American "support" does not necessarily translate into American protection.
separatist regions indefinitely under their control especially when these regions border major powers with imperialist ambitions.President George Bush recently ordered Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice to Georgia to show what he termed "unwavering support" for the former Soviet republic of Georgia. For the US, however, it was a hollow gesture and, worse, reinforced an established negative pattern of behavior. Over the years, the US has developed a rather poor track record when it comes to honoring its security commitments to its allies. Given the experience of the US abandonment of the Poles after Yalta in 1945, the Hungarians in 1956, the Cubans at the Bay of Pigs in 1962, the South Vietnamese in 1975, the withdrawal from Lebanon after the 1983 Beirut bombings (not to mention Moghadishu in 1993), Saddam Hussein's gassing of the Iraqi Kurds in 1988 after prior assurances to them of US military support, our failure earlier this year to support the then-pro-Western government of Lebanon in its power struggle with Hizbullah, and now the abandonment of Georgia and its democratic "Rose Revolution", it has become increasingly apparent to our central and southern European allies that American "support" does not necessarily translate into American protection. Even the Israelis are becoming somewhat uneasy with American security assurances concerning Iran.
Consider Georgia. For some time, President Bush has expressed his support for the pro-democracy movement in the former Soviet republic of Georgia. He lauded the Rose Revolution that swept Mikheil Saakashvili to power, backed Georgia's bid to enter NATO, and traveled to Tbilisi in 2005 to give his "pledge to the Georgian people that you've got a solid friend in America." In response, the Georgians aligned themselves with the US, sent 2,000 troops to fight in Iraq and Afghanistan beside American forces, and even named a main road in Tbilisi after Bush. At the White House last March, Saakashvili expressed his gratitude to the president for having "really put Georgia firmly on the world's freedom map." Nevertheless, when push came to shove, the American response to the Russian invasion of South Ossetia was rhetoric.
On the other hand, there's something more odious at work here. According to Vladimir Putin, the collapse of the Soviet Union was the greatest disaster of the 20th century. Consequently, Putin's invasion of Georgian territory may have had less to do with concern over Georgia's cozying up to the US and its desire to join NATO, and more to do with his greater neo-imperialist agenda. As one of the last Czars, Alexander III, said (and as Putin has repeated), Russia has only two reliable allies - its army and its artillery.
Putin's main aim has always been to weaken America's position in the Middle East whenever possible, as evidenced by his growing support for Iran and Syria. He is intent on showing the world that Russia is the only significant military power in the region; and in responding as it has to the Russian invasion, the US has proven itself neither able nor willing to dispute that.
When the 58th Russian Army of the North Caucasus Military District rolled into South Ossetia and Abkhazia and effectively annexed 18% of Georgia, Russia saw it as "payback" for years of geopolitical irrelevance, for its loss of global influence and empire, and as a response to Western condemnations of Russian transgressions at home and abroad. As Victor Davis Hanson of the Hoover Institute has noted: "The invasion restores a sense of Russian nationalism and power to its populace without the stink of Stalinism, and is... cloaked as a sort of humanitarian intervention on behalf of beleaguered Ossetians."
Putin maintains that the invasion was aimed at ending the Tbilisi government's "genocide" and "ethnic cleansing" of South Ossetia (of which there is no evidence), but his terminology deliberately echoed US and NATO language during their 1999 bombing campaign against Serbia, which resulted in the independence of Kosovo. Although the analogy is unfair and the circumstances entirely different, Georgia inadvertently provided Russia with the pretext it needed to settle its score with Saakashvili's "betrayal" in establishing close ties with the US. It has also restored Georgia to Russia's sphere of influence.
While the US entanglements in Iraq and Afghanistan have demonstrated the limits of US power in that region, the Kremlin's military successes in Chechnya combined with soaring oil prices have provided Russia with a tremendous economic advantage. With a GDP of $1.2 trillion and money from oil and gas revenues filling its treasury, the Russian military is now flexing its muscle by punishing the Georgians for attacking separatist South Ossetia, for seeking membership in NATO and for forgetting in whose "back yard" Georgia sits.
While Putin may not intend to restore the Soviet Union to its former grandeur through occupation (which would be much too costly and exceptionally difficult), he certainly intends to re-establish Russia's sphere of influence in the former Soviet republics, and the Georgian invasion serves as a warning to others like Poland and the Czech Republic, which are toying with the idea of deploying US missile defense systems on their territories. The weak US reaction to the Russian invasion has not only diminished US standing in southern and central Europe, but arguably as a world power as well. As a friend and ally, Georgia was abandoned to the mercies of the Russian war machine. The other former Soviet republics of Ukraine, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland doubtlessly have taken note of this.
For all intents and purposes, Georgia's Rose Revolution (like Lebanon's Cedar Revolution) is over. By humiliating Georgian President Saakashvili and forcing him to comply with ceasefire terms that leave open the possibility of Russian control over portions of his country, Russia has sent a message that it will neither tolerate hostile regimes in bordering states, nor permit its economic or military hegemony in the region to be challenged. It has also 
Russia has sent a message....
demonstrated its indifference to Western opinion by showing its willingness to use force to prevent any former Soviet republic from joining NATO. Having taken the measure of the moral bankruptcy of the West, Putin realizes that Russia's enormous influence over Tehran combined with Russian control over vast reserves of the world's energy supplies, not to mention its military might and willingness to use it, have given him power and influence not experienced since the days of Soviet Russia.
The fundamental premise that has directed American foreign policy in the region since the demise of the Soviet Union has been that Russia has abandoned its imperialist past and wished to become a full member of the Western family of nations. It is the validity of this premise that must now be addressed by the West if the fledgling democracies of southern and central Europe are to survive.
And there's one thing more. If NATO votes to accept Georgia and the Ukraine as members (as it has Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland), it had best ensure that the alliance fully understands the consequences of "collective security" before its members again sign on the dotted line.