Now that the invitations have been finally answered, the choreography rehearsed and substantive negotiations postponed until after the conference, it is possible to evaluate the pre-Annapolis results. Who won and who lost?


The 2003 Road Map is a performance-based, three-phased plan, beginning with the

Israel acquiesced to de facto exempt them from ending terror and incitement.

dismantlement of the Palestinian terrorist infrastructure and the freeze of all Israeli settlement activity (Phase I), and culminating with the convening of an international conference to launch negotiations for a permanent Israeli-Palestinian agreement, to include borders, Jerusalem, refugees and settlements (Phase III). The Palestinians had insisted for a long time on leapfrogging the first two phases.


In the lead-up to Annapolis, Israel acquiesced to de facto exempt them from ending terror and incitement, to unilaterally freeze settlements and to jump-start the Phase III international conference. In addition, and despite the objections of the Israel Defense Forces and security services, it agreed to transfer to the Palestinian Authority 441 convicted terrorists, 25 armored personnel carriers (from Russia ) and two million bullets (from Jordan ). In contrast, PA Chairman Mahmoud Abbas refused to recognize "Israel as a Jewish State," to make any other concession whatsoever, and thus was the clear pre-Annapolis winner.


Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak had been under strong pressure from the US Congress to put an end once and for all, as called for in the 2005 military arrangement between Egypt and Israel, to the virtually unimpeded passage of weapons, explosives and terrorists into Gaza . He managed to score points both by declaring, with the Israeli prime minister at his side, that Egypt and Israel are "cooperating" to end the smuggling, and by publicly supporting the Annapolis conference.


Syria's President Bashar Al-Assad had been isolated by the US and most of Europe for his alliance with Iran, North Korea, Hizbullah, Hamas and jihadists in Iraq, and for the murder of Lebanese politicians. He benefited from an official invitation to the conference and from the recognition that an Israeli withdrawal from the Golan is part of the international agenda.


Hamas and allied terrorist organizations were awarded additional time to strengthen themselves militarily and to go on bombing the Negev at will.


In the Israeli political arena, Defense Minister Ehud Barak was the loser and Prime

Hamas and allied terrorist organizations were awarded additional time to strengthen themselves.

Minister Ehud Olmert the winner. Barak, in a complete about-face, was forced to postpone indefinitely the military operations planned for Nablus and Gaza, to accept the prime minister's decision to dismantle "unauthorized outposts" and additional checkpoints in Judea and Samaria, and to support negotiations with Syria. Above all, even if he had really intended to do so, he will not be able to fulfill his election campaign promise to withdraw the Labor party from the coalition government when the final report of the Winograd commission is belatedly issued (most likely next January) - for how can he justify to his fellow Laborites overthrowing the prime minister in the midst of internationally sanctioned negotiations for a "permanent agreement" with the Palestinians?
For the same reason, and following former Prime Minister Ariel Sharon's example, Olmert seems to have bought "insurance" vis-a-vis the media and the judicial system against the never-ending corruption investigations involving him.


But the biggest losers were the residents of Sderot and nearby Jewish communities, who remain at the mercy of Palestinian rockets and mortars; and all those who will experience, once again, that in the Middle East concessions under fire and without reciprocity are a surefire recipe for further aggression.