A researcher on the Agranat Commission, Col. (ret.) Dr. Yaakov Hisdai, spoke with Arutz-7's Yigal Shok about this week's resignation of IDF Chief of Staff Lt.-Gen. Dan Halutz's resignation and the problems that the resignation does not solve.
(The Agranat Commission was convened to look into the mistakes preceding the Yom Kippur of 1973 - and its findings led to the last IDF Chief of Staff resignation, that of David (Dado) Elazar. The Agranat Commission found Elazar and other IDF brass responsible for the blunders that led to Israel's being taken by surprise in the Yom Kippur War.)
"It's good that Halutz took responsibility," Hisdai said, "but there is still a larger issue that must be faced: Was the Second Lebanese War merely a series of local mistakes that can be solved in a straight-forward manner, or was there actually a long-running problem in the army that will not be solved by the resignation of just one man?"
Hisdai expressed his suspicion that the second possibility is the correct one.
"Even if the Prime Minister and the Defense Minister both quit now," Hisdai continued, "there will still be major questions, for instance, about the decision-making process. After all, what about the other 7-8 generals on the IDF General Staff? If they saw mistakes being made, why didn't they protest? Furthermore, if the IDF investigation shows that several top commanders did not function well in this war, then this begs the question as to how they were trained and promoted? This is a very serious problem that has nothing to do with a couple of resignations, but rather requires a deep investigation and long-range conclusions."
"Some of the problems revealed in this war," Hisdai said, "were found in the Peace for Galilee War in 1982, and even in the Yom Kippur War [of 1973] - and this means that we have an ongoing problem that has not been solved. The resignations now are a contribution to the matter of taking responsibility, but not to the clarification of the IDF's situation."
Hisdai explained that the problems in the IDF are symptomatic of deep-seated problems in Israeli society: "These are not issues to be investigated by just another committee, but are rather long-term social and political processes in Israel in which the establishment becomes more and more rotten but maintains its strength. Every once in a while it throws out a victim to appease the public, but then it just continues along its way. This means that even though there have been signs of army weakness for many years, there is no political element that can do something about it."
Asked if the Disengagement had anything to do with the mal-functioning of Halutz and/or the army, Hisdai backed off: "I don't know exactly what role the Chief of Staff played in the Disengagement; the problem was that the army took a role [in the expulsion] that should have been played by the police. Certainly, the army should not have boasted about what a great job it did - and in fact in the Lebanon war, we saw that it had nothing to brag about."
(The Agranat Commission was convened to look into the mistakes preceding the Yom Kippur of 1973 - and its findings led to the last IDF Chief of Staff resignation, that of David (Dado) Elazar. The Agranat Commission found Elazar and other IDF brass responsible for the blunders that led to Israel's being taken by surprise in the Yom Kippur War.)
"It's good that Halutz took responsibility," Hisdai said, "but there is still a larger issue that must be faced: Was the Second Lebanese War merely a series of local mistakes that can be solved in a straight-forward manner, or was there actually a long-running problem in the army that will not be solved by the resignation of just one man?"
Hisdai expressed his suspicion that the second possibility is the correct one.
"Even if the Prime Minister and the Defense Minister both quit now," Hisdai continued, "there will still be major questions, for instance, about the decision-making process. After all, what about the other 7-8 generals on the IDF General Staff? If they saw mistakes being made, why didn't they protest? Furthermore, if the IDF investigation shows that several top commanders did not function well in this war, then this begs the question as to how they were trained and promoted? This is a very serious problem that has nothing to do with a couple of resignations, but rather requires a deep investigation and long-range conclusions."
"Some of the problems revealed in this war," Hisdai said, "were found in the Peace for Galilee War in 1982, and even in the Yom Kippur War [of 1973] - and this means that we have an ongoing problem that has not been solved. The resignations now are a contribution to the matter of taking responsibility, but not to the clarification of the IDF's situation."
Hisdai explained that the problems in the IDF are symptomatic of deep-seated problems in Israeli society: "These are not issues to be investigated by just another committee, but are rather long-term social and political processes in Israel in which the establishment becomes more and more rotten but maintains its strength. Every once in a while it throws out a victim to appease the public, but then it just continues along its way. This means that even though there have been signs of army weakness for many years, there is no political element that can do something about it."
Asked if the Disengagement had anything to do with the mal-functioning of Halutz and/or the army, Hisdai backed off: "I don't know exactly what role the Chief of Staff played in the Disengagement; the problem was that the army took a role [in the expulsion] that should have been played by the police. Certainly, the army should not have boasted about what a great job it did - and in fact in the Lebanon war, we saw that it had nothing to brag about."