Former Israeli Ambassador to the UN Dore Gold explained in an op-ed in today\'s New York Times why Israel cannot withdraw from all of Judea, Samaria, and Gaza. He also explained what should be Israel\'s substantive approach to the Saudi plan. Excerpts:
\"It is doubtful that another case can be found in recent history of a nation that has been willing to take greater risks for peace than has Israel. Eight years ago, Israel embarked on a diplomatic experiment by agreeing to grant authority to the PLO, an organization whose founding charter called for Israel\'s annihilation… Israel terminated its military government over 98% of the Palestinian population in those territories, transferring most of its powers to the nascent Palestinian Authority.
\"...Instead of reining in Hamas and Islamic Jihad, Yasir Arafat allowed them to establish a vast infrastructure of international terrorism... Palestinian officials have admitted that in October 2000 Mr. Arafat intentionally launched the present intifada, which has been a daily campaign of pure terrorism against Israeli civilians.
\"...Given its strategic decision to support violence, it is not surprising that the Palestinian leadership has utterly failed to comply with nine separate cease-fire initiatives, most of which were under American auspices. It is extremely doubtful that a 10th or 11th American effort to broker a cease-fire, at this time, would produce more effective results. This is an extremely hard reality but it must be faced.
\"First, Israel must win the war that has been imposed on it by Palestinian leaders, convincing them that no tangible political gain will be achieved by using violence...
\"Second, Israel must learn certain diplomatic lessons from this period of violence and apply them to future negotiations. The real lesson of the failed summit at Camp David in 2000 is that in the very difficult issues of permanent status - borders, Jerusalem, refugees and security - the gaps between the most conciliatory Israeli positions advanced by the Barak government and those of the PLO were totally unbridgeable. Those Israeli proposals have essentially been taken off the table by the majority of Israeli voters with the last Israeli elections in 2001.
\"The only realistic diplomatic option for the future is a long-term interim agreement that leaves Israel with vital security zones in the West Bank. In any case, Israel is entitled to defensible borders according to UN Security Council Resolution 242; it is not expected to return to the vulnerable lines of 1967, from which it was attacked more than 30 years ago. That is not just an Israeli position, but has been the policy of American secretaries of state from Henry Kissinger to Warren Christopher...
\"In his last policy address to the Knesset in 1995, Israel\'s late prime minister, Yitzchak Rabin, emphasized the critical importance of an eastern security zone as well, one that would utilize the steep eastern slopes of the West Bank mountain ridge that faces the Jordan River... aimed at countering large Iraqi expeditionary armies that have engaged Israel on the ground in three Arab-Israeli wars [and also to] protect Jordan from Palestinian irredentism, which almost overcame the kingdom in 1970. Thus, strong Israeli security zones can enhance regional stability.
\"There has been much talk in recent days about the interest of Saudi Arabia\'s Crown Prince Abdullah in seeking a broader Arab peace with Israel... Any serious change in Saudi hostility to Israel would be welcome, especially if it led, in the first instance, to a cessation of all forms of financial assistance to groups like Hamas.
\"If the reports of the crown prince\'s insistence on seeing Israel back on the 1967 lines, with Jerusalem divided, represent only an opening position to serious discussions, then his idea merits exploration. But Israel will not experiment with the lives of its citizens by agreeing to concessions that strip away tangible components of its national security, create vulnerabilities that its adversaries will exploit and ultimately undermine the stability of the entire Middle East.\"
\"It is doubtful that another case can be found in recent history of a nation that has been willing to take greater risks for peace than has Israel. Eight years ago, Israel embarked on a diplomatic experiment by agreeing to grant authority to the PLO, an organization whose founding charter called for Israel\'s annihilation… Israel terminated its military government over 98% of the Palestinian population in those territories, transferring most of its powers to the nascent Palestinian Authority.
\"...Instead of reining in Hamas and Islamic Jihad, Yasir Arafat allowed them to establish a vast infrastructure of international terrorism... Palestinian officials have admitted that in October 2000 Mr. Arafat intentionally launched the present intifada, which has been a daily campaign of pure terrorism against Israeli civilians.
\"...Given its strategic decision to support violence, it is not surprising that the Palestinian leadership has utterly failed to comply with nine separate cease-fire initiatives, most of which were under American auspices. It is extremely doubtful that a 10th or 11th American effort to broker a cease-fire, at this time, would produce more effective results. This is an extremely hard reality but it must be faced.
\"First, Israel must win the war that has been imposed on it by Palestinian leaders, convincing them that no tangible political gain will be achieved by using violence...
\"Second, Israel must learn certain diplomatic lessons from this period of violence and apply them to future negotiations. The real lesson of the failed summit at Camp David in 2000 is that in the very difficult issues of permanent status - borders, Jerusalem, refugees and security - the gaps between the most conciliatory Israeli positions advanced by the Barak government and those of the PLO were totally unbridgeable. Those Israeli proposals have essentially been taken off the table by the majority of Israeli voters with the last Israeli elections in 2001.
\"The only realistic diplomatic option for the future is a long-term interim agreement that leaves Israel with vital security zones in the West Bank. In any case, Israel is entitled to defensible borders according to UN Security Council Resolution 242; it is not expected to return to the vulnerable lines of 1967, from which it was attacked more than 30 years ago. That is not just an Israeli position, but has been the policy of American secretaries of state from Henry Kissinger to Warren Christopher...
\"In his last policy address to the Knesset in 1995, Israel\'s late prime minister, Yitzchak Rabin, emphasized the critical importance of an eastern security zone as well, one that would utilize the steep eastern slopes of the West Bank mountain ridge that faces the Jordan River... aimed at countering large Iraqi expeditionary armies that have engaged Israel on the ground in three Arab-Israeli wars [and also to] protect Jordan from Palestinian irredentism, which almost overcame the kingdom in 1970. Thus, strong Israeli security zones can enhance regional stability.
\"There has been much talk in recent days about the interest of Saudi Arabia\'s Crown Prince Abdullah in seeking a broader Arab peace with Israel... Any serious change in Saudi hostility to Israel would be welcome, especially if it led, in the first instance, to a cessation of all forms of financial assistance to groups like Hamas.
\"If the reports of the crown prince\'s insistence on seeing Israel back on the 1967 lines, with Jerusalem divided, represent only an opening position to serious discussions, then his idea merits exploration. But Israel will not experiment with the lives of its citizens by agreeing to concessions that strip away tangible components of its national security, create vulnerabilities that its adversaries will exploit and ultimately undermine the stability of the entire Middle East.\"