Hamas invasion of Israel
Hamas invasion of IsraelYousef Mohammed

Kan News reports that information that dozens of Israeli SIM cards had been activated before the Hamas invasion reached the commander of the IDF Southern Command in the last hours of October 6th.

The first telephone call about the report took place between the Southern Command intelligence commander and Yaron Finkelman, the general commander, a few hours before midnight. The call was based on information and evidence from the Israel Security Agency (Shin Bet) regarding the SIM cards being activated.

Finkelman canceled his vacation in northern Israel and returned to his command. A few hours later, another intelligence service sent even more suspicious findings. The intelligence officer received the information and reported it to Finkelman immediately.

The IDF stated: "The IDF is currently at war and has not yet begun investigating the events of October 7th. Those investigations will begin in the near future and their findings will be presented to the public."

Earlier reports claimed that Israeli intelligence had identified hundreds of mobile phones connecting to Israeli SIM cards in Gaza a few hours before the invasion.

The information was cleared for publication by Israel's military censor after several weeks of various media outlets requesting clearance.

In the first weeks following the invasion, another report claimed that Chief of Staff Herzi Halevi and other commanding generals held at least two consultations over the course of that night.

The first consultation was in the early hours of the night, following reports of initial indications from the field. It was decided to hold a second consultation later and not to send additional forces to the area.

During the second consultation, it was decided to hold a third consultation in the morning, and that no forces would be sent to the area and the forces present would not be placed on higher alert.

The ISA likewise understood that something was afoot. ISA director Ronen Bar made his way to ISA headquarters that night and remained there until the war broke out.

The ISA and IDF both stated that they had believed that the incident would be a rocket bombardment or extremely limited attempted intrusion rather than a large-scale operation.

A rare joint statement from the organizations said, “Reports that 1,000 Israeli SIM cards were activated simultaneously are false and far from the truth. In point of fact, a set of evidence showed that only a few dozen were activated, all of which had been activated in previous incidents. In light of this, the system was prepared and intelligence and operational actions were carried out.”

“As has been reported previously, on the eve of October 7th, information was received due to which assessments were held and decisions were made. The evidence was based on a number of different tools and techniques, including technological tools, the nature and operation of which cannot be discussed. All the incidents and information available about that night will be investigated by the investigative departments of the ISA and IDF. We must be responsible and careful in publications so that they do not impede operational techniques and capabilities during the war.”