The term "correlation of forces" is a useful concept of military
strategy. Widely used by the former Soviet Union, it is applied as a
measure of armed forces, from the subunit level to major formations.
Additionally, it has been used to compare resources and capabilities on
both the levels of military strategy and of so-called "grand strategy."
This meaning is closely related to the concept of "force ratios" used in
the West.
Today, with the winds of war blowing again in the Middle East - winds
hastened by a probable Palestinian state - Israel must undertake
productive assessments of enemy states with particular reference to
"correlation of forces." Here it must seek more than an "objective"
yardstick for measurement of opposing forces. Although the
IDF is assuredly comparing all available data concerning both the
quantitative and qualitative characteristics of units, including
personnel, weaponry and equipment, its commanders will need to know more to establish Israeli force superiority at decisive places and times. This
is especially the case in matters of grand strategy, where opposing forces
are endowed (or will soon be endowed) with weapons of mass destruction.
What, exactly, should be the IDF concept of "correlation of forces?"
First, it must take careful account of enemy leaders' intentions as well
as capabilities. Such an accounting is inherently more subjective than
assessments of personnel, weapons and basic logistic data. Such an
accounting must be subtle and nuanced, relying less on scientific
modeling than upon carefully informed profiles. In this connection, it
will not do to merely gather relevant data from all of the usual
sources. It will also be important to put Israeli strategists into the
shoes of each enemy leader, determining what Israel looks like TO THEM.
Second, the IDF correlation of forces concept must take account of
enemy leaders' rationality. An adversary that does not conform to the
rules of rational behavior in world politics might not be deterred by
ANY Israeli threats, military or otherwise. Here the logic of
deterrence would be immobilized and all bets would be off concerning
expected enemy reactions to Israeli policy. This point now pertains
especially to growing existential threats from Iraq and Iran.
Third, IDF assessments must also consider the organization of enemy
state units; their training standards; their morale; their
reconnaissance capabilities; their battle experience; and their
suitability and adaptability to the prospective battlefield. These
assessments are not exceedingly difficult to make on an individual or
piecemeal basis, but the IDF needs to conceptualize them together, in
their entirety. To get this more coherent picture will require
creativity and imagination, not merely mathematical and analytical skills.
Fourth, IDF assessments must consider the capabilities and
intentions of Israel's nonstate enemies; that is, the entire configuration of
anti-Israel terrorist groups. And once again, such assessments must
offer more than a group by group consideration. Rather, the groups must
be considered in their entirety, as they interrelate with one another
vis-a-vis Israel. And these groups need to be considered in their
interactive relationship with enemy states. This last point might best
be characterized as an IDF search for pertinent "synergies" between state
and nonstate adversaries.
Fifth, IDF assessments must take special note of the ongoing
metamorphosis of a nonstate adversary (PLO) into a state adversary
(Palestine). With this metamorphosis, Israel's strategic depth will soon
shrink to barely manageable levels, and a far-reaching enemy momentum to
transform Israel itself into part of the new Arab state will be energized.
How shall Israel "live" with Palestine? Irrespective of Yasir Arafat's fate,
this shall be an absolutely critical question for Israeli strategists and
scholars.
In the matter of synergies, the IDF must also consider and look for
"force multipliers." A force multiplier is a collection of related
characteristics, other than weapons and force size, that make a military
organization more effective in combat. A force multiplier may be
generalship; tactical surprise; tactical mobility; command and control
system; etc. The presence of a force multiplier CREATES
synergy. The unit will be more effective than the mere sum of its
weapons. IDF responsibility in this area concerns (1) recognizing enemy
force multipliers; (2) challenging and undermining enemy force
multipliers; and (3) developing and refining its own force
multipliers. Regarding number (3), this means a heavy IDF emphasis on
air superiority; communications; intelligence; and surprise. It may also
mean a heightened awareness of the benefits of sometimes appearing less
than completely rational to one's enemies.
Correlation of forces will essentially determine the outcome of the
coming Middle Eastern war. It is time for Israel to go well beyond the
usual numerical assessments to "softer" considerations, and to focus
especially upon the cumulative importance of unconventional weapons and
strategies in the region. A key dilemma in this focus will be the
understanding that, in certain circumstances, preemption is both
indispensable and infeasible.
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LOUIS RENE BERES was educated at Princeton (Ph.D., 1971) and is the author of many publications dealing with Middle Eastern security issues. His work is well-known in both American and Israeli defense and intelligence circles.