The Winograd Commission has released the testimonies of Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, Defense Minister Amir Peretz, and ex-IDF Chief of Staff Lt.-Gen. Dan Halutz - partially censored for security reasons.
The Winograd Commission, reviewing the mistakes leading up to and during the Second Lebanon War, has released the testimonies of six of the 74 witnesses it heard. The testimonies of Prime Minister Olmert, Defense Minister Peretz, and ex-IDF Chief of Staff Halutz were released Thursday morning. Those of Vice Premier Shimon Peres, former IDF Intelligence Chief Amos Malka, and Emergency Economic Authority chief Brig.-Gen. Arnon Ben-Ami were released weeks ago.
Prime Minister Olmert's testimony fills 89 pages, including many ellipses [three dots] on each page indicating censored material. He said it was clear that Israel had to take action against Hizbullah, but "something in our conception of the activation of our forces, and in the control of our forces, was not what we suspected - and without a doubt this was what caused the gap between our capacities and what we actually achieved."
Defense Minister Amir Peretz stated that the original estimation was that the Second Lebanon War was going to be a limited military operation lasting no longer than two weeks.
Together with the publication, Committee members Ruth Gavizon and Menachem Einan expressed their disapproval of the Supreme Court-ordered publication of the testimonies. The two said it would negatively influence the way people testify in future committees, as well as the operation of future committees.
Ehud Olmert: Proud of Peretz
Olmert, the last of the witnesses to be heard by the Winograd Commission, admitted that Foreign Minister Livni was not involved in government consultations at first. "Israel should be proud of Amir Peretz," Olmert said, noting that he had grown up in a development town (Sderot), was injured in battle, led a popular national platform, came from behind to win Labor Party leadership and then led the party to a significant electoral achievement, etc. However, Olmert said that he himself was not involved in the militarily-inexperienced Peretz's appointment as Defense Minister, explaining that it was a political matter determined by Labor. "I had no choice in it," Olmert said.
Olmert said that a ground offensive was not an option at first, as "Chief of Staff Halutz didn't want it." He described his own decisions as having been satisfactory, while admitting that some things could have been done differently, such as holding more discussions with the security mini-cabinet. He said that he asked the army to show him plans, fearing that the situation would "end up leaving Israel stuck in a new Lebanese mire, just like the old one."
Peretz: My Inexperience Had a Good Side
Asked if he had enough experience to be Defense Minister, Amir Peretz said, inter alia, "I don't think we should [deal with this issue]. I was a member of the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee, and I had contact with security issues in my other positions, but I don't think this matters. I believe that [what is important is] the fact that I came in totally clean, without any prior obligation to any system, neither procedurally nor conceptually... I felt the need to ask and investigate everything, more than others; I didn't feel that I knew everything...
Peretz said that on July 12, the day IDF soldiers Ehud Goldwasser and Eldad Regev were kidnapped by Hizbullah, "I didn't know of the unpreparedness of the army; the army did not tell me." Asked to explain his boast that Nasrallah would rue the day he first heard the name Amir Peretz, Peretz said he never said it.
"I accepted the possibility that there might be Katyushas on our homefront," Peretz said, "for it would show the enemy that we could withstand this - and we would thus be more free to operate."
Defense Minister Peretz said that he objected to the proposed massive cut in defense spending immediately after the formation of the government, even though he had always championed social issues: "I felt that this was an irresponsible thing to do at the time, before I had a chance as Defense Minister to see what would be the ramifications. I knew that I would get bad publicity..."
Halutz: "We Could Have Achieved More"
Ex-Chief of Staff Halutz, in his testimony, was asked about his having said in a press interview, that it is possible that if different people had been Prime Minister and Defense Minister, the outcome of the war would have been different: "I meant this very straightforwardly. People make the difference... I don't remove myself from this equation either."
Halutz said that the war should have been shorter, and that its length was its main failure. "If the first ground offensives had been carried out better, we would not have had to reach the major ground offensive at the end [in which many soldiers were killed]... Given the situation and means that we had, we could have achieved much more - had we been more determined, initiating, and responsible. These are the three criteria."
He said that his relations with Peretz were "correct," and that because Peretz was also the head of the party, he was somewhat less attentive to the army's problems. Halutz said his relationship with Olmert was "excellent."