Erfan Fard is a counter-terrorism analyst and Middle East Studies researcher based in Washington, DC. an expert in Middle Eastern regional security affairs with a particular focus on Iran, Counter terrorism, IRGC, MOIS and Ethnic conflicts in MENA. He graduated in International Security Studies (London M. University, UK), and in International Relations (CSU-LA). He is fluent in Persian, Kurdish, Arabic and English. / Follow him in this twitter account @EQFARD
The role of the United States in the Iran chaos of 1979 is an undeniable reality. President Reagan repeatedly stated that America’s misguided policies in Iran caused the fall of the Shah, calling it a historical stain on the United States [Televised Debate, November 1984]. Despite the Shah’s 37-year alliance with the U.S. in the Middle East, Carter effectively undermined him [George Bush, January 26, 1979], notably by dispatching General Haig to Iran to incapacitate the military [Richard Nixon, Politique Internationale, Spring 1981].
Carter himself admitted to following the duplicitous advice of U.S. Ambassador Sullivan, a sympathizer of pro-Mossadeq forces [Carter’s Memoirs, 1982, p. 443]. American officials later condemned Carter’s policies as deceitful and Sullivan’s views as dangerously misguided [Schumer, 1980, p. 148].
Years later, Brzezinski acknowledged that the political uprising against the Shah had U.S. backing [Power and Principles, 1983, p. 356], which ultimately led to his removal from power [Kissinger, The Economist, February 10, 1979]. This policy miscalculation not only caused the Shah’s downfall but also plunged Iran into chaos, leaving it a victim of history.
Carter observed the 1979 crisis in Iran from a distance, while his State Department displayed overt hostility toward the Shah [Brzezinski, ibid, p. 355]. The Shah soon realized that neither Carter nor the U.S. had any intention of supporting him, and he described America’s policy as delusional [Sullivan’s Memoirs, 1981, p. 336].
The Carter administration repeatedly instructed its ambassador to warn the Shah about human rights issues [Encounter Report, November 1984]. History has since recorded Carter’s administration as confused, hypocritical, and paralyzed in the face of Iran’s escalating crisis [Michael Ledeen, Failure in Iran, 1980, p. 231]. At the height of the turmoil, the Shah was abandoned [Nixon, Leaders, 1984, p. 360].
Carter lacked a true understanding of the crisis or its catastrophic consequences. He failed to make sound decisions [Nixon, ibid, p. 312] and did not grasp the irreversible damage his policies caused [Brzezinski, ibid, p. 380]. Sullivan even advised Carter to demand the Shah leave Iran immediately and to align with Khomeini [Carter, ibid, p. 443]. Meanwhile, U.S. intelligence agencies were disorganized, ignoring one another’s warnings, as even the French Interior Minister said on November 6, 1980.
Most notably, the CIA failed to predict the 1979 upheaval or the disastrous rise of the mullahs in Iran, cementing Carter’s role as a key figure in the fiasco.
Carter’s moralizing, cloaked in populism, often bordered on naivete [Time, May 10, 1976]. He claimed to act in the name of God in the Herald Tribune in April 1976, but appeared out of touch with reality. The late Shah harshly criticized Carter, admitting that his gravest mistake was following U.S. advice, which led to the release of murderous terrorists who later orchestrated more violence [Washington Post, June 22, 1980]. The Shah astutely questioned Sullivan, asking, “Why is the CIA so intensely active against me?” [Sullivan, ibid, 1981, p. 156].
The Shah foresaw the devastating catastrophe that was unfolding. Carter, wielding his political and intelligence apparatus, deliberately supported opposition forces to pressure the Shah. Later, the CIA Director confirmed the Shah’s concerns in an article in Newsweek, stating, “Had we shown more vigilance, America’s policy during Iran’s turmoil could have been different” [Newsweek, March 5, 1979].
Carter’s policies were unrealistic, clumsy, short-sighted, indecisive, and full of contradictions, causing global repercussions [Shafa, Crime and Punishment, p. 611]. His treatment of the Shah during his illness was inhumane. It was Carter who, among world leaders, quickly deemed Khomeini a “sacred” figure, describing him as a religious and moderate leader. The ties between Khomeini and Carter before 1979 became clear to all, as BBC Report said on May 21, 2016.
The Iranian Tose’eh newspaper published an interview with Giscard d’Estaing on September 23, 1998, , who said, “The U.S. rang the death knell for the Shah’s rule because Carter had no hope for the regime’s survival.” When Khomeini orchestrated the hostage crisis, Carter first wrote a pleading letter and then resorted to prayers [Jody Powell’s Memoirs, 1984, p. 44]. Though he later sent a rescue mission, it ended in failure.
Carter’s presidency was marked by indecision and weakness. His administration was a series of contradictions, errors, and incompetence, leading to global distrust in both his government and U.S. foreign policy [Shafa, ibid, p. 624].
American authors have frequently criticized Carter’s populist and controversial behavior [See Ronald Kessler, Presidential Secret Service, Chapter on Carter, 2003]. While Carter is now gone, his policies lived on in what can be described as “Carter 2” (Obama) and “Carter 3” (Biden) regarding the Islamic Republic.
Perhaps his death and Trump's election will mark the end of these misguided policies and their dark legacy. Yet, the world first faced the rise of Islamic radicalism during Carter’s era, and the battle against terrorism continues to this day.