It's better to do nothing than to send Israeli boys to fight for . . . Abu Mazen.  But the culture of appeasement is the real problem.

Once upon a time, a long time ago, there was a young officer named Ehud Barak, who was handed an old construction plan and an impossible order:  Here’s the central terminal building in Entebbe, no local intelligence information, plan a rescue while the government negotiates and procrastinates and tries to buy you time to get ready.  Bright and competent, Barak worked night and day, analyzing the mission and preparing everything. 
Once upon a time, a long time ago, there were Israeli governments who could tell friend from foe, and military experts who could apply force, sharp, precise and deadly, to achieve national security

As the government of Israel formally agreed to release prisoners in return for hostages, dun-colored transport planes took off.  The first act of the drama about to unfold came about when the first transport plane rolled to the end of the runway at Entebbe, far from the terminal where the hostages were held.  Combat engineers got out, ran to the jet fighters parked there, and blew them up.  When the transports took off barely an hour later there was no Ugandan Air Force to chase them—Barak had thought ahead, and those fighters were the first thing on his lengthy checklist.  I still remember Idi Amin, the dictator of Uganda, shedding crocodile tears on international TV, asking how the Israelis could do this to him, their best friend who only wanted to help.  Uh-huh.

Once upon a time, a long time ago, there were Israeli governments who could tell friend from foe, and military experts who could apply force, sharp, precise and deadly, to achieve national security.

Today Barak has graduated from obeying orders to giving them.  He's professionally competent and morally feckless.  Writing today in Haaretz, Ari Shavit, praises Ehud Barak for preventing an offensive into Gaza and agreeing to a ceasefire.  The main reason for Barak’s restraint, according to Shavit, is the desire to make the Egyptians happy, to preserve their prestige, to ensure them we did everything we could before assaulting Gaza, an operation they are said to dread—overlooking their complicity in arming Hamas and turning them loose on our cities, something Shavit neglected to mention.
Both the ceasefire with Hamas and the military offensive that is supposedly an alternative to it are aspects of the culture of appeasement that now rules Israeli policy

Lord Castlereagh, Britain’s famous foreign minister at the time of the Napoleonic wars, is reported to have said that Britain had no permanent friends, just permanent interests.  To all appearances, Israel under its present leadership has no interests to speak of, just false friends it wants to appease.  Abandoning Gilad Shalit to his fate was a nice touch, typical of the amoral crew now governing the state of Israel, a reminder of whom we’re dealing with and why they should be consigned to political perdition as soon as possible.

Actually, I prefer Barak’s ceasefire to the alternative.  Not a week ago in this space I made clear my adamant opposition to the kind of “offensive” the Olmert government is planning, in-and-out, sacrificing Israeli lives to make Abu Mazen, now the puppet king of the Arabs of Judaea and Samaria, the puppet king of Gaza as well.  This strategy, if one can grace it with that name, is sure to fail.  True, the ceasefire means Hamas will get tougher and action against them will eventually cost more.  But it won’t cost as much as continuing the peace charade with Abu Mazen.  If you’re not going to fight to win, there’s no point in fighting for the sake of a few newspaper headlines.  Both the ceasefire with Hamas and the military offensive that is supposedly an alternative to it are aspects of the culture of appeasement that now rules Israeli policy.

It’s better to do nothing than to do any of the things that this twisted government, representative of a twisted
It would do Israel’s regional standing no end of good if every nation in the region understood that when Israel is attacked its military response is swift, decisive, and certain
culture and a twisted ethic, is contemplating.  But it’s more important to remember that there are options and policies not dreamt of in this government’s philosophy.  It is hard, and wrong, to advocate going to war lightly.  But Israel is threatened by enemies all about, and appeasement, the attempt to avoid fighting, is a sure recipe for disaster. 

I think it would be wise for Israel to use its military strength preemptively to remove neutralize the Hamas regime (in the manner I laid out last week) before a major regional confrontation.  At this juncture it would do Israel’s regional standing no end of good if every nation in the region understood that when Israel is attacked its military response is swift, decisive, and certain.  The best thing we could do to influence Egypt’s attitude to us in a positive way is to make clear that when our citizens are threatened we are very, very dangerous, and that it behooves everyone around us to run for cover.

Glad as we will all be to see the back of Olmert, will these election be a reason to celebrate?  I’m not overly optimistic.  And that’s too bad, because there could potentially be plenty of reason for optimism.
The situation in Israel today is very similar to the years after the Yom Kippur War--but in the other direction

The situation in Israel today is very similar to the years after the Yom Kippur War.  That war brought a superficial political change to Israel and a much deeper and more destructive cultural change.  In 1977 Menahem Begin was elected Prime Minister.  He gave back all of Sinai, concluded a cold peace with Egypt, and committed Israel to Palestinian “self-determination.”  He did bomb the Iraqi reactor, but overall he turned out to be (with apologies to Yisrael Medad) a very mediocre Prime Minister.

The real change that came over Israel after 1973 was far more serious than Menahem Begin.  The war caused ordinary Israelis to lose faith in the verities of classical Zionism—in effect, to lose their nerve.  Marginal cultural forces took advantage of the opportunity, took over academia, the courts, and the press, and made Israel post-Zionist.  Israel became something Israelis were ashamed of.  Judaism and Eretz Yisrael became anathema.  Peace became a new religion.  That it wasn’t working and could not work made no difference—a demoralized and confused people tried to make it work, again and again.

The situation in Israel today is similar, but in the other direction.  Poll after poll shows that the people no longer believe in peace.  They want it, but don’t think they can get it.  They are skeptical about everything—the courts, the government, the media, the army.  They have lost faith in everything that went before.  What are they going to believe in now?
Israel needs a political force that can challenge the conventional wisdom. Challenging the conventional wisdom does not mean preaching to Orthodox Jews. They’re already converted.

This is an issue much deeper than the upcoming election.  Netanyahu, of course, will be the next Prime Minister, and he’s heaps better than either of the two alternatives, Barak or Livni.  But just as Israelis get ready for a (nonviolent) revolution, Netanyahu has become very conservative.  He probably won’t lead the people on crazy diplomatic adventures, which is good (and he may do something decisive about Iran).  Like Barak, however, he has positioned himself as the protector of the judicial mafia, figuring it’s better to have them with him than against him.  In short, he’s preparing to fight the last election he lost, in 1999.  He’ll win, but this is 2008.

Israel needs a political force that can challenge the conventional wisdom.  Challenging the conventional wisdom does not mean preaching to Orthodox Jews.  They’re already converted.  It means telling ordinary, secular and traditional Jews in the center of the political spectrum that there’s a new agenda—the Jewish state is under threat, from within and without, and Israel needs to jettison its current political establishment and policies and get new ones in order to survive.  Many people who voted for Kadima last time would be prepared to vote for such a platform today.  In short, one needs a leadership that emerges from the “camp of the faithful” but appeals to the center of the political spectrum, a leadership capable of appropriating votes that Likud, Lieberman and Livni properly consider their own.  Unfortunately, no such leadership is in view.

There are two places such leadership could emerge.  One is within the Likud, where efforts are underway to recreate a political “camp” committed to a new agenda.  The advantage of such a grouping within the Likud is that Netanyahu can’t leave them out of his government because they are built in to his party. 
Let’s hope that bold and forward-looking politicians step forward to change the Israel’s political map before the people go to the polls on November 11.

The other is outside the Likud.  The people most tuned in to such a message are Aryeh Eldad and Ephraim Eitam.  Note that one is Orthodox and the other is not, which is just right.  Unfortunately, these two are caught up in an attempt to have their cake and eat it too—to reform the rest of their National Union party and make it embrace primaries and a new agenda.  They can’t decide whether to base themselves on the old Orthodox constituency—which to my thinking would be entirely useless—or make an independent attempt to capture traditionally “center” voters for a new agenda, which would be an extremely risky political strategy—the only one, however, which has any point.

Let’s hope that bold and forward-looking politicians step forward to change the Israel’s political map before the people go to the polls on November 11.

Will the purpose of an offensive into Gaza be to permanently improve Israel's security, or just to provide a show for the newspapers?

Poor Shaul Mofaz.  All he did was shoot his mouth off about attacking Iran for the sake of his political campaign.  He didn’t actually launch F-15s or risk the life of one Israeli soldier (as transportation minister, he’s not in a position to give military orders).  And everybody lands on him for talking too much and sacrificing Israel’s interests to his own personal political ambitions.
Barak, Livni and Olmert have to solve the security problem around Gaza. And at the same time the one thing they cannot afford to do is really solve it.

Now compare Mofaz to Barak, Livni and Olmert.  The latter three (like Mofaz) are in campaign mode now.  All share a common problem:  They have to solve the security problem around Gaza, which now directly threatens a couple hundred thousand Israelis and is sure to get worse.  At the same time, the one thing they cannot do is solve the problem.  Solving it means, at a minimum, permanently taking over about 60% of Gaza, including all the territory of Gush Katif, and placing the rest of Hamastan under close blockade.  They cannot do this because it means kissing goodbye to the supposed justifications for disengagement:  returning Israel to “the quicksand of Gaza” and taking responsibility for the fate of the Arabs there.
 
Perhaps the main reason they cannot solve the Gaza problem is because they face an election.  One would think that a patriotic war is good for somebody running for office.  But in this case it’s just the opposite.  Netanyahu’s speech will be short and to the point (I ain’t seen it, I’m just guessing):  “The Likud applauds the Government of Israel’s operation to restore security to Israel’s citizens in the south.  We’re behind the government all the way.  We just don’t understand what took them so long.  We knew they would have to do this—we told ‘em so, and they now have no choice but to implement the Likud’s policy.  The only thing we’re worried about is whether the government will retreat ignominiously with its tail between its legs when the fighting is over.  If Israel doesn’t want to have to do all this over yet a third time, the
Livni, Olmert and Barak, are contemplating engaging in real, live human sacrifice for the sake of their political ambitions
electorate had better vote Likud on November 11.”  And that’s what the electorate will do.

So what are Livni, Olmert and Mofaz going to do?  They’re going to put on a show.  They will do more of the same.  They will deploy twice as many or four times as many soldiers in Gaza as today and have two to four times as many fire fights with the Hamas, leading to two to four times as many casualties.  They will blow up a few middle-ranking Hamas leaders.  They will call it a big operation to “cut the Hamas down to size” or some such foolishness (the object should be not to cut Hamas down to size but to physically eliminate it).  Of the three, only Barak still retains enough honesty to say that he wants a “middle-scale” operation.  But all three of them simply want to create the impression of doing something.  And while the soldiers are fighting and dying, G-d forbid, they will fill the airwaves about the need for “restraint” and for “leaving an opening for a political resolution” (this is with the Hamas, mind you). Because if the object of the fighting is not to pull punches and let the enemy get up off the floor so as to sign an agreement with him, who needs the likes of Barak, Livni and Olmert?

If they do fight, they'll want to hurt the Hamas—but not defeat it.  They want to soften Hamas’ terms for a long-term cease fire.  And if they accomplish that objective, they will give their blessing to Abu Mazen’s new negotiations with Hamas, and try to conclude that one big, comprehensive peace agreement with a government representing—once again—the Arabs of Judaea, Samaria and Gaza, incidentally leading to the expulsion of 100,000 Israelis from their homes.  I don’t think they will achieve this objective—Hamas is fifty times tougher than they—but that will be the general idea.

Who’s going to be doing the fighting for all this?  Not Olmert’s sons.  They’re in the States, happily and peacefully bringing up their kids (while neglecting to invite Morris Talansky to their bar-mitzvas—one would think that he of all people had earned an invitation).  No, they’re going to send my sons, one a reservist in the artillery, another a reservist in the armored corps.
Nobody feels confident that when Barak or Olmert goes to war they have the best interests of the country at heart, or even know how to achieve it. An army that feels that way will not fight and cannot win. In fact, it may not even show up for the war.

So really, Mofaz has nothing to reproach himself for.  He’s nothing but talk.  The trio who are so down on him for opening his mouth, Livni, Olmert and Barak, are contemplating engaging in real, live human sacrifice for the sake of their political ambitions—sacrifices that will achieve nothing in terms of Israel’s long-term security.

The grim fact is that this leadership and its policies inspire no confidence in ordinary Israelis.  Nobody feels confident that when Barak or Olmert goes to war they have the best interests of the country at heart, or even know how to achieve it.  And an army that feels that way will not fight and cannot win.  In fact, an army that feels that way may not even show up for the war.

I have informed my sons that if for some reason they wind up spending the impending Gaza offensive in Military Prison 6, they won’t lack for brownies and chiffon cake.  One comes back alive from prison.

There is nothing new with Israel’s law enforcement authorities bending the law when they’re out to get a politician they don’t like.
Israel Needs a Permanent Authority to Investigate the Law Enforcement System's Violations of Ordinary Citizens' Due Process Rights

In testimony yesterday before a special Knesset committee, established to investigate the conduct of the law enforcement establishment in prosecuting former Justice Minister Haim Ramon, the current minister, Daniel Friedmann, complained that the police and the Attorney General were doing everything in their power to protect police officials and prosecutors who violated Ramon’s due-process rights.  Freidmann called for the establishment of an official Commission of Inquiry.  Unlike a Knesset committee, an official Commission of Inquiry can issue subpoenas, force civil servants to testify, and prescribe sanctions for offenders.  As things stand now, the people who violated Ramon’s rights are untouchable.

When Kadima came to power in 2006, Olmert made Haim Ramon Justice Minister.  Ramon had a brief to reform the ministry, which means especially its most powerful bureaucracy, the State Prosecution.  On the eve of the Second Lebanon War Ramon kissed a woman officer stationed in the Prime Minister’s office.  He says she led him on; she charged him with sexual harassment.  Ramon was convicted—but not of felonious conduct.  He’s now a minister again.
Daniel Friedmann testified in bitter tones that all his efforts to force his ministry to discipline the officials who violated due process in their haste to railroad Ramon into jail have failed.

The really curious part had to do with the way police, prosecutors and judges handled the Ramon case.  A senior police officer with a checkered history, Miri Golan, apparently pressured the young woman into filing charges, telling her that otherwise she'd be charged instead.  Police obtained a warrant to tap Ramon’s cellphone, apparently on false pretexts.  A judge issued the warrant without asking the most basic questions as to why the warrant was needed or justified.  Then, the prosecution failed to reveal the content of the wiretaps or even the fact of their existence to Ramon’s lawyers, as required by law; doing so would have revealed that the state went fishing for additional incriminating evidence and found none.  All these facts were confirmed by an independent inquiry performed by retired judge Vardimon Zeiler.  Nothing has been done to those responsible for deliberately or carelessly violating Ramon’s rights.

There is nothing new with Israel’s law enforcement authorities bending the law when they’re out to get a politician they don’t like.  When Binyamin Netanyahu was Prime Minister, Attorney General Michael Ben-Yair, a Rabin appointee, filed trumped-up tax-evasion charges against Netanyahu’s Justice Minister, Yaakov Neeman.  Later on a senior police officer, Moshe Mizrahi, obtained a warrant to wiretape conversations between Netanyahu and Avigdor Lieberman, then (and since) under investigation for corruption.  On the basis of the warrant Mizrahi recorded hours and hours of purely political conversations between the two.  The low-ranking police officer who spilled on Mizrahi, Stanislav Yazhemski, fled to Canada because, he said, he feared Mizrahi’s vengeance.  Eventually Mizrahi was force out, a singular and exceptional development. 

In the Knesset yesterday Daniel Friedmann testified in bitter tones that all his efforts to force his ministry to discipline the officials who violated due process in their haste to railroad Ramon into jail have failed.  Judge Zeiler seconded Friedmann’s call for a Commission of Inquiry, saying (according to Haaretz’ Hebrew edition), “Everyone involved with [the Ramon investigation] agrees terrible things were done.”

In reaction, Haaretz reports current Chief Police Inspector David Cohen as saying, “So every time an internal investigation reaches a conclusion someone doesn’t like, we’re going to appoint a special Commission of Inquiry?”  Cohen referred to the anemic “internal investigation” of the affair by the complaisant Judge Nathan Brener, appointed by Mazuz, who concluded that nothing special needed to be done to any individual.
The fact is that Israel’s police and prosecutors habitually play fast and loose with the due-process and civil rights of citizens, prominent or nameless. In a democracy, nobody should exercise authority without oversight.

Inspector Cohen has a point.  What’s needed is not a special Commission of Inquiry.  The fact is that Israel’s police and prosecutors habitually play fast and loose with the due-process and civil rights of citizens, prominent or nameless.  The judges are careless in exercising their authority to oversee, and hence check, violations of citizens’ rights.  The entire law enforcement establishment acts like one big happy family, claiming to act beyond reproach, in practice devoid of oversight and out of control.

In a democracy, nobody exercises authority without oversight.  What’s really needed is set up a permanent civil rights authority, independent of the police, the courts and the Justice Ministry, with the statutory right to do everything, on a permanent basis, that a one-off Commission of Inquiry can do:  Hold investigations, issue subpoenas, and prescribe sanctions for judges, cops and prosecutors who go off the reservation.  The appropriate place to set up such an authority is within the Office of the State Comptroller, which is already responsible for investigating the way the rest of Israel’s government is administered and is not chummy with the cops, courts and prosecutors.