The mitzvah of Sukkah and the definition of Man
The mitzvah of Sukkah and the definition of Man

The Mitzvah that Jews have to dwell in the Sukkah as their permanent abode during the festival of Sukkot greatly reveals to us one of the most complex issues in Jewish law; i.e. the distinction in the nature of a vow between a Neder and a Sh’vuah.  As it is normally understood, a Neder is a prohibition taken upon himself which a person makes about objects in the world which surround him. It is stated in the following manner in the Shulchan Aruch (Code of Jewish Law):

Nedarim cannot apply on anything which is not tangible.  For example, when a person says, “It is prohibited for me to speak with you, to do anything for you, to walk to you, to sleep with you,” that is not a Neder.  And similarly, if he says, “my speech, my action and my walking are prohibited to you, and sleep is prohibited upon me,” that is not a Neder.  .  . . But if he says, “it is prohibited for my mouth to be speaking with you, or my hands to do something for you, or my feet from walking to you, or my eyes to sleep,” that is a complete Neder from the Torah. . . (Yoreh Deah, Laws of Nedarim, 213: 1.)

Thus it is clear that Nedarim can only apply to tangible or physical objects.  And it is also clear that any action or activity is not considered tangible.  Under the definition of activity, examples could be speaking, walking, sleeping, or any activities performed with the hands.  In addition, one could deduce that the category of activities could also include living, or the state of being or existence.  After all, the body is tangible, but the state of being is intangible. What is interesting is that the prime example of a physical object which the Shulchan Aruch uses are parts of one’s body.  It could have just as easily stated, “this chair or this table is prohibited to me” or any other physical object.

A Sh’vuah, however, in contradistinction to a Neder, does apply to all the intangibles stated above. “A Sh’vuah applies to things which are not tangible.  For example, one can swear that he will not sleep or he will not speak.” (Yoreh Deah, Laws of Sh’vuot, 239: 3). 

In his analysis of this law, the Shach introduces a complexity which requires further analysis.  He states, “Even though Nedarim do not apply upon items which are intangible . . . as noted previously in chapter 213, a Sh’vuah applies according to the Torah because the Sh’vuah applies on the body of the person .” (Shach, note 15 on Sh’vuot 239:3).  

This is explained in greater detail in the book Chachmat Adam. 

A Sh’vuah applies both on items which are tangible or are not tangible.  For example, one can make a Sh’vuah that, “I will not sleep, I will not go, not speak” and that is considered a Sh’vuah according to the Torah because the Sh’vuah applies on the person and a person is tangible” (Chachmat Adam, Klal 95b.)

If the Sh’vuah, to be valid, must ultimately also be based upon the tangibility of the person, how do we differentiate between the tangibility required for a Neder and one required for a Sh’vuah?  Is there an underlying principle which explains the difference?

The basis to understand this differentiation is based upon the question of whether one can prohibit himself from fulfilling a mitzvah of the Torah.  The Shulchan Aruch states:

Nedarim apply on an item of a Mitzvah.  For example, if one says, “I prohibit myself from the Sukkah where I dwell or the Lulav that I take,” he is prohibited from dwelling in the Sukkah or taking a Lulav. (Yoreh Deah, Hilchot Nedarim, 115: 1.)

Thus, even in the case of a Mitzvah, when one prohibits himself from the object of the Mitzvah which is tangible, it becomes prohibited to him and the law is not able to force a person to utilize that which is prohibited to him.  

When it comes to performing a Mitzvah, the formulation of a Sh’vuah does not apply when one emphasizes primarily the activity. “Sh’vuah Eina Chala al D’var Mitzvah” A Sh’vuah does not apply to doing a Mitzvah.  (Yoreh Deah, Laws of Shvuot, 239:4.) Despite the Sh’vuah, the person is obligated to fulfill the mitzvah.

The Chachmat Adam emphasizes the reason for this law:

A Sh’vuah (not to do a Mitzvah) does not apply to a Mitzvah stated in the Torah because of the reason which was mentioned above, that since a Sh’vuah is upon the body of the person, he was already sworn at Mt. Sinai (to do the mitzvah) whether he expressed it with the language of a Sh’vuah where he said, “I will not sit in the Sukkah” or whether he said, “the sitting in the Sukkah is prohibited upon me with a Sh’vuah” because both expressions are considered a Sh’vuah. . . (Chachmat Adam, Hilchot Nedarim,  Klal 95:3.)

Thus we see, that even though ultimately both the Neder and the Sh’vuah are based on a tangible foundation - either an external object or the body of the person, a major distinction exists between these tangible items. This distinction must be understood in the following manner:

In the case of a Neder, the body of the person must be regarded as an object.  In the case of a Sh’vuah, the body of the person must regarded as the subject.  The major difference between man as a subject or man as an object is the concept of consciousness or self-consciousness.  Man as an object is no different than any other object or substance.  He is merely a body consisting of a compilation of hands, legs, arms and other body parts. (The parts can be seen as separate objects as well).

Man as a subject primarily consists of consciousness, reason and will.  It is that active will which allows a person to regard himself either as subject or object.

The clearest example of this distinction is expressed in the Mitzvah of dwelling in the Sukkah.  If a man transforms himself into a compilation of body parts, there is no mitzvah upon those parts (or to the compilation as a whole) to dwell in the Sukkah.  A person can thus make them irrelevant to the Mitzvah as he could with any other object.

Man as a subject, however, which is bound by consciousness and memory, does not have the freedom to dispose of his existence or rid himself of his memory.  He has the unique relationship of the combination of body and soul, and thus, once he has accepted upon himself the Sh’vuah at Sinai to obey the Mitzvot, that Sh’vuah applies to his body as well as to his mind.  Thus, he is unable now to renounce it through another Sh’vuah.

This is analogous to the mind-body dichotomy which was stated by Rene’ Descartes in his Meditations.  It is the existence of that dichotomy and the way in which the intangible consciousness relates to the tangible body which expresses the uniqueness of man in this world.

The Mitzvah of Sukkah expresses this uniqueness in the highest form.  It requires the totality of one’s being to be encompassed by the sacred space of the Sukkah.  However, that can only be meaningful if that process is undertaken through consciousness and will.  Without consciousness, there is no commandment on the body as an object to be in the Sukkah. 

This is best expressed by the requirement that one has to sleep in the Sukkah. That can only be a Mitzvah if one consciously decides that he will sleep in the Sukkah.  If his unconscious body is put into a Sukkah, it cannot be the expression of a Mitzvah.

It is thus through the fulfillment of the Mitzvah of dwelling in the Sukkah, we are enabled to understand the distinction between man as subject and man as object, as expressed in the laws of Nedarim and Sh’vuot, in its clearest formulation.