Dr. Salem AlKetbi is a UAE political analyst and former Federal National Council candidate
Most experts agree that restoring nation-state authority is essential for security and stability in the Middle East. This means ending the era of terror militias, which have been major drivers of chaos and unrest across the region. Since these militias primarily operate under the influence of one regional power - the Iranian regime - current developments suggest their role may be diminishing.
This change is unfolding through an Israeli strategic plan being executed with precision in Gaza, Lebanon, and Yemen. Ultimately, the plan clearly aims to strike at these militias’ command and control center and limit its ability to threaten Israel and others in the region and worldwide.
Expectations for the end of the terror militia era have grown stronger following the elimination of key figures. These include Yahya Sinwar, the Hamas terror movement leader, and Hassan Nasrallah, the Lebanese Hezbollah leader. Both had been directing violent confrontations with Israel in recent times. These expectations are driven largely by the absence of alternative experienced leaders who can maintain the fight and manage terror and violent operations on the ground.
Sinwar’s absence from Gaza will likely create confusion within Hamas. His death may prove more impactful than the assassination of Ismail Haniyeh, the movement’s former president. While Haniyeh was a political leader whose role could be filled relatively easily, Sinwar held unique symbolic importance among the movement’s members. His death inevitably lowered morale and combat effectiveness, as spirit matters more than weapons and equipment. Therefore, Sinwar’s elimination represents the most serious blow to Hamas.
Lebanese Hezbollah faces a similar situation, with Nasrallah’s absence creating a massive leadership vacuum. His successors will struggle to fill this gap due to Nasrallah’s long tenure as party leader, his experience in regional conflicts, and his close relationships with Iranian regime leaders.
Another crucial factor, specifically related to Hamas, is the weak connection between the movement’s new leadership and their Iranian backers. These relationships reached their peak under Sinwar’s leadership of Hamas, as he had established the strongest alliance with the Iranian regime among the movement’s leaders. His absence creates a void that will be difficult to fill, as current conditions make it nearly impossible to develop similar levels of trust and communication with new leaders. As a result, the operational ties between Hamas’s field leadership and Iran’s broader network of proxies are unlikely to return to their previous strength—and may never be restored at all.
Given these developments, Israel’s current strategy appears highly effective. It combines targeting both leadership and infrastructure of Iranian-backed militias. This approach breaks the backbone of these terror militias and limits their ability to rebuild their ranks and restore their combat capabilities in both the short and long term. However, serious questions remain about these organizations’ survival on the ground and whether they can rebuild themselves, possibly spawning even more violent and extreme future generations.
Two major Iranian proxies remain in the Middle East: the Houthi group in Yemen and terrorist sectarian organizations in Iraq.
The Houthi group’s military capabilities could likely be destroyed through intensive American strikes, and eliminating this terror group’s threats is important for creating a new Middle East free from threats to Israel’s security.
The Iraqi terrorist militias are complex organizations with stockpiles of Iranian-made missiles and drones, taking orders from the Iranian Revolutionary Guard. Controlling them is a matter of time and depends on reducing Iranian regional influence so Iraq’s government can assert control over these groups and prevent them from acting as parallel armies in a country the size and weight of Iraq.
While we cannot definitively declare the end of Iranian militias, we are seeing the beginning of the end of this dark chapter in the region’s history. This issue extends beyond military and security concerns to include political dimensions and roles that various actors must play, as in Lebanon’s case.
It is not enough for Israel to destroy Hezbollah’s capabilities, infrastructure, and leadership. Lebanese politicians must complete the task of ending the party’s military role in Lebanese life, especially given the severe blows the party has suffered and the massive pressure on its Iranian puppet master.
However, the challenge remains in other Lebanese parties’ submission to circumstances and their affliction with flaccidity, corruption, and declining popularity and organizational capabilities.
The rebels' success so far in Syria also weakens Iranian control, as Iran and Russia back Assad. Time will tell.
Ending the militia era requires more than destroying infrastructure and leadership. It primarily depends on creating alternative ideological, organizational, and political conditions that prevent these militias from recovering on those levels. Now may be Lebanon's chance to do so without Hezbollah.