The Culture of Appeasement

(Israelnationalnews.com) It's better to do nothing than to send Israeli boys to fight for . . . Abu Mazen.  But the culture of appeasement is the real problem.

Once upon a time, a long time ago, there was a young officer named Ehud Barak, who was handed an old construction plan and an impossible order:  Here’s the central terminal building in Entebbe, no local intelligence information, plan a rescue while the government negotiates and procrastinates and tries to buy you time to get ready.  Bright and competent, Barak worked night and day, analyzing the mission and preparing everything. 

As the government of Israel formally agreed to release prisoners in return for hostages, dun-colored transport planes took off.  The first act of the drama about to unfold came about when the first transport plane rolled to the end of the runway at Entebbe, far from the terminal where the hostages were held.  Combat engineers got out, ran to the jet fighters parked there, and blew them up.  When the transports took off barely an hour later there was no Ugandan Air Force to chase them—Barak had thought ahead, and those fighters were the first thing on his lengthy checklist.  I still remember Idi Amin, the dictator of Uganda, shedding crocodile tears on international TV, asking how the Israelis could do this to him, their best friend who only wanted to help.  Uh-huh.

Once upon a time, a long time ago, there were Israeli governments who could tell friend from foe, and military experts who could apply force, sharp, precise and deadly, to achieve national security.

Today Barak has graduated from obeying orders to giving them.  He's professionally competent and morally feckless.  Writing today in Haaretz, Ari Shavit, praises Ehud Barak for preventing an offensive into Gaza and agreeing to a ceasefire.  The main reason for Barak’s restraint, according to Shavit, is the desire to make the Egyptians happy, to preserve their prestige, to ensure them we did everything we could before assaulting Gaza, an operation they are said to dread—overlooking their complicity in arming Hamas and turning them loose on our cities, something Shavit neglected to mention.

Lord Castlereagh, Britain’s famous foreign minister at the time of the Napoleonic wars, is reported to have said that Britain had no permanent friends, just permanent interests.  To all appearances, Israel under its present leadership has no interests to speak of, just false friends it wants to appease.  Abandoning Gilad Shalit to his fate was a nice touch, typical of the amoral crew now governing the state of Israel, a reminder of whom we’re dealing with and why they should be consigned to political perdition as soon as possible.

Actually, I prefer Barak’s ceasefire to the alternative.  Not a week ago in this space I made clear my adamant opposition to the kind of “offensive” the Olmert government is planning, in-and-out, sacrificing Israeli lives to make Abu Mazen, now the puppet king of the Arabs of Judaea and Samaria, the puppet king of Gaza as well.  This strategy, if one can grace it with that name, is sure to fail.  True, the ceasefire means Hamas will get tougher and action against them will eventually cost more.  But it won’t cost as much as continuing the peace charade with Abu Mazen.  If you’re not going to fight to win, there’s no point in fighting for the sake of a few newspaper headlines.  Both the ceasefire with Hamas and the military offensive that is supposedly an alternative to it are aspects of the culture of appeasement that now rules Israeli policy.

It’s better to do nothing than to do any of the things that this twisted government, representative of a twisted culture and a twisted ethic, is contemplating.  But it’s more important to remember that there are options and policies not dreamt of in this government’s philosophy.  It is hard, and wrong, to advocate going to war lightly.  But Israel is threatened by enemies all about, and appeasement, the attempt to avoid fighting, is a sure recipe for disaster. 

I think it would be wise for Israel to use its military strength preemptively to remove neutralize the Hamas regime (in the manner I laid out last week) before a major regional confrontation.  At this juncture it would do Israel’s regional standing no end of good if every nation in the region understood that when Israel is attacked its military response is swift, decisive, and certain.  The best thing we could do to influence Egypt’s attitude to us in a positive way is to make clear that when our citizens are threatened we are very, very dangerous, and that it behooves everyone around us to run for cover.