The Winograd Report will be ignored by the politicians.  The proper public response is to wipe out the parties responsible at the polls, whenever they take place.

How wonderful that Israel's government has prepared in advance for every possible scenario and constructed lines of defense against every possible threat.  No, of course I don't mean the events on the Gaza border last week, which could have a decisive impact on Israel's future, first and foremost on the welfare of the unfortunate residents
The tragedy of the whole Winograd Report affair is that it exists at all. In any other democratic country the new government elected in the aftermath of the war would long be busy executing its public mandate.
of Sderot and the Western Negev, so near to Hamastan and Sinai, so far from the Prime Minister's office in Jerusalem and the Defense Minister's office in Tel Aviv.  Gaza, after all,  proved once more, if proof were needed, that our fearless leaders cannot see much farther than the end of their nose, are devoid of courage or character, and that nothing they say ("Gaza will be blockaded!") needs to be taken seriously.  Or maybe Hamas just took them by surprise while they were busy with more important things:  Neutralizing the anticipated effects of the Winograd Commission's report, to be published today, and ensuring their continuation in office.

The tragedy of the whole Winograd Report affair is that it exists at all.  In any other democratic country with a Parliamentary (rather than Presidential) form of government the publication of the Winograd Report, a year and a half after a lost war, would only rate a minor headline.  The new government elected in the aftermath of the war would long be busy executing its public mandate.  The personalities criticized in the report would have long moved off the public stage, and interest in the report itself would mainly be confined to technocrats and military professionals.

I greatly doubt that the Winograd Report will change much.  The plain fact is that neither Ehud Olmert, Ehud Barak nor Eli Yishai of Shas want to face the public, so the public can go hang as far as they're concerned.  The main onus for the continuation of the Olmert government rests of course on Barak.  Most of the country wants Olmert out, but Barak isn't willing to let this happen until he's sure he can take Olmert's place.  This is now unlikely to occur in the foreseeable future. 

Hamas has just proved that Barak can neither foresee their strategy nor deter them effectively.  This will become increasingly evident to the public at large in the ensuing weeks.  More than ever, the real response to Hamas is a large-scale offensive into Gaza, but this Barak will not initiate.  He may not be competent but he's also not a fool.  He wants a victory not another bloodbath with an uncertain outcome as in Lebanon, and he's not likely to attain anything but a bloodbath under the rules of combat Israel's legal system will dictate to him.  So he will do nothing and, like Olmert, become another failed politician taking refuge in his posh office from the public's ire.

The case of Eli Yishai, the head of Shas, is slightly different.  Yishai too can throw Olmert out of office if he wants.  If asked, "well, why don't you do it!?" he can give an answer that should give pause to any interlocutor:  "And if I do so, will things be any better after elections?"  Binyamin Netanyahu and the Likud are saying all the right things about Gaza and Iran—for now.  The public at large now speaks from Netanyahu's mouth, but will Netanyahu actually do what he says once elected?  One hopes so, but one can at least understand Yishai's unwillingness to gamble on the uncertain possibility that the future will be better.

Nevertheless Yishai's calculus is mistaken.  Even if the Prime Minister who failed in Lebanon were from the Israeli
object of all—protesting company commanders, parents of the fallen, and millions of ordinary Israeli citizens, right or left, religious or secular—should be to wipe out the parties now constituting the Olmert government at the polls. There is a reasonable political alternative for every one of them.
Right—Menahem Begin comes to mind—he would be morally obligated to take the blame and resign (as Begin did).  The issue at stake is not just the government's policy but the integrity of Israel's democracy.  Principle requires that those who fail take responsibility for their failures.

During the Dreyfus affair in France, one of the rallying cries of Dreyfus' supporters was "ecraser l'infame!"—erase the infamy.  From today until the next elections, whenever they take place, this should become the rallying cry of all the groups now calling, in vain, for a change of government.  The object of all—protesting company commanders, parents of the fallen, and millions of ordinary Israeli citizens, right or left, religious or secular—should be to wipe out the parties now constituting the Olmert government at the polls.  There is a reasonable political alternative for every one of them.  Leftists can vote for Meretz or Uzi Dayan.  Rightists and the orthodox have a plethora of choices.  The voters need to send Israeli politicians a message:  There are worse things than submitting to the verdict of the people when the great majority of people demand it.  You might be condemned, not merely to opposition, but to the street outside the Knesset, and for keeps.

A "Reasonable Decision?"

The most remarkable finding of the Winograd Commission is that the government's decision to launch the final ground assault in the concluding 60 hours of the war, sacrificing the lives of 33 soldiers in the process, was "reasonable" even "unavoidable."  This is the political headline today and ensures that Ehud Olmert will remain in power until he makes another mistake Israelis recognize as egregious and unforgivable (such a mistake may materialize in Gaza sooner than anyone suspects).

I find this manner of presenting the decision astounding and substantially incomplete.  In the narrowest of senses the verdict is, strictly speaking, correct.  On the night of August 11 2006, it was clear that the UN was about to adopt a resolution ending the war that was largely unfavorable to Israel.  Moreover, the only way to ensure that those parts of the resolution favorable to Israel--those calling for the establishment of an international force along the border--were implemented depended on the Israeli army siezing the positions where the international force was to be stationed, so it could turn them over to the UN.  Hizbollah clearly wasn't about to cooperate voluntarily.  So yes, given the circumstances, the decision made some diplomatic and military sense.

But to say no more than that is a misrepresentation.  In evaluating the decision to launch the assault, one cannot say that the decision to launch was reasonable under the circumstances without analyzing how Israel got itself entangled in such "circumstances."  After all, the assault was launched in under the worst possible military conditions--under a deadline, when the enemy was totally alert and expecting it and in a position to exact the highest possible price in Israeli lives.  None of this need have happened.

UN Resolution 1701 was the product of the sharp erosion of Israeli prestige by a month of futile fighting.  Israel had many options at the start of the war, but it frittered them away.  By the time the decision to launch the ground assault was taken, Israel had boxed itself into a diplomatic and military trap, in which it had no good options left, only the bad one of launching an assault in the worst conditions and for an objective of doubtful value.  Only in that narrow sense was the decision "reasonable"--in light of the record of failure that had brought Israel to such a pass.

In March 1939, four months after the Munich debacle, Hitler's Germany swallowed what was left of Czechoslovakia.  Only then did the British Prime Minister, Nevile Chamberlain, wake up and realize his country's true situation.  He did a volte-face and extended a British military guarantee to Poland, thereby making war certain.  Of this Winston Churchill writes in his memoirs:  "Here was decision at last, taken at the worst possible moment and on the least satisfactory ground" [The Gathering Storm, p. 347].  Of course Churchill congratulated Chamberlain at the time.  Of course the decision was "reasonable," even "unavoidable" under the circumstances.  But it cannot be seen apart from the folly that created the circumstances.  It was produced by previous failures and did not rectify them.  Neither did the Olmert government's decision to launch the final assault of the Second Lebanon War.