The time is long overdue for those supporters of Israel who desperately wanted to believe that Ariel Sharon represents the nationalist camp to soberly reassess the situation and admit that we were wrong. It is time to acknowledge that behind the image of the "hard-line hawk" hides someone who only aligned himself with the nationalist camp because it gave him the most direct route to the reins of power.
The memorable image of Sharon from the time of the Yom Kippur War, with his head bandaged, has prevented us from seeing that he does not belong to the nationalist camp, because he lacks a nationalist ideology. We mistook his aggressiveness, ruthlessness and indefatigable energy in dealing with enemies of the Jewish state for his beliefs. We did not want to think that he could turn all these traits against his former allies, if he perceives them to be a stumbling block on the road toward his goals.
Not all, however, have been blind. Symbolically, two voices spoke up in unison, from two opposite camps, pointing out that everything that Sharon does, he does first and foremost for the sake of his own advancement. The first of these is Psychologist Vadim Rotenberg, MD, PhD who wrote an article titled "Ariel Sharon - a Simple and Boring Story":
"I assert that the main theme of Sharon's behavior at all phases of his carrier was the achievement of success and self-affirmation. Ideological concerns were never determinative for him, in contrast, for example, to Menachem Begin. Begin could make mistakes, but these mistakes were caused by his comprehension of the situation, and the motivation for him in all cases was not his personal success, but always the success of the cause he represented. From this perspective Sharon is the complete opposite to Begin. When Sharon was fighting terror... it was good for his society and facilitated Sharon's success as well. However, because it was good for Israel, by no means does this imply that Sharon's interest in his own success did not play an important, and even pivotal role. In this case, there was simply no conflict between the interests of the individual and of society."
For many years, Sharon's interests coincided with the interests of the Jewish state. The crossing of the Suez Canal during the Yom Kippur War, the promotion of settlements in Judea, Samaria and Gaza, and especially the War in Lebanon (when, with the help of the leftist press, Sharon was transformed, as Rotenberg puts it, "into a hero and a martyr of the Right camp") convinced us that all the pieces of the puzzle had fallen into place - Sharon became seen as a politician of the nationalist camp.
However, when Sharon became prime minister he "found himself at the epicenter of the battle between the 'right' and the 'left' camps" and the puzzle fell apart. According to Rotenberg, Sharon, lacking ideological motives, calculated that it would best serve his interests if he aligned himself with the leftist camp. Thus, he became the protector of Israeli leftist politicians guilty of shoving the Oslo accords onto Israel, and this immediately calmed the attacks on him from the leftist Israeli media. At the same time, the right-wing was competing in trying to figure out what secret motives were driving Sharon's obviously not-right-oriented politics, while not seriously considering an alternate candidate as their leader.
The conclusion that Rotenberg derived from analyzing Sharon's behavior was the same conclusion at which the leftist Israeli journalist Uzi Benziman arrived, in his controversial biography of Sharon, Sharon, an Israeli Caesar, published in 1985. Several episodes from Sharon's life documented in the book are extremely revealing in proving that Sharon not only lacks a nationalist ideology, but that he is a foreign element in the Likud.
It is a well-known fact that Sharon was the driving force behind the creation of the Likud. His ceaseless energy brought together several right-oriented parties into a new political organization. However, our memory conveniently forgets that this happened only because the Labor party rejected Sharon. As Benziman puts it, "The Labor party government apparently had little respect for his skills as a military leader and, therefore, was easily willing to see him leave the army. His [Sharon's] political goal was to remove this government."
In spite of the fact that Sharon received a Revisionist education at home, he was a full member of the Labor movement from his youth. Thus, it is not his views or ideology that caused Sharon to side with the nationalist camp, but his desire to gain power. His decision to forge an alliance of right-wing parties was a calculated one, and was based on his good understanding of Israeli politics. "He read the political map of the country well and understood that the people were looking for a serious alternative to Labor," writes Benziman.
It is interesting to note that when Sharon started negotiations with Begin, the latter suggested that he join the Liberal Party, and not his own Herut party. Since both parties were elements of the main opposition party, Gahal, Sharon followed Begin's advice. He was not concerned with differences between the parties. How prophetic seems the episode described by Benziman, in which Elimelech Rimalt, an elder statesman, presented Sharon with his membership card. Rimalt "emphasized that the membership card was not simply a piece of paper, but a symbol of one's loyalty to a particular political philosophy."
Political philosophy? At that time Sharon knew only one type of philosophy - that of a military commander. This philosophy was dictated by a superior officer, and in accordance with it, the higher the military rank of a commander, the more people followed his philosophy. Therefore, responding to Rimalt, Sharon said that he would continue to work toward the creation of a major political party that would "transform the country." As Sharon saw it, if the Likud were to become a major party, everybody would follow its philosophy.
Although the Likud gained 38 seats in the Knesset, the election results "disappointed Sharon as his dream of converting the Likud into a potent political force capable of removing the Labor Alignment from power remained unfulfilled." Though he was elected to the Knesset, his whole nature rebelled against the boring routine of political life. He was "soon discovered to be an impatient politician, who held his colleagues in the parliament and in his party in complete contempt."
Disappointed by the slow pace of the democratic governing process, Sharon began looking for a way of returning to the army. Soon after Yitzchak Rabin was elected prime minister, Sharon resumed his attempts to become the Chief of Staff of the Israeli army by exploiting the deteriorated relationship between Rabin and Shimon Peres. In June 1975, he was appointed as a special advisor to the prime minister. Although this meant that he would need to support the Labor party, for him, this was not a big problem. He "explained his willingness to cross party lines by referring to the severe defense situation and the dangers which the country faced. In practice, however, Sharon's only motivation was his personal ambition to become Chief of the General Staff."
The next two sentences from Benzman's narrative are important in understanding Sharon's ideology, or, to be more precise, lack thereof: "Sharon had long since become tired with his political activity in the Likud and he faced no particular ideological or moral problems in supporting and contributing to a government that he had so vociferously opposed until recently. Indeed, from the moment he received his appointment [in the Labor government], he stopped all criticism."
Eight months later, after realizing that he could not play any significant role in Rabin's government, Sharon resigned from his post and started scheming inside the Likud, trying to convince its separate constituent parties that he and not Begin should be at the top of the Likud's list. When his attempts to usurp Begin's leadership failed, Sharon decided to cut his relations with the Likud and to establish his own political party.
[Part 1 of 3]
The memorable image of Sharon from the time of the Yom Kippur War, with his head bandaged, has prevented us from seeing that he does not belong to the nationalist camp, because he lacks a nationalist ideology. We mistook his aggressiveness, ruthlessness and indefatigable energy in dealing with enemies of the Jewish state for his beliefs. We did not want to think that he could turn all these traits against his former allies, if he perceives them to be a stumbling block on the road toward his goals.
Not all, however, have been blind. Symbolically, two voices spoke up in unison, from two opposite camps, pointing out that everything that Sharon does, he does first and foremost for the sake of his own advancement. The first of these is Psychologist Vadim Rotenberg, MD, PhD who wrote an article titled "Ariel Sharon - a Simple and Boring Story":
"I assert that the main theme of Sharon's behavior at all phases of his carrier was the achievement of success and self-affirmation. Ideological concerns were never determinative for him, in contrast, for example, to Menachem Begin. Begin could make mistakes, but these mistakes were caused by his comprehension of the situation, and the motivation for him in all cases was not his personal success, but always the success of the cause he represented. From this perspective Sharon is the complete opposite to Begin. When Sharon was fighting terror... it was good for his society and facilitated Sharon's success as well. However, because it was good for Israel, by no means does this imply that Sharon's interest in his own success did not play an important, and even pivotal role. In this case, there was simply no conflict between the interests of the individual and of society."
For many years, Sharon's interests coincided with the interests of the Jewish state. The crossing of the Suez Canal during the Yom Kippur War, the promotion of settlements in Judea, Samaria and Gaza, and especially the War in Lebanon (when, with the help of the leftist press, Sharon was transformed, as Rotenberg puts it, "into a hero and a martyr of the Right camp") convinced us that all the pieces of the puzzle had fallen into place - Sharon became seen as a politician of the nationalist camp.
However, when Sharon became prime minister he "found himself at the epicenter of the battle between the 'right' and the 'left' camps" and the puzzle fell apart. According to Rotenberg, Sharon, lacking ideological motives, calculated that it would best serve his interests if he aligned himself with the leftist camp. Thus, he became the protector of Israeli leftist politicians guilty of shoving the Oslo accords onto Israel, and this immediately calmed the attacks on him from the leftist Israeli media. At the same time, the right-wing was competing in trying to figure out what secret motives were driving Sharon's obviously not-right-oriented politics, while not seriously considering an alternate candidate as their leader.
The conclusion that Rotenberg derived from analyzing Sharon's behavior was the same conclusion at which the leftist Israeli journalist Uzi Benziman arrived, in his controversial biography of Sharon, Sharon, an Israeli Caesar, published in 1985. Several episodes from Sharon's life documented in the book are extremely revealing in proving that Sharon not only lacks a nationalist ideology, but that he is a foreign element in the Likud.
It is a well-known fact that Sharon was the driving force behind the creation of the Likud. His ceaseless energy brought together several right-oriented parties into a new political organization. However, our memory conveniently forgets that this happened only because the Labor party rejected Sharon. As Benziman puts it, "The Labor party government apparently had little respect for his skills as a military leader and, therefore, was easily willing to see him leave the army. His [Sharon's] political goal was to remove this government."
In spite of the fact that Sharon received a Revisionist education at home, he was a full member of the Labor movement from his youth. Thus, it is not his views or ideology that caused Sharon to side with the nationalist camp, but his desire to gain power. His decision to forge an alliance of right-wing parties was a calculated one, and was based on his good understanding of Israeli politics. "He read the political map of the country well and understood that the people were looking for a serious alternative to Labor," writes Benziman.
It is interesting to note that when Sharon started negotiations with Begin, the latter suggested that he join the Liberal Party, and not his own Herut party. Since both parties were elements of the main opposition party, Gahal, Sharon followed Begin's advice. He was not concerned with differences between the parties. How prophetic seems the episode described by Benziman, in which Elimelech Rimalt, an elder statesman, presented Sharon with his membership card. Rimalt "emphasized that the membership card was not simply a piece of paper, but a symbol of one's loyalty to a particular political philosophy."
Political philosophy? At that time Sharon knew only one type of philosophy - that of a military commander. This philosophy was dictated by a superior officer, and in accordance with it, the higher the military rank of a commander, the more people followed his philosophy. Therefore, responding to Rimalt, Sharon said that he would continue to work toward the creation of a major political party that would "transform the country." As Sharon saw it, if the Likud were to become a major party, everybody would follow its philosophy.
Although the Likud gained 38 seats in the Knesset, the election results "disappointed Sharon as his dream of converting the Likud into a potent political force capable of removing the Labor Alignment from power remained unfulfilled." Though he was elected to the Knesset, his whole nature rebelled against the boring routine of political life. He was "soon discovered to be an impatient politician, who held his colleagues in the parliament and in his party in complete contempt."
Disappointed by the slow pace of the democratic governing process, Sharon began looking for a way of returning to the army. Soon after Yitzchak Rabin was elected prime minister, Sharon resumed his attempts to become the Chief of Staff of the Israeli army by exploiting the deteriorated relationship between Rabin and Shimon Peres. In June 1975, he was appointed as a special advisor to the prime minister. Although this meant that he would need to support the Labor party, for him, this was not a big problem. He "explained his willingness to cross party lines by referring to the severe defense situation and the dangers which the country faced. In practice, however, Sharon's only motivation was his personal ambition to become Chief of the General Staff."
The next two sentences from Benzman's narrative are important in understanding Sharon's ideology, or, to be more precise, lack thereof: "Sharon had long since become tired with his political activity in the Likud and he faced no particular ideological or moral problems in supporting and contributing to a government that he had so vociferously opposed until recently. Indeed, from the moment he received his appointment [in the Labor government], he stopped all criticism."
Eight months later, after realizing that he could not play any significant role in Rabin's government, Sharon resigned from his post and started scheming inside the Likud, trying to convince its separate constituent parties that he and not Begin should be at the top of the Likud's list. When his attempts to usurp Begin's leadership failed, Sharon decided to cut his relations with the Likud and to establish his own political party.
[Part 1 of 3]