weapons in response to certain first-strike and retaliatory attacks.
Israel's strategic doctrine must aim at strengthening nuclear deterrence. It can meet this objective only by convincing enemy states that a first-strike upon Israel will always be irrational. This means communicating to enemy states that the costs of such a strike will always exceed the benefits. Hence, Israel's strategic doctrine must always convince prospective attackers that their intended victim has both the WILLINGNESS and the CAPACITY to retaliate with nuclear weapons. Where an enemy state considering an attack upon Israel were unconvinced about either or both of these components of nuclear deterrence, it could choose to strike first. This would depend in part upon the particular value it placed upon the expected consequences of such an attack.
Regarding WILLINGNESS, even if Israel were prepared to respond to
certain Arab/Islamic attacks with nuclear reprisals, enemy failure to
recognize such preparedness could provoke an attack upon Israel. Here,
misperception and/or errors in information could immobilize Israeli nuclear
deterrence. It is also conceivable that Israel would, in fact, lack the
willingness to retaliate, and that this lack of willingness were perceived
correctly by enemy state decision-makers. In this case, Israeli nuclear
deterrence could be immobilized not because of "confused signals," but
because of signals that had not been properly distorted.
Regarding CAPACITY, even if Israel were to maintain a substantial
arsenal of nuclear weapons, it is essential that enemy states believe
these weappons to be distinctly usable. This means that if a first-strike
attack were believed capable of sufficiently destroying Israel's atomic
arsenal and pertinent infrstructures, that country's nuclear deterrent
could be immobilized. Even if Israel's nuclear weapons were configured such
that they could not be destroyed by an enemy first-strike, enemy
misperceptions or misjudgments about Israeli vulnerability could still
bring about the failure of Israeli nuclear deterrence. A further
complication here concerns enemy state deployment of anti-tactical
ballistic missiles, which might contribute to an attack decision against
Israel by lowering the attacker's expected costs.
The importance of usable nuclear weapons must also be examined from
the standpoint of probable harms. Should Israel's nuclear weapons be
perceived by a would-be attacker as very high-yield, "city-busting"
weapons, they might fail to deter. Contrary to the conventional wisdom on
this subject, successful nuclear deterrence may actually vary INVERSELY
with perceived destructiveness. It follows that Israeli nuclear deterrence
requires not only secure second-strike forces, but also forces that can be
used productively in war.
All this brings us back to the overrall importance of strategic
doctrine. To the extent that Israel's doctrine actually identified nuanced
and graduated forms of reprisal - forms calibrating Israeli retaliations to
particular levels of provocation - disclosure of such doctrine could
contribute to Israeli nuclear deterrence. Without such a disclosure,
Israel's enemies will be kept guessing about the Jewish State's probable
responses, a condition of protracted uncertainty that could serve Israel's
survival for a while longer, but - at one time or another - would fail
catastrophically.
---------------------
LOUIS RENE BERES was educated at Princeton (Ph.D., 1971) and is author
of many books and articles dealing with nuclear strategy and nuclear war. His work is well-known to the Israeli and American military/intelligence communities.
Shimon Peres, December 22, 1995 Israel's policy of "opacity" or "deliberate ambiguity" on nuclear weapons is now faintly ridiculous. In essence, Shimon Peres already undermined Israel's longstanding commitment to keeping the bomb in the "basement" only weeks after he succeeded Yitzhak Rabin as Prime Minister. At that time, speaking with a group of Israeli newspaper and magazine editors, Peres advanced the idea of unilateral denuclearization in exchange for "peace."
Aside from the inherent foolishness of Peres's offer (Israel's
relinquishment of nuclear weapons would assuredly invite genocidal war by
several enemy states), the proposal was extended apart from any coherent
strategic doctrine. Such doctrine, however, could provide Israel with broad
policy frameworks from which particular decisions and tactics might be
extracted. In fashioning its strategic doctrine, Israel must begin by
addressing the following major questions: Should Israel begin to identify certain general elements of its nuclear arsenal and nuclear plans? Would it be in Israel's best security interests to make certain others aware, in prudentially general terms, of its nuclear targeting doctrine; its retaliatory and counterretaliatory capacities; its willingess under particular conditions to preempt; its willingess under particular conditions to undertake nuclear warfighting; and its capacities for ballistic missile defense?
Although the answers to these questions would be necessarily
complex and very general, one thing is clear: The Arab/Islamic awareness of
an Israeli bomb does not automatically imply that Israel has credible
nuclear deterrence. After all, if Israel's nuclear arsenal were seen as
vulnerable to first-strikes it might not persuade enemy states to resist
attacking the Jewish State. Similarly, if Israel's political leadership were
seen to be unwilling to resort to nuclear weapons in reprisal for anything
but unconventional and fully annihilatory strikes, these enemy states may
not be deterred. If Israel's nuclear weapons were seen as too large and too
destructive and too indiscriminate for rational use, deterrence could fail.
If Israel's targeting doctrine were seen to be predominantly "countercity"
oriented, Israel might be judged less willing to retaliate and/or less
capable of actually fighting a nuclear war. If Israel's targeting doctrine
were judged to be predominantly "counterforce" targeted (that is ,
targeted on enemy state weapons and supporting military infrastructures),
enemy states could so fear an Israeli first-strike that they would
consider more seriously striking first themselves.
Aware of the countercity/counterforce implications, Israel's leaders
must quickly determine not only the best configuration of these two
targeting doctrines, but also the most favorable means and levels of
disclosure. How shall enemy states best be apprised of Israel's targeting
doctrine so that these states would be deterred from various forms of
first-strike and retaliatory strike actions? In any event, it is not enough
that Israel's enemies merely know that the Jewish State has nuclear
weapons. They must also be convinced that these arms are secure and
usable and that Israel's leadership is actually willing to launch these
weapons in response to certain first-strike and retaliatory attacks.
Israel's strategic doctrine must aim at strengthening nuclear deterrence. It can meet this objective only by convincing enemy states that a first-strike upon Israel will always be irrational. This means communicating to enemy states that the costs of such a strike will always exceed the benefits. Hence, Israel's strategic doctrine must always convince prospective attackers that their intended victim has both the WILLINGNESS and the CAPACITY to retaliate with nuclear weapons. Where an enemy state considering an attack upon Israel were unconvinced about either or both of these components of nuclear deterrence, it could choose to strike first. This would depend in part upon the particular value it placed upon the expected consequences of such an attack.
Regarding WILLINGNESS, even if Israel were prepared to respond to
certain Arab/Islamic attacks with nuclear reprisals, enemy failure to
recognize such preparedness could provoke an attack upon Israel. Here,
misperception and/or errors in information could immobilize Israeli nuclear
deterrence. It is also conceivable that Israel would, in fact, lack the
willingness to retaliate, and that this lack of willingness were perceived
correctly by enemy state decision-makers. In this case, Israeli nuclear
deterrence could be immobilized not because of "confused signals," but
because of signals that had not been properly distorted.
Regarding CAPACITY, even if Israel were to maintain a substantial
arsenal of nuclear weapons, it is essential that enemy states believe
these weappons to be distinctly usable. This means that if a first-strike
attack were believed capable of sufficiently destroying Israel's atomic
arsenal and pertinent infrstructures, that country's nuclear deterrent
could be immobilized. Even if Israel's nuclear weapons were configured such
that they could not be destroyed by an enemy first-strike, enemy
misperceptions or misjudgments about Israeli vulnerability could still
bring about the failure of Israeli nuclear deterrence. A further
complication here concerns enemy state deployment of anti-tactical
ballistic missiles, which might contribute to an attack decision against
Israel by lowering the attacker's expected costs.
The importance of usable nuclear weapons must also be examined from
the standpoint of probable harms. Should Israel's nuclear weapons be
perceived by a would-be attacker as very high-yield, "city-busting"
weapons, they might fail to deter. Contrary to the conventional wisdom on
this subject, successful nuclear deterrence may actually vary INVERSELY
with perceived destructiveness. It follows that Israeli nuclear deterrence
requires not only secure second-strike forces, but also forces that can be
used productively in war.
All this brings us back to the overrall importance of strategic
doctrine. To the extent that Israel's doctrine actually identified nuanced
and graduated forms of reprisal - forms calibrating Israeli retaliations to
particular levels of provocation - disclosure of such doctrine could
contribute to Israeli nuclear deterrence. Without such a disclosure,
Israel's enemies will be kept guessing about the Jewish State's probable
responses, a condition of protracted uncertainty that could serve Israel's
survival for a while longer, but - at one time or another - would fail
catastrophically.
---------------------
LOUIS RENE BERES was educated at Princeton (Ph.D., 1971) and is author
of many books and articles dealing with nuclear strategy and nuclear war. His work is well-known to the Israeli and American military/intelligence communities.