Israel's hesitance to launch a ground offensive in Rafah to decisively eliminate Hamas cannot be solely attributed to American pressure or concerns for Israeli hostages held by Hamas. It also reflects a deeper challenge that Israeli policymakers must confront: ‘The Day after Hamas.’
The Post-Hamas Scenario in Gaza
In preparing for the post-Hamas era, it is crucial to dispense with vague language. Simply put, even if the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) were to enter Rafah and neutralize every Hamas operative, it would not equate to a total defeat of Hamas. It would, at best, only target members of the Izz ad-Din Al-Qassam Brigades, Hamas' military wing.
This distinction holds significant implications. The Izz ad-Din Al-Qassam Brigades represent Hamas' armed force, which operates under the umbrella of the broader Islamic Resistance Movement. Therefore, a genuine defeat of Hamas requires discrediting this 'Islamic Resistance' not only militarily, politically, and diplomatically, but also ideologically.
Failure to address this ideological dimension risks allowing Hamas to regenerate, much like other jihadist movements have done historically. Recent surveys in Judea and Samaria, showing strong sympathy for Hamas among Arabs, underscore the formidable challenge of achieving lasting success through military means alone.
Political Solutions for Post-Hamas Governance
Proposals like Daniel Pipes' suggestion of empowering non-Hamas-affiliated Gazans may sound appealing but lack realism. Pre-fighting opinion surveys in Gaza indicated that only a minority opposed armed struggle against Israel. Moreover, this minority, however virtuous, would likely face rejection by the broader Gazan population and risk becoming perceived as collaborators.
Even if Israel identified and promoted these individuals to positions of authority, their legitimacy would likely erode rapidly, if it does not cost them their lives. This mirrors the experience in Iraq, where initial support for the US-backed government waned swiftly.
Thus, achieving peace, democratic governance, and reconstruction in Gaza necessitates more than financial support and liberal democratic gestures. It requires addressing Hamas’ influence and prestige, which are scuttling any possible peace agreement based on mutual coexistence.
Hamas' Role in Preserving the Status Quo
Hamas' grip on Gaza has effectively paralyzed international attempts to advance a two-state solution. Consequently, defeating Hamas militarily may also eliminate Israel's primary justification for resisting Palestinian statehood.
Professor Mohammed Dajani Daoudi’s peace proposal shows that a two-state solution need not lead to ethnic cleansing in the 'West Bank'. Unfortunately, at this stage, any 'solution' that grants more power and freedom to Arabs in the Gaza Strip and the 'West Bank is almost bound to shed more Jewish and Arab blood'. The over 80% Arab residents in the 'West Bank' endorsing the atrocities of October 7th foreshadows this threat.
Tragically, few international leaders openly acknowledge this sad state of affairs. Thus, if Israel were to extol the liberation of Gazans from Hamas tyranny, while simultaneously maintaining checkpoints and expanding ‘settlements’ in the 'West Ban', accusations of hypocrisy and double standards would wreck Israel's international standing (such as it is). Especially, in the event of a popular uprising in the 'West Bank'.
Toward an Ideological Victory
Israel must recognize that defeating Hamas militarily, while essential, is insufficient. Hamas' ideological underpinnings must be discredited to secure a lasting victory. Contrary to Western perceptions, Hamas represents a mainstream Sunni Muslim movement, akin to Christian Democrats in Europe.
The silence of most Islamic authorities regarding Hamas' goals and tactics underscores the broader acceptance of its ideology within mainstream Islam. Therefore, defeating Hamas requires challenging this ideology, much like the defeat of Communism hinged on discrediting its tenets through tangible examples.
The ideological defeat of Communism in the Western world owes much to the post-World War II trajectory of Germany. The stark contrast between the thriving democracy of West Germany and the stagnant dictatorship of East Germany, separated by the Berlin Wall, contributed significantly to discrediting the notion of socialism's superiority over democracy and capitalism.
This ideological victory was facilitated by the clear juxtaposition between East and West Germany. Had Germany remained unified and successful, while Poland stagnated under Communist rule, proponents of Communism could have argued persuasively that Poland's failures were caused by factors other than Communism.
A Practical Proposal
In light of this historical precedent, Israel could strategically divide the Gaza Strip into two distinct sections: a northern region to be directly governed and managed by Israel, and a southern area, including Rafah, to be administered by an emasculated Hamas.
Within the northern sector, Israel would undertake comprehensive measures, including the revision of educational materials, the appointment of Imams renouncing violence in the name of religion, and the reconstruction of infrastructure with financial support from American and Diaspora Jewish sources.
Additionally, the Christian minority in Gaza would find refuge in this northern segment, alongside other non-conformist residents of the Gaza Strip. Abandoned mosques previously used by jihadist groups would be repurposed for Sufi, Ahmadiyya, Bahai, and Christian congregations seeking to promote a peaceful interpretation of religious teachings.
Security within the 'Northern Section' would be initially overseen by Israeli police and military forces, with a focus on recruiting Druze or Israeli Arab personnel or Jews fluent in Arabic. This region would maintain a secure border with the southern section, which Hamas would attempt to rebuild with backing from Iran and Qatar.
Due to its reduced territorial control and proximity to fewer Israeli communities, Hamas's capacity to threaten Israel would be severely curtailed. Any attempted missile launches would likely be intercepted over Israeli territory or fall within the northern segment of Gaza.
Consequently, while the 'Northern Section' flourishes culturally, economically, and socially, the 'Southern Section' will inevitably remain mired in poverty and misery. Whenever Israel's adversaries attempt to attribute these conditions to Israeli actions, the Jewish State can confidently reiterate its commitment to transforming the entire Gaza Strip into a prosperous entity, akin to Singapore, contingent upon Hamas relinquishing its weapons.
Moreover, as the 'Northern Section' emerges as a beacon of stability, Hamas may find itself compelled to seal the borders to prevent residents of the 'Southern Section' from seeking refuge in the free and prosperous north. This development will constitute a significant political and ideological triumph for Israel, akin to the symbolic victory captured by Western media when documenting East German soldiers shooting civilians attempting to flee the confines of Communist rule.
This proposal presents an additional strategic benefit: Undertaking the full-scale reconstruction and governance of the entire Gaza Strip without reliance on foreign donors who, in exchange, insist on Israel's acceptance of Palestinian Arab statehood, is financially extremely burdensome for the Jewish state. Conversely, focusing efforts on rebuilding and administering a designated section of the Gaza Strip is both financially viable and pragmatic from an economic and diplomatic point of view.
Given the practicality of this plan, there are compelling reasons for the Jewish state to embrace it, as it aligns with long-term strategic objectives and offers a sustainable approach to addressing the complex challenges posed by the Gaza Strip.
Conclusion
Israel's policymakers must embrace innovative and forward-thinking strategies to address the complexities of governing the Gaza Strip. Conventional approaches, such as reverting to pre-Oslo Accords arrangements or restoring Palestinian Authority rule, are prohibitively expensive and, above all, dangerous.
Instead, by contrasting Israeli freedom with Hamas despotism, the Jewish State can foster a new generation of Palestinian Arabs committed to dialogue and reconciliation, ultimately paving the way for genuine peace and stability in the region.
Rafael Castro is an independent political analyst. A graduate of Yale and Hebrew University, Rafael is a Noahide by choice, and can be reached at [email protected].