Recep Tayyip Erdogan
Recep Tayyip ErdoganAFP photo

Does Israel need to worry about Saudi outreach to Turkey?

The recent nuclear deal with Iran is not even a final agreement, but it seems the final week of the negotiations cemented a new reality in the region: a more assertive (if not aggressive) Saudi Arabian military policy, American re-emergence in the war against ISIS, and a more anti-Iranian stance from Turkey. What this all means for Israel strategically is not yet clear.

The Turks have a number of other interests, mainly economic. With that in mind, it is not yet clear that Turkey would become a full partner with Saudi Arabia in anti-Iran strategy says Gallia Lindenstrauss of the Institute for National Security Studies (INSS).

“It has already been remarkable that in relation to Saudi intervention in Yemen, Erdogan issued such a harsh statement against Iran saying that Iran’s attempts at regional dominance are intolerable. However, I think this is a temporary rift.”

“It will be very intriguing to see if Erdogan’s planned visit to Tehran on the 7th will go as planned and how it will develop.”

According to Lindenstrauss and Yoel Gruzansky (also of INSS) in their recent discussion of the Saudi war effort, they thought that the prospect of bringing Turkey totally on board would be extremely difficult for a particular reason.

“Indeed, in light of the good relations between Egypt and Saudi Arabia, it is clear that Turkey’s tough stance toward Egypt is the weak point in the Sunni alliance that the Saudis are trying to create.”

“Are you kidding me?” Erdogan said to a journalist who asked him if he was planning to meet with el-Sisi during his visit in Riyadh. However, Erdogan also noted that Saudi Arabia wanted Turkey to reconcile with Egypt and that this issue was, in effect “the only disagreement” between the two countries. At the same time, he added, “of course they want this, but there is no insistence.”

Turkey has had extraordinary difficulty gaining a leadership role in the Middle East. It seemed that their turn away from Israel in 2009 and toward Syria was an attempt to wield influence over two strong, yet smaller countries in the region. Since then, Turkey’s relationship with both countries has worsened. Egypt was tacked onto the list. Iranian support for Syria has made the relationship with Tehran complicated to boot.

“Turkey and Iran have in the past found ways to bypass differences between them and at least in the economic realm, enjoy mutually beneficial relations. Turkey probably also has a lot to gain once the sanctions on Iran are removed. “

That makes going ‘all in’ as it were on a Saudi-led bloc specifically targeting Iran’s influence in the Middle East incredibly difficult. Erdogan’s country still makes very pragmatic economic decisions. The best example of this is Turkey’s close relationship with the semi-autonomous Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) in northern Iraq. By all accounts, the Turks have many reasons to give that government the cold shoulder in order to discourage Kurdish calls for autonomy in Turkey itself, but Kurdish oil has changed that calculus.

Last month, Gabriel Mitchell of Mitvim told Arutz Sheva, “Even if the Persian Gulf states want Turkey on their side (against Iran), Turkey will remain a bit independent," he said.

But if the Saudis do break that paradigm, would it be worth it for Saudi Arabia to reduce its ties with Israel just to bring Turkey on board? Would Turkey have to soften its own stance against the Israelis if it were cooperating more with the Saudis?

Lindenstrauss feels that the relationship between Jerusalem and Riyadh, already out of the public eye, is not going to be threatened if Erdogan surprises and moves closer to the Saudis.

“I don’t think Saudi Arabia needs to currently reduce its ties with Israel (which are anyhow below the radar) to bring Turkey on board. On the contrary, the current improvement in Saudi-Turkish relations results from occurrences Israel has no or at least very little influence on.”

That being said, she does acknowledge there is worry in some Israeli security corners that things could change in the future.

There are rumors that the new Saudi king is willing to take an easier stance on the Muslim Brotherhood and its Palestinian affiliate, Hamas. That would complicate things for Hamas in the long run, but in the short term it means trying to pry Hamas away from Iran.

“The worry is more abstract that in getting closer to Turkey (and also because of Saudi attempt to improve relations with Hamas) the Saudis will also get more critical on Israel since they will be influenced more by the views of these two actors.”