United Right party leader Gideon Sa'ar told the Civilian Investigative Committee today (Sunday) what he believed led to the October 7th massacre.
"I think October 7th was a result of 30 years of strategic misguidance", he said. "There was a concept that the leading political figures and the security services and the media, they all supported the same policy."
He added: "There were many who protested, but they were considered delusional, extreme, against peace and against the dream. It's not true that these things weren't said."
"As I said during 'Operation Protective Edge' and the disengagement, and also two years ago in May 2022 when the decision was made to allow Palestinian workers from the Gaza Strip, I opposed it and voiced my concerns loudly. The idea that the senior politicians and the security services held needs to be understood that in security matters, the major influence is usually held by the Prime Minister and the Defence Minister. The security cabinet sometimes decides on a specific action, if it is effective then more so, and if less, then less, but ultimately the security policy has three fathers — the Prime Minister, the Defence Minister, and the Chief of Staff."
He added: "In these matters, I am talking about, unfortunately, if we look back, we see that there was usually consensus in these circles. That we should give incentives to Hamas, like Qatari money or work permits, while knowing that Hamas is directing terror activities and trying to ignite Jerusalem and Judea and Samaria, organizing terror activities in Judea and Samaria. I'm not talking about the surprise from the Gaza Strip."
Sa'ar claimed that "There was an assumption that Gaza can be kept quiet, and Hamas will act in other arenas. Essentially you are letting Hamas stay in its comfort zone, where it builds its strength, and becomes stronger, and then the question is when will it attack. There's a lot of talk about the intelligence failure.
"I want to say that in life there are always surprises. One should assume that you will be surprised. When you look back and analyze, you are amazed, because today you hear all the warnings from Unit 8200, from surveillance posts, and more. By the way, it didn't reach the politicians. The starting point should be that you will be ready to deal even when there is a surprise.
"What was the problem of October 7th, I'm trying to refine the statement. Essentially the failure has three dimensions. One is an intelligence failure, the second is an operational failure, it's unreasonable that even if surprised, this would be the outcome on the ground in terms of the number of victims. It’s unreasonable that from the border of the Strip in the east and to the southern corner at Kerem Shalom, there are only 500 soldiers, without a second line. It's not reasonable."
Sa'ar further said that in his opinion, the third failure is a state failure: "It is essentially a failure of 30 years of heading in the wrong direction constantly. When asked where we ended up, I say we arrived where we were headed, precisely so. If in one of these dimensions — intelligence, operational, or state — the country had functioned correctly, there would not have been a 7.10. One dimension would have been enough for the results to be completely different, but there was a multi-dimensional collapse."
"I divide it into two periods, the period of withdrawals from the Oslo Accords and the transfer of territories. The unilateral withdrawal from Lebanon and Gaza caused a loss of control and allowed terror armies to take over the state's borders in the north and south with a constant threat to the State of Israel. These withdrawals created the conditions for the second part which I call the 'containment policy', and after the withdrawals came 18 years of containment and enabling these two fronts without acting, only reacting."
Regarding the question of who should govern the Gaza Strip the day after the war, he replied: "In terms of security we need to treat Gaza like Judea and Samaria - complete security control by us."