Human Sacrifice

Will the purpose of an offensive into Gaza be to permanently improve Israel's security, or just to provide a show for the newspapers?

Poor Shaul Mofaz.  All he did was shoot his mouth off about attacking Iran for the sake of his political campaign.  He didn’t actually launch F-15s or risk the life of one Israeli soldier (as transportation minister, he’s not in a position to give military orders).  And everybody lands on him for talking too much and sacrificing Israel’s interests to his own personal political ambitions.
Barak, Livni and Olmert have to solve the security problem around Gaza. And at the same time the one thing they cannot afford to do is really solve it.

Now compare Mofaz to Barak, Livni and Olmert.  The latter three (like Mofaz) are in campaign mode now.  All share a common problem:  They have to solve the security problem around Gaza, which now directly threatens a couple hundred thousand Israelis and is sure to get worse.  At the same time, the one thing they cannot do is solve the problem.  Solving it means, at a minimum, permanently taking over about 60% of Gaza, including all the territory of Gush Katif, and placing the rest of Hamastan under close blockade.  They cannot do this because it means kissing goodbye to the supposed justifications for disengagement:  returning Israel to “the quicksand of Gaza” and taking responsibility for the fate of the Arabs there.
 
Perhaps the main reason they cannot solve the Gaza problem is because they face an election.  One would think that a patriotic war is good for somebody running for office.  But in this case it’s just the opposite.  Netanyahu’s speech will be short and to the point (I ain’t seen it, I’m just guessing):  “The Likud applauds the Government of Israel’s operation to restore security to Israel’s citizens in the south.  We’re behind the government all the way.  We just don’t understand what took them so long.  We knew they would have to do this—we told ‘em so, and they now have no choice but to implement the Likud’s policy.  The only thing we’re worried about is whether the government will retreat ignominiously with its tail between its legs when the fighting is over.  If Israel doesn’t want to have to do all this over yet a third time, the
Livni, Olmert and Barak, are contemplating engaging in real, live human sacrifice for the sake of their political ambitions
electorate had better vote Likud on November 11.”  And that’s what the electorate will do.

So what are Livni, Olmert and Mofaz going to do?  They’re going to put on a show.  They will do more of the same.  They will deploy twice as many or four times as many soldiers in Gaza as today and have two to four times as many fire fights with the Hamas, leading to two to four times as many casualties.  They will blow up a few middle-ranking Hamas leaders.  They will call it a big operation to “cut the Hamas down to size” or some such foolishness (the object should be not to cut Hamas down to size but to physically eliminate it).  Of the three, only Barak still retains enough honesty to say that he wants a “middle-scale” operation.  But all three of them simply want to create the impression of doing something.  And while the soldiers are fighting and dying, G-d forbid, they will fill the airwaves about the need for “restraint” and for “leaving an opening for a political resolution” (this is with the Hamas, mind you). Because if the object of the fighting is not to pull punches and let the enemy get up off the floor so as to sign an agreement with him, who needs the likes of Barak, Livni and Olmert?

If they do fight, they'll want to hurt the Hamas—but not defeat it.  They want to soften Hamas’ terms for a long-term cease fire.  And if they accomplish that objective, they will give their blessing to Abu Mazen’s new negotiations with Hamas, and try to conclude that one big, comprehensive peace agreement with a government representing—once again—the Arabs of Judaea, Samaria and Gaza, incidentally leading to the expulsion of 100,000 Israelis from their homes.  I don’t think they will achieve this objective—Hamas is fifty times tougher than they—but that will be the general idea.

Who’s going to be doing the fighting for all this?  Not Olmert’s sons.  They’re in the States, happily and peacefully bringing up their kids (while neglecting to invite Morris Talansky to their bar-mitzvas—one would think that he of all people had earned an invitation).  No, they’re going to send my sons, one a reservist in the artillery, another a reservist in the armored corps.
Nobody feels confident that when Barak or Olmert goes to war they have the best interests of the country at heart, or even know how to achieve it. An army that feels that way will not fight and cannot win. In fact, it may not even show up for the war.

So really, Mofaz has nothing to reproach himself for.  He’s nothing but talk.  The trio who are so down on him for opening his mouth, Livni, Olmert and Barak, are contemplating engaging in real, live human sacrifice for the sake of their political ambitions—sacrifices that will achieve nothing in terms of Israel’s long-term security.

The grim fact is that this leadership and its policies inspire no confidence in ordinary Israelis.  Nobody feels confident that when Barak or Olmert goes to war they have the best interests of the country at heart, or even know how to achieve it.  And an army that feels that way will not fight and cannot win.  In fact, an army that feels that way may not even show up for the war.

I have informed my sons that if for some reason they wind up spending the impending Gaza offensive in Military Prison 6, they won’t lack for brownies and chiffon cake.  One comes back alive from prison.

The Untouchables

There is nothing new with Israel’s law enforcement authorities bending the law when they’re out to get a politician they don’t like.
Israel Needs a Permanent Authority to Investigate the Law Enforcement System's Violations of Ordinary Citizens' Due Process Rights

In testimony yesterday before a special Knesset committee, established to investigate the conduct of the law enforcement establishment in prosecuting former Justice Minister Haim Ramon, the current minister, Daniel Friedmann, complained that the police and the Attorney General were doing everything in their power to protect police officials and prosecutors who violated Ramon’s due-process rights.  Freidmann called for the establishment of an official Commission of Inquiry.  Unlike a Knesset committee, an official Commission of Inquiry can issue subpoenas, force civil servants to testify, and prescribe sanctions for offenders.  As things stand now, the people who violated Ramon’s rights are untouchable.

When Kadima came to power in 2006, Olmert made Haim Ramon Justice Minister.  Ramon had a brief to reform the ministry, which means especially its most powerful bureaucracy, the State Prosecution.  On the eve of the Second Lebanon War Ramon kissed a woman officer stationed in the Prime Minister’s office.  He says she led him on; she charged him with sexual harassment.  Ramon was convicted—but not of felonious conduct.  He’s now a minister again.
Daniel Friedmann testified in bitter tones that all his efforts to force his ministry to discipline the officials who violated due process in their haste to railroad Ramon into jail have failed.

The really curious part had to do with the way police, prosecutors and judges handled the Ramon case.  A senior police officer with a checkered history, Miri Golan, apparently pressured the young woman into filing charges, telling her that otherwise she'd be charged instead.  Police obtained a warrant to tap Ramon’s cellphone, apparently on false pretexts.  A judge issued the warrant without asking the most basic questions as to why the warrant was needed or justified.  Then, the prosecution failed to reveal the content of the wiretaps or even the fact of their existence to Ramon’s lawyers, as required by law; doing so would have revealed that the state went fishing for additional incriminating evidence and found none.  All these facts were confirmed by an independent inquiry performed by retired judge Vardimon Zeiler.  Nothing has been done to those responsible for deliberately or carelessly violating Ramon’s rights.

There is nothing new with Israel’s law enforcement authorities bending the law when they’re out to get a politician they don’t like.  When Binyamin Netanyahu was Prime Minister, Attorney General Michael Ben-Yair, a Rabin appointee, filed trumped-up tax-evasion charges against Netanyahu’s Justice Minister, Yaakov Neeman.  Later on a senior police officer, Moshe Mizrahi, obtained a warrant to wiretape conversations between Netanyahu and Avigdor Lieberman, then (and since) under investigation for corruption.  On the basis of the warrant Mizrahi recorded hours and hours of purely political conversations between the two.  The low-ranking police officer who spilled on Mizrahi, Stanislav Yazhemski, fled to Canada because, he said, he feared Mizrahi’s vengeance.  Eventually Mizrahi was force out, a singular and exceptional development. 

In the Knesset yesterday Daniel Friedmann testified in bitter tones that all his efforts to force his ministry to discipline the officials who violated due process in their haste to railroad Ramon into jail have failed.  Judge Zeiler seconded Friedmann’s call for a Commission of Inquiry, saying (according to Haaretz’ Hebrew edition), “Everyone involved with [the Ramon investigation] agrees terrible things were done.”

In reaction, Haaretz reports current Chief Police Inspector David Cohen as saying, “So every time an internal investigation reaches a conclusion someone doesn’t like, we’re going to appoint a special Commission of Inquiry?”  Cohen referred to the anemic “internal investigation” of the affair by the complaisant Judge Nathan Brener, appointed by Mazuz, who concluded that nothing special needed to be done to any individual.
The fact is that Israel’s police and prosecutors habitually play fast and loose with the due-process and civil rights of citizens, prominent or nameless. In a democracy, nobody should exercise authority without oversight.

Inspector Cohen has a point.  What’s needed is not a special Commission of Inquiry.  The fact is that Israel’s police and prosecutors habitually play fast and loose with the due-process and civil rights of citizens, prominent or nameless.  The judges are careless in exercising their authority to oversee, and hence check, violations of citizens’ rights.  The entire law enforcement establishment acts like one big happy family, claiming to act beyond reproach, in practice devoid of oversight and out of control.

In a democracy, nobody exercises authority without oversight.  What’s really needed is set up a permanent civil rights authority, independent of the police, the courts and the Justice Ministry, with the statutory right to do everything, on a permanent basis, that a one-off Commission of Inquiry can do:  Hold investigations, issue subpoenas, and prescribe sanctions for judges, cops and prosecutors who go off the reservation.  The appropriate place to set up such an authority is within the Office of the State Comptroller, which is already responsible for investigating the way the rest of Israel’s government is administered and is not chummy with the cops, courts and prosecutors. 

Voodoo History

The Left's problem is its inability to understand that people who fight for an objective seriously believe it's worth fighting, killing and dying for.

While researching a paper on “Jewish labor”—the movement to employ Jews in the economy of the pre-State yishuv, now proposed by some as a way to combat the Palestinian erosion of the Zionist enterprise—I read the history of the “Jewish labor” phenomenon published (in Hebrew) thirty years ago by Prof. Anita Shapira of Hebrew University  This book gave me a sudden insight into the post-Zionist mind.
When people have a conflict, it’s because some objective is very important to them. Even when they negotiate, they apply sanctions—“pressure and power”—to make the other side accede to their interests.

This blog is not really about “Jewish Labor” but it’s worth investing a minute to understand the problem, which hasn’t changed in eighty years.  Back in the 1930s urban factory workers were expected to have finished eighth grade or to have a skill, and there was no problem keeping those jobs in Jewish hands.  The problem arose with simple, unskilled, hard physical jobs like fruit-picking or spadework:  Jews didn’t want to do them, and in any case Arabs would do them for less. 

Nonetheless, for some unskilled Jewish workers in the 1920s and early 1930s, agricultural jobs—and an above-market wage for them—were very important.  The interests of Jewish fruit farmers, many of whom were barely breaking even, conflicted with Jewish workers who wanted jobs in the orchards reserved for them.  Sometimes the conflict wasn’t pretty:  Jewish workers would drive Arabs out of the orchards.  The rest of the Yishuv, led by the socialist Labor party, castigated the farmers for pursuing their private interests at the expense of Zionism.  In the end the principle of Jewish labor became accepted throughout the pre-state Yishuv.

Now here is what Prof. Shapira has to say in conclusion: 

"Most of the workers’ movement in the first half of the 1930s did not understand the meaning of a genuine compromise [emphasis added].  For its part, compromise had to be at least a partial victory, the result of pressure and power, and not of discussion [emphasis added]. [Futile Victory, “Conclusion,” p. 349]."

I had to read this twice before I understood it.  When people have a conflict, it’s because some objective is very important to them.  Even when they negotiate, they apply sanctions—“pressure and power”—to make the other side accede to their interests.  The final disposition of the conflict depends on the balance of power between the two sides, and on how important to them their respective objectives were in the first place.  To the degree that each side succeeds in partially realizing its objectives, it will consider that a partial victory.  That was the point of the exercise all along.

But Shapira appears not to be able to accept this simple fact of life.  She is distressed by the very notion of a conflict of interests turning into a conflict in fact.  She is convinced there ought to be a better, nobler way.  Her term for it is hidabrut, discussion.  This is exactly the same term Israeli leftists use when asked for their solution to, say, the genocidal Hamas regime in Gaza.  We ought to sit down and discuss things with them:  “OK, you want us dead.  We wouldn’t like to be dead.  Can’t we come to a meeting of minds?”

The Left refuses to acknowledge the existence of a world in which fighting and killing us is a genuine, clearly articulated objective that other people think it worth sacrificing their lives to achieve.  A world in which hidabrut is futile because it means asking people to give up on what they consider the most important objective in the world, the one that gives their lives meaning.  A world in which it is possible that there is no compromise resolution to our conflict with the
According to the Leftist perspective, this entire point of view is illegitimate. Force applied in the pursuit of an objective is morally wrong, no matter what the objective of the other side is.
 Palestinians because the Palestinians really, truly don't want one.  In which case our wanting one is completely beside the point.  This may indeed be a tragedy, but that doesn’t make it an avoidable one.

According to the Leftist perspective, this entire point of view is illegitimate.  Conflicts aren’t real.  They shouldn’t be expected to govern people’s behavior.  Force applied in the pursuit of an objective is morally wrong, no matter what the objective of the other side is.  The real way to treat any conflict is through hidabrut, a meeting of minds.  People who refuse to accept this are mindless warmongers, and in the wrong by definition. 

Somehow an essential aspect of human relations seems to have escaped Prof. Shapira’s notice.  Her analysis of conflict is Utopian, and seems based upon willful ignorance of an essential aspect of human nature.  Call it voodoo history:  a happy ending will spring into being, detached from anyone’s real interests or determination to realize them.  I doubt she pursues such an attitude in her daily life.  Applied to international relations, this approach is crippling, deadly.  Alas, it also explains a lot about Israeli culture and Israeli foreign policy.