
The operational investigation into the battle at Kibbutz Nir Oz was concluded by former Chief of Staff Herzi Halevi and presented yesterday (Thursday) to the bereaved families and members of the Nir Oz community.
The report states unequivocally that the IDF failed to protect the kibbutz during the Hamas terror attack on October 7, 2023. The damage to the kibbutz was very severe, with more than a quarter of the residents murdered or kidnapped.
According to the report, the security forces arrived in Nir Oz only 40 minutes after the last of the terrorists was identified, and in fact did not encounter the terrorists during the search and rescue operations.
The local security squad fought bravely but was outmatched by the organized enemy force which had a significant numerical advantage. The main failure, the investigation showed, was the collapse of the chain of command and the lack of a clear situational picture at the time of the incident, which prevented the sending of reserve forces in real time.
The investigation team determined that if the battalion had been given warning, even the shortest, there is no doubt that the damage caused during the attack could have been reduced; both in terms of creating advance awareness that this was a wartime situation and in terms of the deployment of forces in positions and communities.
On the day of the incident, at 06:29 am, Hamas launched a broad surprise attack on the Israeli communities near the Gaza border, using heavy weapons, attack drones and explosives. The forces defending the area, including the Golani Brigade, were quickly neutralized by massive fire, and the terrorists penetrated Israeli territory through 14 different infiltration routes.
Residents of Nir Oz entered protected rooms, but the terrorists penetrated the kibbutz through several gates and began a campaign of killing and kidnapping. Fighting began at 06:52, and the local security squad held out for about two hours until it was subdued.
The military security coordinator of Nir Oz called the local security squad at 06:43 and at 06:49 the first terrorists entered the kibbutz through the northern gate, and then also from the Kerem Gate and the southern gate. The first murder inside the kibbutz took place at about 06:57.

The attack on Nir Oz included organized Nuhkba Force terrorists, which included between 100 and 130 terrorists, alongside Gazan civilians who arrived from Gaza following calls from the Hamas leadership to participate in the operation. In addition, the burned tank on the border became a focal point and caused crowds to flow towards the kibbutz.
The investigation team estimated that the number of Gazan civilians who arrived in Nir Oz to join in the terrorist attack was in the hundreds, between 300-530.
The report notes that the IDF forces in the south were not prepared for such a large-scale attack and did not receive advance warning. In addition, the chain of command quickly collapsed: senior commanders were injured or cut off, the brigade headquarters was under fire, and the military bases were neutralized. At the same time, attempts to convey information about the severity of the incident failed, which caused a serious delay in the arrival of reinforcements.
Despite desperate calls from residents, the IDF forces were engaged in combat in other sectors and did not understand the scope of the incident in Nir Oz.
At 09:22, a combat helicopter arrived for the first time and attacked a site south of the route from the Gaza Strip to the kibbutz, where a concentration of many dozens of terrorists was identified. During its attempt to cut between the terrorists and the kibbutz and being close to the ground above the kibbutz, the helicopter was hit by terrorist fire, was forced to leave, and eventually made an emergency landing.
Afterward, there were four more sorties by combat helicopters, which struck many terrorists. The investigation indicated that multiple kidnapped kibbutz residents were also hit by this fire, and one of them was killed.
Around 12:30 - about six hours after the start of the attack, the last of the terrorists in the kibbutz was identified. The first force to arrive in the area arrived only at 1:10 pm, after the terrorists had already left and nearly seven hours after the attack began.
The investigation concluded that the IDF failed to defend Nir Oz; the serious damage was caused by the lack of preparation and poor functioning of the headquarters; the residents of Nir Oz were left alone for six hours against armed terrorists; the local security squad fought bravely, but could not cope with such a large enemy force; a western outpost for the kibbutz is required and significant improvements are needed in the decision-making processes and information transfer in the military.
The investigation team noted two gaps in the security force's conduct: A. The security forces should have joined forces with the Nir Oz security squad or other officials in the town to clarify the situation and help the Southern Brigade prioritize the allocation of forces. Without the flow of information from below, it was very difficult to build a situational picture in the brigade.
B. The forces should have prevented the neutralization of the military base; if this had been accomplished, it would have had a reserve that could have been used in favor of Nir Oz. This issue still needs to undergo in-depth research, both regarding the exercises and instructions and the fact that there should be outposts built for defense near the fence, not ill-defended bases.