Several investigative committees appointed by Lt.-Gen. Dan Halutz himself have found that he is directly responsible for some of the IDF's malfunctioning in the war this past summer in Lebanon. Other committees are in the process of preparing their reports.
The harshest criticism was proffered by a Halutz-appointed committee headed by Maj.-Gen. (ret.) Amiram Levine, a former head of the Northern Command. Levine concluded that the IDF had "failed in achieving its goals," and that the "responsibility lies on the shoulders of the Chief of Staff." Specifically, Levine found, Halutz failed in management of forces and did not give priority to land forces. Halutz headed the Israel Air Force before taking over the helm of the IDF.
Gen. Levine also cited the delay in the activation of reservists at the start of the war, the general lack of preparedness of the Northern Command, the lack of readiness for the barrage of Katyusha rockets into Israel, and more.
Halutz said recently that he would make a decision as to his future after the various committees complete their work - and specifically the committee headed by former Chief of Staff Lt.-Gen. (ret.) Dan Shomron. Shomron is specifically looking into Halutz's performance during the war.
A government-appointed commission headed by former Tel Aviv District Court President Eliyahu Vinograd is still at least 2-3 months away from submitting its findings.
Another commission, headed by Maj.-Gen. Udi Shani, outgoing head of the IDF Military Communications Branch, found last week that wartime communications in the Northern Command were “severely flawed.” As had been charged earlier by soldiers themselves, orders were sometimes changed on an hourly basis, the commission found.
As of now, Gen. Halutz continues his daily routine, taking no actions that might hint as to his future plans.
Halutz and the Disengagement
Halutz was appointed Chief of Staff in June 2005, less than three months before the implementation of the Disengagement from Gaza and parts of northern Shomron, in the knowledge that he would be responsible for implementing the expulsion.
Several weeks before the Disengagement, Halutz threatened - twice - to close the Hesder Yeshivot or dismantle Hesder platoons on the backdrop of refusals to carry out withdrawal-related orders. "We will not tolerate refusers," he said on one occasion. "I am targeting my statement mainly at the leaders of the hesder yeshivas and pre-army colleges. You cannot have a dual system and call on people to refuse orders and at the same time enjoy the conditions the IDF offers the hesder yeshivas. This will not go on if this phenomenon becomes common."
Halutz replaced Lt.-Gen. Moshe Yaalon as top IDF officer. Yaalon was one of the first to warn of the dangers of the disengagement, saying In 2004 that the withdrawal would provide a "tail wind" for terrorism. It was widely felt that this statement is a main reason why Yaalon's tenure as Chief of Staff was prematurely and abruptly ended.
The harshest criticism was proffered by a Halutz-appointed committee headed by Maj.-Gen. (ret.) Amiram Levine, a former head of the Northern Command. Levine concluded that the IDF had "failed in achieving its goals," and that the "responsibility lies on the shoulders of the Chief of Staff." Specifically, Levine found, Halutz failed in management of forces and did not give priority to land forces. Halutz headed the Israel Air Force before taking over the helm of the IDF.
Gen. Levine also cited the delay in the activation of reservists at the start of the war, the general lack of preparedness of the Northern Command, the lack of readiness for the barrage of Katyusha rockets into Israel, and more.
Halutz said recently that he would make a decision as to his future after the various committees complete their work - and specifically the committee headed by former Chief of Staff Lt.-Gen. (ret.) Dan Shomron. Shomron is specifically looking into Halutz's performance during the war.
A government-appointed commission headed by former Tel Aviv District Court President Eliyahu Vinograd is still at least 2-3 months away from submitting its findings.
Another commission, headed by Maj.-Gen. Udi Shani, outgoing head of the IDF Military Communications Branch, found last week that wartime communications in the Northern Command were “severely flawed.” As had been charged earlier by soldiers themselves, orders were sometimes changed on an hourly basis, the commission found.
As of now, Gen. Halutz continues his daily routine, taking no actions that might hint as to his future plans.
Halutz and the Disengagement
Halutz was appointed Chief of Staff in June 2005, less than three months before the implementation of the Disengagement from Gaza and parts of northern Shomron, in the knowledge that he would be responsible for implementing the expulsion.
Several weeks before the Disengagement, Halutz threatened - twice - to close the Hesder Yeshivot or dismantle Hesder platoons on the backdrop of refusals to carry out withdrawal-related orders. "We will not tolerate refusers," he said on one occasion. "I am targeting my statement mainly at the leaders of the hesder yeshivas and pre-army colleges. You cannot have a dual system and call on people to refuse orders and at the same time enjoy the conditions the IDF offers the hesder yeshivas. This will not go on if this phenomenon becomes common."
Halutz replaced Lt.-Gen. Moshe Yaalon as top IDF officer. Yaalon was one of the first to warn of the dangers of the disengagement, saying In 2004 that the withdrawal would provide a "tail wind" for terrorism. It was widely felt that this statement is a main reason why Yaalon's tenure as Chief of Staff was prematurely and abruptly ended.