Military Intelligence

The IDF, Israel's army, is in a bad way.  True, most of its units are far better trained today than sixteen months ago, on the eve of Israel's abortive war in Lebanon.  But it has a serious manpower problem.
The IDF, Israel's army, is in a bad way.
  Peace, it seems, is not around the corner, and the IDF has to plan for simultaneous fighting in Lebanon, Gaza, and the Golan Heights.  40% of Israeli males of draft age either dodge the draft or get thrown out in the middle of their stint, and there isn't enough manpower to go around.  The problem would be less severe if the IDF had a large body of trained reservists to draw upon, as it's supposed to, but up to a year and a half ago the assumption was that peace was indeed around the corner, and the IDF let reserve training slide.  Fixing this will take years.

That's far from the worst of it.  The IDF depends on thousands of young, relatively low-ranking officers to do immensely responsible jobs, anything from leading troops under fire to making sure every man in a division gets his three square meals a day.  About half the IDF's junior officers have left or want to leave.  A source tells me that about 50 critical supply and administrative positions are unfilled because their incumbents have left and there is nobody competent to replace them.

These young officers leave partly because civilian jobs pay more, but the chief factor seems to be lack of confidence in their top leadership—the score or two of top generals who actually run the army.  They don't want to serve leaders who don't inspire and whose incompetence may waste lives.

So the IDF's problem is not just numbers.  It needs motivated, dedicated, intelligent soldiers at all levels, from the top down.

As it is, there is a source of such soldiers.  Young men from the national-religious community traditionally are highly motivated to serve.  About 40% of the latest batch of newly minted officers, and 50% of those slated for combat command, wear knitted kippot.  Among the brightest are those who go to pre-military academies (mechinot) and hesder yeshivot, which combine military service with Torah study.

These soldiers represent a problem, however.  The problem is that they are not mindless automatons. (Wait, we thought that was what the IDF needed!)  They have values and convictions, and view service in the IDF as part of the larger skein of values that govern their lives.

One of these values is that one does not throw a Jew out of his home.  Some months ago several of these soldiers were ordered to help expel Jews from their homes in Hebron.  Six of them refused orders and were sent to jail.  A busload of the rest were sent to Hebron.  They stayed on the bus, and a military policeman sent to get them off was expelled from the bus at high velocity (fortunately the bus was parked at the time).
Ashkenazi and Stern seem to have a problem with real, live soldiers, whose code of values don't fit into their neat categories of good and bad.

Another value is modesty with respect to the opposite sex.  This modesty is impossible to maintain where men and women train together in combat exercises, which is an experiment the IDF has been attempting in recent years.

These values have raised the dudgeon of senior IDF commanders, specifically the Chief of Staff, Gabi Ashkenazi, and the head of the IDF's manpower division, Gen. Elazar Stern.  These officers maintain there is no place for private convictions in the IDF—except of course when those convictions raise a soldier's motivation to serve and make him a better soldier.  Ashkenazi and Stern seem to have a problem with real, live soldiers, whose code of values don't fit into their neat categories of good and bad. 

Recently Ashkenazi and Stern decided that the solution to the IDF's manpower problem was to draft more women and use them in every possible combat role.  This might solve the problem of quantity—though I doubt it—but it would make the problem of quality far worse.  Mixed-sex combat units in the IDF perform worse than their all-male counterparts, since soldiers find it difficult to concentrate on the mission at hand when their attention is distracted by something else.  Also, the policy bids fair to drive increasing numbers of the IDF's most motivated soldiers out of the service and into jail for refusing orders.

An interesting test case came to light recently, in the IDF's training program for soldiers who will serve in Field Intelligence.  A significant crop of this year's trainees are students from the Yeshivat Har Beracha in Elon Moreh, now doing their military-service stint.  Field Intelligence training includes a lot of nighttime cross-country maneuvers, and many of the instructors are women.

One of the trainees told his commander that it went absolutely against his religious conscience to engage in training of this sort in close contact with a woman.  His commander accepted his argument and declined to punish him for refusing orders.  The rest of the soldier's yeshiva colleagues hastened to make the same complaint.  Result:  No women instructors will be assigned to this unit.  In three months these soldiers will finish their training and begin to make life very difficult for terrorists in Hebron, Ramallah, and—who knows?—maybe Gaza and Kuneitra as well.
The IDF ought to get out of the business of expelling Jewish civilians or upholding abstract principles of equality of the sexes at the expense of the combat ability of its field units.

That junior Field Intelligence officer made an intelligent decision (remember, the IDF desperately needs officers capable of intelligent decisionmaking).  His unit needs motivated soldiers and that's what interests him.  He isn't about to make a stink over his men's private conscience and whether their convictions fits some abstract notion of obedience.  He wants his men to fight hard and serve him enthusiastically, not with reservations and lack of motivation.

What the IDF needs now is not to fight ideological battles with its best soldiers over whether their conscience suits some abstract ideal of obedience.  The IDF's mission is to attract and retain quality soldiers who have come to fight the enemy, not turn those very soldiers into the enemy.  The IDF ought to get out of the business of expelling Jewish civilians or upholding abstract principles of equality of the sexes at the expense of the combat ability of its field units.  If its top commanders are incapable of realizing this and emulating the intelligence of their subordinate in Field Intelligence, maybe they should look for something else to do.

Accident Prone

Olmert's skills as a political survivor cannot forever obscure his dismal record as Prime Minister.

Recently a foreign journalist asked me if Olmert's multitude of criminal investigations would lead to his downfall.  I had to tell him that the smart money in Jerusalem was betting they wouldn't.  Even if Olmert is indicted, the letter of the law says he doesn't have to quit until convicted.  One can expect Olmert to hang on to office until led out in handcuffs by the police.  The shame and self-doubt to which ordinary mortals are
The shame and self-doubt to which ordinary mortals are prey, and which are so essential an element of civilized society, seem to have no part in Olmert's makeup.
prey, and which are so essential an element of civilized society, seem to have no part in his makeup.

"So does that mean Olmert is likely to see out the end of his term?" my foreign journalist asked.  "Not necessarily," I replied.  "We're all fascinated today by the question of how long he can hang on in office because he made an immense blunder last summer.  The real question is whether he possesses the judgment required of a Prime Minister. What if he blunders again?"

Olmert's sheer skill at day-to-day survival has won him a reputation for political wizardry that translates into grudging respect.  Boy, he must be smart, people think to themselves, to be so universally despised and yet hang on to office.  In part, Olmert's success lies in getting us to focus on the drama of his continued tenure in office, rather than on how he actually uses the authority vested in him.

Olmert's next blunder seems not far off.  It came about in typical Olmert fashion.  He needed to keep certain people happy:  Condoleeza Rice, who bullies him; Attorney General Menahem Mazuz, a left-wing radical (he favors left-wing draft dodgers but prosecutes right wingers) who will decide whether to indict him; and a few important journalists and intellectuals, who might help shore up his reputation if he subscribes their dreams of withdrawal and peace.  Above all, he had to present himself to the public as doing something.  To accomplish all this he had to commit himself to making Abu Mazen happy.

Trumpeting the prospect of peace, Olmert rushed in where any reasonably prudent angel would fear to tread.  The consensus among Israeli security experts is that Abu Mazen's potential for actually ruling Palestinian society is nil.  Right now he is in effect an Israeli puppet, sustained exclusively by the Israeli bayonets against which he rails.  If Israel were to hand him an independent Palestinian state, Hamas would have his head within a month.
The real question is whether he possesses the judgment required of a Prime Minister. What if he blunders again?"
 

Promising to give up everything, including Jerusalem, Olmert failed to appreciate the adverse political forces he was arousing.  He did not foresee the pressure that would be brought to bear on his coalition partners, Shas and Yisrael Beitenu, and within his own Kadima party.  Yet he rashly gave his word to Condoleeza Rice to deliver, and she is squeezing him to do just that.  The Annapolis conference, if it ever happens, seems likely to end in an Israeli debacle.  Nothing will be achieved, and everybody will be angry at Israel.

Olmert's behavior appears to be based on a shockingly autistic world view:  There are no real issues.  Nothing really matters to anybody but their public image and private perks.  The Prime Minister's office puts at his disposal immense resources to manipulate and satisfy personal ambitions, a kind of city hall writ large.  Surely, with such advantages, this master of brokering and massaging can manage anything?

Alas, no.  For Ehud Olmert's savvy as a politician is matched by his utter incompetence as a statesman.  He appears to have no real comprehension of the large issues he deals with.  He recklessly embraces projects which anyone with the understanding of a child would shun.  He did so last summer, and he did so again this spring with his Abu Mazen peace accord gambit.  He seems to be doing so yet once more with the issue of a
Ehud Olmert's savvy as a politician is matched by his utter incompetence as a statesman.
constitution, declaring on the first day of the Knesset's winter session that he will adopt a constitution that "everyone, I mean everyone, agrees to," this in a country deeply divided about the most fundamental issues. 

True, he did bomb something in Syria, with apparent success, but that was a single, isolated incident, not a major policy issue.  Moreover, in this case, exceptionally, Olmert learned about the issue and made his decision through the filter of professional intelligence and military advisers.  On issues he deals with himself, he gives the impression of being out of his depth, a bush leaguer deposited by serendipity in a place ordinarily reserved for the major leagues.

A master manipulator can make a serious mistake and survive.  Olmert, however, is on his way to acquiring a reputation for being an accident-prone prime minister, always botching the important issues.  That makes him a serious liability to his party and coalition colleagues.  Not to mention the rest of the country.

The Blue Pushke At Stake

A constitutional crisis is shaping up in Israel over a fundamental issue of Jewish nationalism.

I imagine most readers of this blog grew up, as I did, with the little blue JNF pushke as part of their cultural baggage. 
Founded nearly 100 years ago, before the Jews created a state in the Middle East and the post-Zionists hijacked it, the JNF was established in order to buy land in the Eretz Yisrael and hold it in trust for the Jewish people
Founded nearly 100 years ago, before the Jews created a state in the Middle East and the post-Zionists hijacked it, the JNF was established in order to buy land in the Eretz Yisrael, hold it in trust for the Jewish people, and settle Jews upon it.  To this day the JNF controls vast tracts of prime Israeli agricultural land and a significant proportion of the most valuable urban real estate in the country.

The State of Israel was established in 1948 and it, too, controls vast tracts of land.  The policy of the JNF became the policy of the State of Israel:  Public land was supposed to be used for Jewish settlement.  In 1961 the JNF and the Israel Lands Authority signed an agreement:  The Authority would manage the JNF's land as part of a national land policy.  The state committed itself to manage the JNF's land in accordance with the JNF's charter:  JNF land was to be used for Jewish settlement, and never sold, only leased.  After all, the JNF's land didn't belong to the State of Israel.  It was held in trust for the Jews.

In the 1990s the JNF set aside land for what is today the suburban settlement Katzir.  Like all JNF settlements, Katzir was supposed to be Jewish.  An Arab named Ka'adan decided (with the help of lots of well-financed and ideologically motivated friends) to buy a house in Katzir.  He took his case to Israel's Supreme Court, then dominated by the legendary Aharon Barak.  The court ruled that it was illegal for the Israel Lands Authority to enforce the JNF's charter, as it was committed to doing, and to refrain from leasing land to Ka'adan, even though he wasn't a Jew.  Today Ka'adan owns a house in Katzir.  At one blow, ninety years of Zionist policy and a key tenet of Zionism was struck down.  The court also struck a blow for a key principle of post-Zionism:  Jewish nationalism is discri
What Israel's Supreme Court now proposes to mandate is, in my view, a form of judicially sanctioned theft. And it's not theft of the wealthy or privileged, but of generations of Jewish poor, whose hopes and dreams created Zionism and a Jewish state
minatory, if you will . . . racist.  Something we should all be ashamed of.

Barak hedged his Ka'adan decision with caveats, and the equivalent of a judicial smirk.  He wrote that the Ka'adan case was to be regarded as an individual case , not setting a general rule.  He well knew that the principle he was establishing—that Zionist land policy was discriminatory—could not long be confined to a single case.  Arab advocacy groups like Adala and Mussawa took the hint.  They soon mounted a legal challenge against the JNF's charter.  As we write, the JNF is knuckling under:  Under court order, its management is negotiating the surrender of its most valuable urban lands to the state, no longer to be reserved for Jewish settlement.  In return the State of Israel will pay the JNF money.

For four generations, tens of thousands of Jews around the world, in Polish slums and New York sweatshops, put their pennies in the blue pushke to redeem the Land of Israel for the Jewish people.  The JNF's land is held in trust for the Jews.  Selling it—which is what the JNF's management now proposes to do—is illegal under its charter.  What Israel's Supreme Court now proposes to mandate is, in my view, a form of judicially sanctioned theft.  And it's not theft of the wealthy or privileged, but of generations of Jewish poor, whose hopes and dreams, now so basely betrayed, created Zionism and a Jewish state.

Last month an interesting thing happened.  In defiance of the Supreme Court, the Knesset passed, on its first reading, a law meant to write the original JNF charter into Israeli law.  The vote was a landslide, 64-16.

The vote immediately produced judicial murmers offstage.  Israel's Attorney General, Menahem
A constitutional crisis is shaping up in Israel, pitting elected legislators against judges who appoint one another, with a fundamental issue of Jewish nationalism at stake. Who will win?
Mazuz, declared the law unconstitutional.  Israel has no constitution, and never had a law that authorizes the Supreme Court to strike down the Knesset legislation, but Israel's judges have never let trivial matters such as the legality of their own decisions hinder them in the past.

Today, however, things are different.  The prestige of Israel's judiciary has declined precipitously.  It is viewed now as it really is:  insular, inefficient, presumptuous in its grasp for powers the people never granted it, and intellectually unimpressive.  Also, there is a new undercurrent in Israel:  Olmert is still Prime Minister, but among the grassroots Jewish nationalism is making a comeback.  Five years ago, the Knesset would never have defied the Supreme Court.  Today is something else again.

The "JNF Law" still has to be reported out of the Knesset's Economics Committee—which seems a shoo-in—and pass a second and third reading.  A constitutional crisis is shaping up in Israel, pitting elected legislators against judges who appoint one another, with a fundamental issue of Jewish nationalism at stake.  Who will win?